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ABSTRACT
From Martyrs to Mothers to Chicks in Choos: The Medieval Female Body
and American Women’s Popular Literature
by
Gina M. Sully
Dr. Joseph McCullough, Dissertation Committee Chair
Distinguished Professor of English
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Placing the generic conventions of medieval hagiography, Nina Baym’s insights
about nineteenth-century American sentimental fiction’s overplot, and contemporary
American women’s popular literature into tension illuminates some important
commonalities. First, biographers of the medieval virgin saints and authors of
contemporary American women’s popular literature deploy the same overplot that Baym
identifies as characteristic of American women’s nineteenth-century popular fiction.
Second, in order to define feminine virtue and establish the virtue of their protagonists,
nineteenth-century and post-millennial American women writers rework the contrastive
tropes by which hagiographers establish their heroines’ virtue. Third, struggles for
ascendance in the domestic realm gesture toward its inherently political functions.
Fourth, contemporary American women’s popular literature presupposes and reproduces
a medieval configuration of the female body as a site for narrative and political conflict
and locates women’s work in a hybrid domestic-work space. Finally, the literary
reconfiguration of the workspace undoes the public-private distinction on which theories
of democratic liberalism rely to construct male citizenship.
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For Joel,
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CHAPTER ONE
CRITICAL FRAMES AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
Situating Myself
When I was a child, my grandmother bought me a little book made of envelopes.
Labeled chronologically to indicate the school grade it was intended for, each six-byeight-inch envelope could hold memorabilia and ephemera from that school year.
Although my mother continued for a time to put my report cards and ribbons from
corsages in the envelopes, after my kindergarten year at All Saints Catholic School, I
myself filled in the spaces designated on the outside of the envelopes for the names of
special or new friends, teachers, favorite subjects, and desired life path. In kindergarten, I
wanted to be a mommy. In first and second grades, I wanted to be a nun, like my
teachers. In third grade, I wanted to be a teacher and spent much of my play time reading
to dolls and teaching them the alphabet and the basics of mathematics. In fourth grade,
though, Sister Alexia read saints’ biographies aloud to us. That year, in the blank labeled
“When I Grow Up,” I wrote Virgin Martyr.
I’m not sure that I knew what virgin meant back then, but I understood what
martyr meant, and I knew what virgin martyrs did: They refused to marry the men who
found them beautiful and irresistible, the men in whom their beauty aroused a disgusting
(but disturbingly fascinating to me) lust. They stood up to their fathers and the pagan men
who abused them, and they retained their purity (whatever that was) in the face of
tortures so vile that Sister Alexia skipped those parts. Like the Sisters of Mercy who
taught me, the virgin martyrs married Christ and remained faithful to him. That summer,
having earned an adult library card by reading one hundred books in four months, I

1

devoured English translations of saints’ biographies. I read biographies of Polish and
Russian saints, French and Italian saints, Irish and German saints, English and American1
saints. I read accounts of the lives of male and female saints, transvestite saints, and
reformed-prostitute saints. But the biographies of the medieval virgin saints captured me
as none of the others did. Thrilling to the idea of retaining my faith in the face of tortures
so depraved they had to be elided by my biographer, I longed for the same kinds of tests
Saints Agnes, Lucy, and Bridget had transcended. I longed to be as worthy of Jesus’ love
as they had been. By the next school year, of course, my interests and my goals had
changed, but those texts were my introduction to the kind of unruly, ambiguously defiant
heroines I continue to find myself most attracted to as a reader, heroines who cannot “just
go shopping or get [their] hair done like a normal girl” (Springer, Killer 202).
When I re-encountered the virgin saints’ biographies during my undergraduate
education, I grumbled, disappointed that we wouldn’t be reading other English-language
literature from the period. However, those hagiographical texts haunted my scholarly
writing in graduate school and inspired papers and articles about literary forms and
genres as seemingly unconnected as formulaic contemporary romance and the literature
of the American Renaissance. Nonetheless continuing to focus primary research on
American domestic humor, I planned to use my dissertation to explore the ways male and
female authors constructed narrative personae in American domestic humor written
between the World Wars.2 Then, during my final class as a PhD student, I read Nina
Baym’s Women’s Fiction. I was thunderstruck. The “overplot” Baym identified in U.S.
women’s domestic fiction written between 1820 and 1870 was virtually identical to one
I’d identified virgin saints’ biographies and Samuel Richardson’s Pamela as sharing: A
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“young girl” is separated from the social supports on which she had “rightly or wrongly”
depended to sustain her throughout life and is faced with the necessity of winning her
own way in the world. . . . The happy marriages with which most—though not all—of
this fiction concludes are symbols of the successful accomplishment of the required task
and successful resolution of the basic problems raised in the story, which is in most
primitive terms the story of the formation and assertion of a feminine ego. (Baym,
Women’s Fiction 11)
According to Baym’s taxonomy, heroines are either flawed or unflawed (36).
Obstacles, perhaps including the need to earn a living, enable unflawed heroines to
discover within themselves the “intelligence, will, resourcefulness, and courage sufficient
to overcome them” (23). Flawed heroines must develop all or some of these qualities in
order to overcome impediments to the formation of a coherent and intelligible adult
female identity, which is, Baym says, their “real goal” (17). With the exception of the
virgin saints, all of the heroines in this study are flawed. These flawed heroines all must
learn that “some degree of self-control is a moral and practical necessity while total selfabnegation is suicidal” (36), and that they are “entirely responsible for overcoming” their
tribulations, although that responsibility does not strip them of the right to seek assistance
(17).3
Baym finds two basic “power situations” in the plot’s narrative set up (37). Either
the heroine is not loved or valued,” and “those who should love and nurture her instead
exploit or neglect her,” or those with “authority” over her “abuse” that authority (37). As
a heroine struggles to overcome the hurdles in her path, she connects with a network of
people “who support, and advise, and befriend her,” and “her final ‘domesticity’ is
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defined as her relations with” those in that network (38). Her primary emotional support
comes from the domestic circle she thus defines, especially her female friends or a man
with whom she shares a platonic friendship (39). Power is absent from this sphere, and
relations are based in rational friendship and love.
This study will begin by examining generically and historically disparate
literatures written by U.S. women to see if they show evidence of Baym’s overplot. I
chose to analyze U.S. women’s contemporary domestic humor and popular romance
series, two modes of literature as authoritatively designated women’s and culturally
associated with female readers/auditors as nineteenth-century sentimentalism is.
Women’s domestic humor and popular romance series suffer from scholarly neglect, yet
they are among the bestselling modes of popular literature in the United States.
My choices of literary texts still may seem somewhat capricious and temporally
disconnected. Let me address the latter issue first. This study is not intended as an
historical overview of the development of the overplot. To trace the overplot from the
early medieval period through the twenty-first century would be a daunting task, one far
beyond the scope of this text, although one certainly worthy of further study. Instead,
rather than explore the depths of medieval or early modern conceptions of sexed and
gendered bodies, I want to investigate the breadth of efficacy of a particular medieval
conception of the female body in a twenty-first-century “postfeminist” culture. Of course,
since multiple feminine identity possibilities were available to embodied medieval and
early modern Christian women, constructions of femininity were not as monolithic as my
discussion perhaps paints them. And again, research to fill in the temporal gaps is
wanting.
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My most immediate goal is to establish that there are significant plot and
characterological similarities among texts separated by millennia. If I am correct, what
might it mean for the binaries by which we classify literature—popular/canonical, for
instance—that canonical and popular texts repeat the same plot? Secondly, by
juxtaposing texts that explicitly announce their didactic intentions, as sacred biography
and Pamela do, with texts widely believed to function only as mindless entertainment,
such as contemporary popular romance series, I want to explore the possibility that
popular literature does more than reflect and reinforce hegemonic sex/gender discursive
and material practices. I suggest that it plays a role in encouraging the kind of selfdiscipline Foucault argues is an integral component of identity construction.4 I want to
discover if these texts also offer opportunities for feminist subversion of hegemonic
sex/gender. To this end, I explore the techniques and devices authors deploy to encourage
readers to identify with or accept the values of narrative personae and heroines in two
varieties of contemporary U.S. women’s humor. Humor seems a good fit because its
success at engendering laughter requires that readers and narrative persona share beliefs
and values. Simply put, I want to understand how narrative personae and first-person
heroines try to ensure that readers “get it.” What values and beliefs do the texts assume
readers and heroines share? If popular literature is didactic and makes both ethical and
moral claims, what sort of claims are they? On whom do they make the claims they
make? Can juxtaposing such contemporary popular literature provide a fruitful route for
examining changing conceptions of the individual, identity, and sex/gender? Answers to
these questions can perhaps add something to feminist debates about the potential of
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women’s humor for encouraging bonding among women and about what women’s
popular literary humor does for the women who produce and consume it.
In chapter one, I outline my methodology and methods. I argue for a feminist
cultural realist frame and for supplementing the traditional methods of literary criticism
with those of Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis and the conclusions of ethnographic
research into reading and writing practices. I briefly sketch scholarly attempts to define
important terms, and propose working definitions. In chapter two, I identify the
paradoxical female body in medieval hagiography’s ritualized conventions of plot and
characterization and trace it into Samuel Richardson’s Pamela. By attending to the
parallels between medieval virgin saints’ biographies and Pamela, I tease out two
threads. First, interpersonal power struggles take shape as battles over what Adrienne
Rich calls the “right to name” (“When We Dead” 35).5 Second, interpersonal power
struggles between men and women in the ostensibly apolitical domestic realm can figure
for power struggles in the political realm and reveal the falseness of the politicaldomestic dichotomy.
Chapter three begins with a discussion of sentimental ethics and some of the
scholarly literature on American women’s humor. I then historically contextualize Erma
Bombeck’s At Wit’s End and Shirley Jackson’s two contributions to domestic humor, Life
among the Savages and Raising Demons, and examine them for evidence of Baym’s
overplot and the contrastive trope which, I argue, narrators and narrative personae use to
intelligibly identify themselves for readers. After considering how Jackson and Bombeck
establish the “virtue” of their narrative personae through contrast, voice, and stance, I
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consider the role of humor in constructing persona and these authors’ legacies to the U.S.
women’s humor.
The literary subjects of chapter four are Janet Evanovich’s Stephanie Plum series
and Gemma Halliday’s Making It series of contemporary comic romantic mysteries. Nora
Ephron’s “A Few Words about Breasts” informs the analysis in this chapter. I propose
the “Signifying Breast” as a metonym for generically conventional character types whose
presence in the text facilitates normalization of the heroine’s performance of
cisgendered,6 heteronormatively receptive female sexuality and the value systems her
performance endorses for cooperative readers. This chapter includes a consideration of
the implications of this literature’s location of work in a hybrid domestic-business space.
In doing so, these texts relocate the logical grounding of the sentimental moral sense
from Shaftesbury’s “maternal instinct” to heteronormative love.
That all of the authors treated in this text are white and heterosexual is in part due
to generic conventions, in part to limits of time and space, and in part to my reading
habits as a child, when I first encountered all of these “women” but two. Nor do I mean to
suggest that my readings are the “correct” readings, or the only readings, or even that
they are “preferred” readings. These are my readings, in a very important sense the
products of the particularity of my reading practices and my history, my situatedness as a
middle-aged, white, working-class, well-educated, able-bodied, cisgendered female in
late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century U.S culture. Regrettably, the limits of
language in general and the language of scholarly inquiry in particular, the habits of
training, and the limits of my own intellect leave me unable to express myself
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consistently in ways that adequately foreground the speculative and provisional nature of
my claims. For my lapses, I beg my readers’ indulgence and their pardon.
Engaging Feminism
Lillian Robinson notes that feminist criticism ought to be “criticism with a Cause”
(Robinson 879). This text constitutes the kind of “revolutionary” feminist criticism that
she calls for (879). Questions about the real-world concerns of situated embodied women
motivate this study. It focuses on and takes seriously representations of white, workingand middle-class women,7 their literary production and consumption, and their
interpretive practices with an eye toward contributing something to ongoing feminist
conversations and activism grounded in a shared belief in the transformative power of
popular literature and culture.
Our understandings of the social world and how subjects are related to it are
implicated in the hypothesis around which research is designed and data are gathered and
affect how researchers interpret results and data (Kuhn 52-70). Interpretations of the
social world shape our perceptions of what ought to be done, what can be done, and the
purpose of doing anything at all (35-42). Literary and cultural criticism can tie feminists’
activists and intellectual lives together, for, since it is on the basis of our understanding of
reality that we act, activism is, in effect, based in interpretive practices. Moreover, by
revealing the contingency of what seems natural—popular romance’s heteronormativity,
for instance—and its impact on meaning-making practices in other contexts—seeing two
men holding hands or kissing—interpretation can constitute transgressive revolutionary
activity. Perhaps, as M. Scott Momaday says, we read to get a sense of who we are and
what we are doing. Or maybe “[w]e read to change ourselves and others” (Howe 268).
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Perhaps we read to confirm that we are like others, that we are “okay,” or that others feel
as we do. Maybe we read to connect, to escape, or to play. In fact, American women
read—and write—to do all of these things (Radway).
Every wave of American feminists has argued that cultural representations of
gender can contribute to the devaluation of women’s lives and activities and profoundly
affect women’s ability to define themselves and achieve socio-political equality with men
(Polizzi 24-25). To be sure, in the mid-nineteenth century, first-wave feminists called on
women to establish their own print media in order to counteract media ridicule and
elisions of the emergence of the “New Woman” model as a gender-performative
possibility for women (Carter and Steiner 1-2). Nearly one hundred years later, Betty
Friedan’s 1963 publication of The Feminine Mystique re-opened public discussion and
feminist criticism of print media’s naturalization and normalization of a private-sphere,
consumerist femininity (2), in opposition to a public-sphere, productive masculinity. By
the mid-1960s, second-wave American feminists had begun to systematically examine
media representations of women and to critique the gender ideologies they saw those
representations serving. Second-wave feminist research into and activism around mass
media began “from the assumption that a change in media representation of women was
necessary for the achievement of political change” (Bradley 161). Early second-wave
engagements with media representations of gender, however, were themselves
problematic. Feminists of color and lesbian feminists continued to take issue with the
ways that Western, white, middle-class, college-educated, heterosexual feminists
normalized their own lives as women’s experience.8
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Questions about the social and political dimensions of popular culture and
women’s literature and their relationships to ideology and life now occupy feminist
critics who, crossing disciplinary boundaries, incorporate methods from sociology,
philosophy, communications, media studies, and anthropology. Feminist literary scholars
grapple with issues like whether women’s literature is related to the commodification of
identity; the nature of the relationship between women’s literature and the feminization of
consumption; and, most prominently in regard to American women’s popular literature,
whether women’s literature reflects, reinforces, or subverts gender stereotypes and
norms. I hope to use this text to participate in an ongoing conversation with others who
share my interest in these conflicts and lacunae, and I address some of these questions in
detail.
Methodology and Methods
Because scholars often use the terms method and methodology interchangeably, I
want to define how I use them. Gayle Letherby usefully distinguishes between them:
A method is a technique, a tool for doing research, for gathering evidence,
for collecting data. . . . Methodology entails a perspective or framework.
Thinking methodologically involves describing and analyzing the methods
used, evaluating their value, detailing the dilemmas their usage causes and
exploring the relationship between the methods that we use and how we
use them, and the production and presentation of our data. (5)
Methodology: Feminist Cultural Realism
Feminist interventions have raised a number of questions about commonplaces of
scholarly literary analysis. Recognizing that “every act of meaning-making . . .
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contributes to the reproduction and maintenance of the social order, and also . . . [to]
resisting and transforming that order” (Lazar 11), American feminists such as Elizabeth
Cady Stanton, Nina Baym, Elaine Showalter, and Annette Kolodny have long
interrogated canonicity and the so-called objective aesthetic standards it presupposes.
Feminist critiques of racialized, gendered, sexualized, and classed social and discursive
relations and practices have revealed literary studies’ elision of the myriad ways readers,
writers, texts, discourses, and discursive practices presuppose and (re)produce ideologies
of race, gender, and sexuality. Paula L. Moya’s critique of poststructural feminism and
Satya Mohanty’s work in epistemology have led me to adopt feminist cultural realism
(FCR) as an epistemological frame that accommodates an understanding of sexuality,
gender, race, and class as social constructs. According to this frame, objective reality
exists independent of anyone’s perceptions of it; however, the knowledges that emerge
out of the activity of embodied human beings within that reality are always already
multiple, situated, and mediated by language. In other words, cultural realism begins
from the premise that the natural world materially preexists cultural artifacts and systems,
including embodied, already-situated human beings, but can only be “known” through
language, itself a cultural construction. Because knowledge of nature, like knowledge of
anything, presupposes language, the cultural is epistemologically prior to the natural even
though the natural world is ontologically prior to the cultural.
However, the claim that the cultural is epistemologically prior to the natural
entails neither a full-throttle descent into the postmodern maelstrom of relativity nor a
positivist march toward authorial intentionality. Relativism is based in conflation of the
epistemological and the ontological; the idea that we cannot directly know objects of
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inquiry becomes the claim that the objects of inquiry do not exist, that since experience of
reality is mediated by language, it is reducible to language. But the idea that what is
mediated by language is reducible to language is obviously an error. The idea that the
world is text (Derrida’s dictum9 simplistically misunderstood) because human beings so
often experience it as such is perhaps too often unquestioningly adopted as a first premise
in literary criticism. A feminist cultural realist frame acknowledges—no, it demands—
multiple interpretive possibilities for a single text because it begins with the situatedness
of embodied readers and writers, including (but not limited to) the material conditions of
literary production and consumption, generic and discursive conventions, and ideology’s
ubiquity.
Texts can look very different from different perspectives. The difference between
reading Moby Dick at fourteen and at forty-two might make one feel as if one is reading
an entirely different text, for instance. This difference, however, is not merely a function
of gender, race, class, age, or any other identity marker, although these factors stand in
dialectical relation to the myriad other factors out of which idiosyncratic readings of texts
emerge. Acknowledging that texts, readers, writers, and reading and writing practices are
always already situated forecloses pretensions to interpretive objectivity and certainty. As
considerations of situatedness erode the foundation for such claims, multiple readings
emerge as plausible interpretive possibilities. However, this does not mean that all
interpretations emerge as equally plausible possibilities. More importantly, perhaps, it
doesn’t rule out the possibility of misinterpretation, either.
Before moving on, I must define how I use the word emerge and its variants.10
Simply put, emergence is the process by which a complex system becomes or seems to
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become more than the sum of its parts. Grounded in systems physics, emergence denotes
dynamic properties and processes that arise in highly complex systems, properties and
processes that cannot be wholly or definitively explained by reference to the operation of
any of the parts or to any known inter-reaction between or among parts. As Margolis
convincingly demonstrates, “persons and selves, artworks, artifacts, texts, actions,
institutions, societies, words, and sentences” (Interpretation 7) are “historied,” emergent
entities without essences (Margolis Historied; Selves). On this view, interpretations can
only emerge out of the activities of historicized and situated embodied interpreters and
are thus themselves historied, ongoing processes.
Beginning from the argument that “(1) knowledge is inherently interpretive; (2)
interpreting beliefs so that they count as knowledge is inherently legitimative; hence (3),
neither the self nor knowledge can be satisfactorily ‘naturalized’” (Interpretation 253),
Margolis’ vision of interpretation is entirely consistent with a feminist cultural realist
methodology and, like FCR, acknowledges interpretive contingency while avoiding the
pitfalls of ethical subjectivity and relativity. The activity of literary criticism is thus
conceived as the historically and culturally emergent practices of situated, embodied
human beings who can at best legitimate their interpretations by providing textual
evidence and genealogizing their own interpretive processes and methods (Margolis,
Interpretation).11
Stuart Hall argues that four codes can be embedded in texts: dominant codes,
professional codes, negotiated codes, and oppositional codes. Dominant codes accept
hegemonic ideologies as their starting point and their dialectical relationship to
professional codes facilitates the normalization of both (Hall 16). Professional codes such
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as generic conventions mask the presence of hegemonic codes in texts by shifting
attention to matters of textual quality and cultural value (16). The dialectical interaction
of these two codes allows marked literatures to be deemed unworthy of serious study. A
negotiated code accepts hegemony’s big ideological “truths” but “operates with
‘exceptions’ to the rule” on a “restricted, situational level” (17). Examples of negotiated
encoding include a public performance of authorship that positions the writer as “just a
housewife,” as the humor analyzed in chapter three does, and a moral system that
prescribes monogamy but excuses specific transgressions, such as popular romance’s
negotiation of heroines’ infidelity. Oppositional codes reject hegemonic discourses. Some
of the ephemera coming out of the Occupy movement manifest oppositional codes. For
example, one poster juxtaposes images of morbidly obese white children eating, and
skeletal black children lying on the ground. The caption reads, “Capitalism Isn’t
Working.”
Methods
My methods include the traditional methods of literary analysis, such as close
reading, plot and character analysis, and considering the scholarly literature.
Additionally, I attempt to discern and describe discursive patterns by placing into tension
texts by different authors and texts from different literary periods, a common method
among literary critics. Nevertheless, despite my commitment to the methods of literary
studies, I cross disciplinary boundaries to make use of ethnographic research and
empirical studies of the reading practices of situated readers to appropriate some of the
methods of feminist critical discourse analysis (FCDA), which itself is a set of
interpretive practices and methods used by feminist scholars in linguistics and
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pragmatics. These scholars have produced empirical studies that demonstrate that men
and women are encouraged to perform power differently (Holmes), show some ways that
women negotiate power in educational institutions (Remlinger), attempt to establish what
comprises effective embodied speech in Western classrooms (Baxter 80-127), reveal
some of the subtle forms that homophobia takes in newspapers that eschew openly
discriminatory rhetoric (Gouveia), and deconstruct readings of gendered, raced, and aged
female bodies in the context of academia (Ideta and Cooper; Middleton). The methods
these scholars employ allow them to carefully attend to both manifest meaning and
meaning possibilities implicit in discursive transactions and to tease out the “subtle and
complex renderings of ideological assumptions and power relations” produced by
embodied meaning-makers in discursive communities (Lazar 13). Their methods and the
results of their empirical research on reading practices supplement the more traditional
methods of literary analysis in this study.
In its approach to texts as “situated, emergent, and reflexive human phenomena”
(Lindlof 22) and its challenge to the view of discourse and genre studies as sites of
“neutral and objective inquiry” (Lazar 2), FCDA is philosophically consistent with a
feminist cultural realist frame. Since FCDA seeks discursive patterns rather than causal
explanations, it provides a nearly ideal toolkit for this project and can facilitate analytical
attention to the communal and communitarian possibilities of language and discourse that
is such an important part of American women’s popular literature.
Perhaps most usefully for this study, FCDA provides a vocabulary for critical
consideration of what Lazar calls “marked inclusion” (19), the practice of including
representations of those traditionally marginalized while discursively or
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representationally marking them as Other, outside of the “mainstream” (19). This concept
is crucial to understanding the relationships among marked and unmarked literatures—
among popular literature, women’s literature, and just plain literature, for instance,—the
role of market relations in constructing and maintaining false textual dichotomies such as
popular/canonical and masculine/feminine, and the misunderstanding of these polarities
as politically neutral, purely denotative categories of ontologically distinct kinds of
literature. How can the perspectival multiplicity afforded by the feminist cultural realist
frame help to answer these questions and the theoretical flexibility of interdisciplinary
scholarship help to resolve the issues raised by feminist scholars? That perhaps depends
on what one thinks literature and literary criticism ought to do—and on what one
considers their limits.
Literature and Women’s Literature
Some of the most contentious debates in feminist literary scholarship turn on
questions about what American women’s popular literature does and, even more
basically, what it is. Of course, answers to these questions presuppose that some texts can
be identified as literature and others as not-literature; some texts as popular literature,
and others as, at the very least, not-popular; some texts as women’s literature and others
as, well, you see the pattern. So. Can we define literature? Well, any number of literary
scholars have tried. In the introduction to his own Literary Theory, Terry Eagleton
considers and rejects a number of possible criteria that have been proposed for defining
literature. First, Eagleton notes, attempts to define literature based on a distinction
between imaginative (fiction) and factual (non-fiction) fail, “not least because the
distinction itself is often a questionable one” (1) and because definitions of imaginative
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and factual have evolved and changed over time. Formalist attempts to define literature
by differentiating its supposedly characteristically self-conscious uses of language from
everyday use fail for Eagleton as well because they presume an identifiable “normal” to
which literary uses of language can be opposed (4), because any utterance can contain the
kinds of ambiguities formalists define as characteristic of literary language (6), and
because “[t]o think of literature as the formalists do is really to think of all literature as
poetry” (5, emphasis in original). Nor do definitions based in the quality of the writing
fare any better with Eagleton; after all, standards change, and if literature is good writing
by definition, then the phrase bad literature could only denote a category mistake.
Finally declaring that “[t]here is no essence of literature whatsoever” (8),
Eagleton advocates John M. Ellis’s conception of literature as a “functional rather than
ontological” term that indicates “the role of a text . . . in a social context” (8, emphasis in
original). On this conception, the term literature, like the term weed, indicates something
about what situated, embodied human beings do rather than something about “some
inherent quality or qualities displayed by certain kinds of writing” (8, emphasis in
original). What is it that situated human beings do in relation to literature? We produce it,
we consume it, and, most importantly here, we value it. On this definition, then, literature
is “highly valued” writing. Of course, this definition of literature renders the literary field
unstable because values themselves are situated cultural constructs: “‘Value is a transitive
term: it means whatever is valued by certain people in specific situations, according to
particular criteria, and in light of given purposes” (10).12
In fact, if one follows Ellis and Eagleton in defining literature functionally, to
distinguish between women’s literature and literature implies that differently gendered
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people value each of them and/or value different purposes for each. Gender is one of the
ways in which embodied readers and writers are culturally identified and located. Gender
is not innate to human beings. Gender is conventional just as language is conventional; in
the same sense that language pre-exists individual human beings, gender is prior to them
as well. Gender’s potency as a normalizing13 ideology is rivaled in American society
perhaps only by the disciplinary power of normalized sexuality. The important point here,
though, is that whatever gender is, it is not a collection of characteristics or rhetorical
devices that can be embedded in texts or that determine readers’ or writers’ tastes. The
relationship between gender and interpretation is more complex than that.
Having laid out some of the directions attempts to define literatures have taken
and some of the difficulties with them, I tentatively define literature as discursive
conjunctures of emergent systems of conventional productive and consumptive practices.
These conventional productive practices are enacted in and through dynamic, open
systems of relationships among material texts, emergent culture(s) of representation,
embodied meaning-making subjects, and other, perhaps indeterminable, emergent
systems. Situated repetitions of conventional discursive and interpretive productive
practices overdetermine the relationships among and within the systems. Understanding
literature in this way allows for its treatment as fluid and contingent conjunctions of
multiple meaning-making practices available to and engaged by situated subjects, rather
than as an ontological entity with clearly defined boundaries.
Reading, Writing, and Gender
Whatever else the word women’s denotes, when attached as a possessive to the
word literature it certainly implies that gender affects who values the literature in
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question, how people value it, and for what purposes they value it. And indeed, these are
the lines along which the earliest feminist critiques of the canon and canonicity
developed. Tillie Olsen’s Silences and Nina Baym’s “Melodramas of Beset Manhood”
articulate this thread in American feminist literary criticism; feminist recoveries of lost
texts and authors exemplify it in practice. However, this is at best a partial understanding
of what gender-labeling of cultural artifacts actually does because it depends on an
understanding of gender as a purely causal factor in interpretation.
The classification of some literature as women’s literature is analogous to the
classification of some films as chick flicks. We call some films chick flicks because their
content focuses on relationships: emotional relationships between men and women,
emotional relationships between female friends, emotional relationships between family
members, intrapersonal relationships between women and themselves. Think Steel
Magnolias or Fried Green Tomatoes. The protagonist(s) of chick flicks is usually female,
although the protagonist might be an especially sensitive male or a male cast in a
traditionally feminine role, for example, Dustin Hoffman in Kramer vs. Kramer. In
contrast, films that we have come to call dick flicks usually involve vast quantities of
action and violence. Unlike chick flicks, which center on interiority and on the private
realm of relationships ostensibly devoid of political content, dick flicks are set in the
public realm. Conventional plots include a solitary man’s active attempts to define his
place in the public realm on his own terms, a man’s (or male-only group’s) efforts to save
loved ones (or the country, or the planet) from an external threat, or a man’s (always
successful) stab at avenging a wrong done to him or his family by an outside antagonist.
Think Die Hard and High Noon. The dick flick’s protagonist is almost always a heroic
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male.14 Common wisdom tells us that these two different film genres have arisen because
men and women as gendered human beings have different tastes in movies. However, the
normalizing repetition of the very names chick flicks and dick flicks and the repetition of
motifs, plots, and characterizations specific to each help to create the very gendered
males and females to whose taste we suppose them to respond.15 Authoritative
normalization of these category labels encourages subjects to self-regulate their gender
performances and provides a vocabulary of gender that makes their performances
intelligible to others. Cultural conceptions of the nature of gender and cultural valuations
of gender are contained in the metonymic adjectives chick and dick.
Gender is a discourse in Michel Foucault’s sense of being a “historically, socially,
and institutionally specific” system of “statements, terms, categories, and beliefs” (Scott
256). But gender is something more. It is an overdetermined set of emergent performative
practices. And, like other human practices, it includes muted or negated material. In a
world in which gender is, however contingently, a binary construct, to be man is, in some
sense, to be not-woman, and what is appropriate for “chicks” is not appropriate for
“dicks.” Thus, the appellations chick flicks and dick flicks inform embodied viewers
which films are appropriate for them. Chick flicks encourage embodied females to
identify with their heroines and valorize traditionally feminine characteristics and ways
of interacting with others. Calling them chick flicks discourages males from too-publicly
identifying themselves as fans; my husband, in fact, was reluctant to let me use him as an
example of a man who has been moved by such films.
Chick flicks and dick flicks thus help to teach embodied males and females how
to perform femininity and masculinity. Reading experiences and generic labels condition
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(but do not determine) audience members’ often-unconscious beliefs about whether or
not they “ought” to be reading particular sorts of texts. Inscribing texts with labels
denoting gender-appropriateness encourages the kind of self-regulation and gender
performance that Michel Foucault and Judith Butler have respectively demonstrated so
convincingly to be crucial to the construction of gendered human beings. What appears to
be the cause of production is simultaneously the effect of interpretive practice. What
appears to be characteristic is, instead, performance. The generic marking of some
American literature as American women’s literature parallels film’s designation of
generic gender-appropriateness.
Moreover, most of us buy books in bookstores or from Internet sites that helpfully
tell us whether particular books are fiction or nonfiction, memoir or cookbook, detective
novel or perennial classic, humor or tragedy. In fact, the nation’s two largest bookselling
chains, Borders and Barnes & Noble further break literature down. Both stores
differentiate, for example, between literature for boys and literature for girls in their
children’s sections,16 between classics and women’s literature in their literature sections,
between plain old humor and women’s humor in their humor sections. But culturally
dominant authorization via such practices as categorization is not the only factor in
normalizing some texts as appropriate for one gender and others for another.17
While there are many factors involved in normalizing textual genderappropriateness, when it comes to literature, one of the most important factors seems to
be the biological sex of the author. If it is true, as Foucault notes, that the name of the
author can provoke a set of expectations in readers, that same name often signifies the
author’s sex, which is always defined as falling at either the male or female pole of the
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culturally authorized binary. Studies by Cameron, Caughie, Linkin, and Murray show
that readerly awareness of authorial sex may affect reading practices. When it comes to
literature, the normalizing power of femininity and femaleness can construct the author as
a women’s humor writer, regardless of the subject matter, tone, or style of her work.
Molly Ivins, for instance, takes the political public sphere as the topic of her humor, and
she utilizes the devices and techniques of literary satire to do so. Still, Ann Safran Dalin
includes one of Ivins’s essays in Life’s a Stitch: The Best of Contemporary Women’s
Humor, even though its content is not woman-specific or of special interest to women. It
is, rather, about the traditionally masculine public realm: “I believe politics is the finest
form of entertainment in the state of Texas: better than the zoo, better than the circus,
rougher than football, and even more aesthetically satisfying than baseball. Becoming a
fan of this arcane art form will yield a body endless joy—besides, they make you pay for
it whether you pay attention or not (Ivins 124). Thus, although women’s humor is most
commonly defined as humor written by and for women, Ivins’ sex seems to have been
enough for her text to have been included in an anthology of women’s humor. However,
as feminist research into media consumption shows, interpretive practices tend to be
more influenced by the social relations surrounding consumption than by textual content
(Carter, Branston, and Allan 8), and “texts, contexts and readers . . . obtain their identity
in interaction with one another” (Lehtonen 2).
People’s non-literary reading practices and experiences inform how they read
literary texts, what they read those texts for, their willingness to interact with particular
texts, and their beliefs (sometimes unconscious) about whether or not they “ought” to be
reading particular sorts of texts. Through repetition of their own reading experiences,
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many of which take place outside of the institutional frame, readers establish their own
reading practices as authoritative (Murray 10) and themselves as authoritative readers.
Interpretive conventions encountered in our day-to-day lives “echo prior actions and
accumulate the force of authority through the repetition or citation of a prior and
authoritative set of practices” (Butler, Excitable 51, emphasis original). Because they are
“reiteration[s] of a norm or a set of norms[,]” reading practices are performatives (Butler,
Bodies qtd. in Murray n. 5). As performatives, reading practices construct the textual
meanings we suppose them to discover and the gendered writers and readers they purport
to reveal. By concealing their own and their constructs’ contingency and conventionality,
by making both themselves and their products seem natural and normal—perhaps even
inevitable—performative reading practices carry normalizing, prescriptive force. Writing
practices’ reiterations of conventions ensure that the signs that will enable encultured
readers to construct meaningful interpretations are there to be read.18
Readers with different reading styles will enter texts from different points in order
to maximize the efficacy of their reading strategies. Ethnographic research into reading
and writing practices has identified what are most often called “male” and “female”
modes of reading and writing. “Female” reading and writing practices foreground
engagement, cooperation, attention to detail, and attention to relationships both within
and among texts. Objectivity/detachment, hierarchy, competition, and attention to rules
characterize “male” modes of reading and writing. The modes have been named for the
sex of the people who are most likely to use them and who use them most often in
contemporary American society. “Female” readers try to cooperate with and understand
texts; “male” readers are more likely to try to dominate texts by judging them and either
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accepting or rejecting them (Linkin 3). These reading practices parallel the American
construction of “normal” femininity and masculinity. However, anomalous data indicate
both that there is no natural or necessary link between sex and gender and that there is no
necessary connection between reading or writing practices and biological sex or gender
identity. For example, Bleich notes that while there are “significant” sex-based
reading/interpretive “patterns,” there are also “significant exceptions” to those patterns
(qtd. in Caughie 321). His data show that while some men always read in the “male”
mode, and most men usually do, some men never do. The same holds true for females
and the “female” mode. Thus, reading practices do not clearly or consistently break down
along sex-based lines. Yet many researchers continue to cast biological sex as an
objective correlative for gender, as though all females are gendered feminine and all
males are gendered masculine. Michel Foucault and Judith Butler have shown, albeit in
different ways, the assumption that sex and gender are either naturally or necessarily
connected is untenable,19 and research into reading practices bears this out.
One explanation offered for the sex-based anomalous reading patterns echoes
Carol Gilligan’s hypothesis about ethical decision-making.20 Thus, as Renee Edwards
studied the effects of gender, gender roles, and gender-based values on the interpretation
of messages, she found that men and women are, in general, oriented differently. Women
tend to be “relationally oriented”; men tend to be “control oriented” (Edwards 55). This
translates to a cluster of males at the hierarchy and dominance pole of reading practices
and one of females at the cooperative pole, with members of both sexes occasionally
employing either set of practices contingent upon task and context, some readers never
deploying the “gender-appropriate” set of reading practices, and others nearly always
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doing so. And, while both dominating and cooperative readers “read for power,”
cooperative readers seek empowerment through “connection to a community” and
dominating readers look for “competition within a hierarchy” (Linkin 2). Thus,
cooperative readers tend to discuss the relationships they find in texts; dominating
readers’ analyses focus on power. For example, in Holland’s study of gendered readings
of King Lear, cooperative readers concentrate on Cordelia and Lear’s relationship, while
dominating readers’ analyses center on Lear’s “helplessness and even sexual impotence
in response to the death of Cordelia” (Holland 283). American gender ideology says that
women are concerned with relationships, and cooperative readers see relationships as
texts’ central concern. The same “common knowledge,” which arises out of the
normalizing function of gender ideologies, says that men focus on competition and
dominance, and dominating readers see power. Thus, while texts themselves may be
genderless, the reading practices one employs can in effect gender them by mimicking
authorized gendered ways of relating to the world and positing them as inherent to the
text itself. Although researchers have been unable to identify a clear-cut “genderlect” or
gendered writing style (Linkin 16), reading practices themselves can gender texts, for
“texts, contexts and readers . . . obtain their identity in interaction with one another”
(Lehtonen, 2000, 2).
Gender is one of the identity discourses, the schemata, the “organizing structures
built up from prior experiences” that influence the activities of situated, embodied
subjects as they engage meaning-making practices (Caughie 320). In “What Is an
Author?” Michel Foucault points out an author’s name is, in part, a functional “means of
classification” (1627). If an author’s style and usual subject matter is known, his or her
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name arouses expectations in readers that can influence the reading practices they deploy.
Even if an author is not well known, his or her name nearly always reveals his or her sex.
The sex of the author creates its own set of readerly expectations, in much the same way
that his or her name does. Sometimes readers feminize authors in order to dominate texts.
When the sex of an author is not known, they use belittling descriptors associated with
femininity to describe texts they believe to have been written by a woman twice as often
as cooperative readers (Linkin 15), thus feminizing the text and the author
simultaneously. Even when they know an author is male, dominating readers feminize
him in order to control the text.21 And, when dominating readers encounter authors they
know to be female and who confound their expectations of femininity, they may resist
submitting to the text with “virulence” and rage (9), by “minimizing [the author’s]
achievement” (10). Resistant cooperative readers, on the other hand, simply refuse to
fully participate, by, for example, shifting attention from the author to his or her
relationship to other authors or to the canon (10). In this way, cooperative readers
maintain their relationship orientation while resisting relating to the text at hand.
The increasing number of texts by women authors introduced into the canon has
revealed yet another interesting and significant aspect of reading practices: readers’
assignment of sex to authors according to the perceived gender of their texts. In one
study, students were asked to identify the sexes of two poets on the basis of their poetry
(Englebrecht, cited in Linkin, 15-16). Most correctly identified Galway Kinnell as a male
after reading an excerpt from his “Little-Sleep’s-Head Sprouting Hair in the Moonlight,”
and an excerpt from Sharon Olds’ “Looking at Them Asleep” enabled them to correctly
identify her as female. In responding to questions about the features that characterized
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Kinnell’s poem as having been written by a male, students responded with the descriptors
“choppy, distant, difficult, metaphorical, abstract, negative, intellectual, abrupt, cryptic,
and technical” (15). The same students used the adjectives “accessible, emotional, tender
and loving, intimate, flowing . . . direct, cute or sweet, soft, and nice” to identify the
characteristic markers that inclined them to identify the poet as a woman (15). However,
as we have seen, gender is not inherent to texts. How, then, can we understand the
students’ success in identifying the sex of the authors? By looking to the reading
practices they deployed and the normalizing power of gender discourse.
The performativity of reading practices and the normalizing power of gender
ideologies intersect in readers’ interactions with texts, and readers assign masculinity or
maleness to authors and texts they find difficult to connect with or control and femaleness
or femininity to texts they perceive as fostering connection or providing multiple entry
points. Holland’s study indicates that both dominating and cooperative readings of King
Lear assign “power to men and compliance to women” (284); even though reading
practices can be differentiated according to how they seek power in relation to texts, both
cooperative and dominating readers assign power in traditional, sex/gender-based ways:
They designate as feminine texts that offer multiple points of entry and texts that they can
easily connect with or control, and they may assign femininity or femaleness to the
authors of such texts even when they know the author to be male. Certain texts can
arouse little effort to dominate, sometimes because the dominating reader can find no
way to order them hierarchically. Other texts may afford many readers no way to
cooperate: the Tagalog and Baybayin passages in Barbara Jane Reyes’s Poeta en San
Francisco come to mind. The point is that readers and writers carry beliefs and practices
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that affect how they engage the texts with which they interact and these beliefs and
practices influence them as they move from genre to genre and from text to text—and
from moment to moment within a single text.
The work of feminist critics and historians of literature reveals ways women
writers have been silenced and reconstructed as palimpsests, their own words erased and
others’ words inscribed in their place. Women write of their experiences; their
experiences are dismissed with the admonition that it is not the universal (read:
masculine) experience with which good literature concerns itself. Of course, this
presupposes a particular socially constructed public/private hierarchy that construes the
public as intrinsically more valuable than the private, a valuation that American women
critics and writers have tried to undermine from the beginning of American literature. In
fact, feminist scholarship on nineteenth-century American sentimentalism indicates that
ethical sentimentalism itself represents the efforts of situated, embodied American
women’s efforts to transform and increasingly materialistic, industrialized, and
dehumanizing society by importing the values of the private realm into it wholesale.
While few of them would have identified as feminist, some nineteenth-century women
writers and readers valued this literature for its perceived ability to transform material
social relations. Contemporary feminists may value it for the same reason.
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NOTES
1

In this text, I alternate between U.S. and its variants, and American and its variants. By this, I do
not mean to indicate that I think these terms are equivalent. I understand that reference to the United States
as America has a history of discursively normalizing U.S. domination in the hemisphere, but it also has a
long tradition in literary studies, a tradition in which some of my readers have been immersed for long and
productive careers. It is a vocabulary with which they are familiar, and more than one reader has mentioned
that they found the use of U.S. “jarring” and “distracting.” On the other hand, the vocabulary of
hemispheric studies is transforming the ways we talk about literature in the United States. I cannot ignore
its illumination of the linguistic colonization implicit in using the word America to refer only to the United
States. I alternate between the terms in an attempt to negotiate the subtleties and nuances of the discourses
and practices that stand behind them.
2
I use persona rather than author or narrator to connote a literary blending of author and
character into a new identity performative. The persona is a sort of literary alter-ego or literary equivalent
of the stand-up comic’s performative identity. It’s Mark Twain to Samuel Clemens. A more detailed
discussion can be found later in this chapter.
3
While it may appear that martyrs, by definition, do not understand this at all, according to the
world view they shared with their readers and biographers, they do in fact survive the death of their bodies
and are rewarded for withstanding attacks and successfully asserting their identities as adult Christian
women.
4
See the chapter, “The Panopticon,” in Discipline and Punish. Foucault argues that today
Europeans and Americans are so conditioned to surveillance that they self-police their own identity
performances.
5
Rich’s “radical critique of literature . . . take[s] the work first of all as a clue to how we live, how
we have been living, how we have been led to imagine ourselves, how our language has trapped as well as
liberated us, how the very act of naming has been till now a male prerogative, and how we can begin to see
and name—and therefore live—afresh” (“When We Dead” 35).
6
Cisgendered refers to an individual whose gender identity is congruent with his or her home
culture’s normalized construction of the male/masculine-female/feminine binaries. This term is used to
avoid discursively labeling transgendered people as deviant. In other words, if your body matches its
culturally normalized gender identity, you are cisgendered (“Cisgender”).
7
That the limits of time and space preclude the inclusion of detailed discussions of other
American women and their lives is one of the shortcomings of this text, and I address it in the conclusion to
this introduction. Nor do I mean to depict the emergence of ideas, philosophies, ethical systems, discourses,
ideologies, or anything else as orderly Hegelian marches toward perfection. Indeed, the processes and
systems I sketch in this text are far more complicated than can ever be fully analyzed, let alone analyzed in
a project of this type.
8
See, for example, B. Cameron; Combahee River Collective; Davis; Frye; hooks; Lorde; C. T.
Mohanty; Moraga; and Rich.
9
“Il n’y a pas de hors-texte” (There isn’t any outside-text) (Derrida 158; my translation).
10
I first encountered the concept of emergence in the thought of Joseph Margolis, whose work in
epistemology and aesthetics has deeply influenced how I think about texts, identity, and subjectivity.
11
See chapters 5-7 for the detailed argument.
12
Note that this is not the same as claiming that values are entirely subjective. It is to hold that
values are culturally emergent in the same way that language is.
13
I use “normalizing” as I understand Foucault to use it, in the sense of encompassing both
“normativity” (what one ought to do or be), and “normality” (what normal people do or are). See
Discipline and Punish, especially chapter 3, part 3: “Panopticism” (195-228).
14
The dick flick’s protagonist is sometimes a heterosexual couple comprised of a masculinized but
really hot female and an even more masculine male; occasionally a dick flick will have a female
protagonist—think Angelina Jolie in Lara Croft: Tomb Raider—but in such cases, the female must be . . .
well, Angelina Jolie. Most often, the dick flick is a female-free zone, and all-male casts are not uncommon.
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15

My thinking here is influenced by Michel Foucault’s repressive and productive hypotheses.
Thanks to my colleague, Tiffany Wilgar Boyles, for reminding me of this.
17
I do not assert here that human gender (or sex) is limited to two binary possibilities. In fact, I do
not believe they are. I do believe, however, that the dominant, authoritative gender discourses do construct
both gender and sex as binaries, and it is that construction ,therefore, that I want to examine here.
18
Unfortunately for writers of humor, neither performative reading practices nor performative
writing practices can guarantee that readers construct the meaning the author intended.
19
In fact, most of their analyses assume that they are naturally and necessarily connected. Nor do
they question the assumption that there are only two sexes. Anomalous reader reactions and reading
practices might prove less vexing if we were to expand our notions of “sex” and “gender” to accommodate
more than the two of each Euro-American culture sets as limits. See Foucault’s three-volume History of
Sexuality and Butler’s Gender Trouble for more detailed discussions of this point.
20
Although both males and females make ethical decisions based on the justice-based moral
decision-making model and on the ethics of care model, if the two modes of decision-making are placed at
the poles of a continuum, more males will gather in the justice end, and more females will group in the care
end.
21
One student in Bleich’s study said, for example, “‘I began to think that, whether cultural or
biological, this silent element is the woman in Melville—either a real woman, or a part of himself he
associates with women that he considers unavailable to himself’ ” (Bleich, qtd. in Linkin 8).
16
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CHAPTER TWO
MARTYRS: MEDIEVAL BODIES AND LITERARY LEGACIES
Medieval Christian interpretative practices emerged out of a dualist ontology that
understood the world as comprised of two essentially different realms, heaven and earth
(Heffernan 9). For medieval Christians, the spiritual, unchanging, perfect heavenly plane
directed the material, ephemeral, imperfect earthly plane (10), and the things that
populated the earthly realm imperfectly resembled those that comprised the heavenly.
Out of this particular brand of dualism emerged an interpretive model in which physical
signs were thought to directly point to spiritual truths, and interpretation was the process
of correctly determining to which spiritual truth a particular sign pointed. In other words,
interpretation was the task of deciphering Foucauldian resemblances (Order).
As the revealed word of God, the Bible served as the ultimate textual authority for
early and medieval Christians. Genesis 3:161 portrays Eve’s subordination to Adam as
her divinely ordained punishment for bringing sin into the world by succumbing to the
serpent’s temptation. Women analogically resemble Eve, so Eve’s punishment becomes a
divinely ordained justification for women’s subordination to men. By the fifth century
CE, Augustine interprets Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians2 as meaning that a woman
cannot instantiate the imago Dei except when considered together with her husband.3
Thus, obedience became “the mother of all virtues” for medieval Christian women,
married or not (Augustine, Of the Good of Marriage 30). Virginity would, however,
supplant it for unmarried women.
Although groups advocating adult celibacy attracted a great deal of interest in preChristian Greco-Roman and Semitic societies (Heffernan 234), the Christian glorification
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of virginity developed out of early Christians’ need to distinguish themselves as
something other than “another example of heterodox Judaism” (239) and their belief that
the parousia was imminent (235). Virginity signified a special kind of purity that allowed
unmediated access to God. In some Christian cultures of late antiquity, virginity became
the ideal for all men and women, and its paradigmatic force derived from “two great
models for celibacy . . . Christ and Mary” (238). By the thirteenth century, chastity,
understood as having only lawful sexual intercourse, was the ideal for all married people;
virginity, defined as never having sexual intercourse, remained the ideal for unmarried
women (238). In the thirteenth century, all women were expected to obey the men to
whom their subordination was divinely ordained, and English vernacular texts
represented virginity as the cardinal female virtue for unmarried Christian women (253).
Virginity’s importance to late medieval Christians resulted in part from its prevalence as
a motif in saints’ biographies, which were among the most popular texts in England
during the Middle Ages and into the early modern period.4
While the Bible reinforced pre-Christian conceptions of the social necessity of
male control of women,5 especially their bodies,6 medieval hagiography describes strong
women, pious women, women who disobey their earthly male superiors and sacrifice
their lives in order to remain free of “defilement or intercourse with a man” (Donovan
58).7 Hagiographical texts portray women who seem to behave contra medieval notions
of women’s divinely ordained obligation to obey men. Still, female virgin saints’
biographies became part of the liturgy, were read aloud to congregations made up of both
sexes and diverse social classes (8-9), and signified on multiple levels for their audiences.
On a literal level, saints’ biographies served as historical records of early Christianity for
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medieval Christians, as accounts of God’s revelation of his active divinity in the material
world (Heffernan 97). Deciphering the spiritual meaning of these texts involved correctly
ascertaining which textual elements signified which important spiritual truths. Repetition
indicated significance, and eventually became ritualized as formulae.
Medieval biographers ritualize structure and form. For instance, early
hagiographical texts are nearly all written as letters to individuals, congregations, or the
inhabitants of convents. The epistolary structure was preserved as texts were gathered
into vernacular collections to be read to the laity. To ensure that audiences understood the
texts as they were intended to be understood, composers of saints’ biographies wrote
elaborate prefaces detailing their purposes and explicating the spiritual truths to which
their texts pointed. These, too, were preserved when the texts were collected. Biographers
ritualize characterization as well, and do little to differentiate the women one from the
other. Physically, the heroines are all but interchangeable, all young and beautiful, but
few are physically described beyond that. For example, Agnes is “beautiful in form”
(Donovan 46); Eugenia is a “beautiful maiden” (71); Domnina’s daughters are “in the
freshness and bloom of life” (Eusebius 332). These women’s physical beauty signifies on
both the literal and analogical levels of interpretation available to the medieval Englishlanguagelaity. On the literal level, the level on which these texts functioned as historical
documents, the women actually are all young and beautiful. On the spiritual level, that
same beauty points to the saints’ purity; since physical beauty is an imperfect reflection
of spiritual beauty, great physical beauty also signifies great spiritual beauty. But the
saint’s physical beauty is by definition embodied, and the female body signifies
independently of its beauty. Because all female bodies materially resemble Eve’s, all

33

female bodies are linked to Eve’s temptation of Adam in the garden. All female bodies
signify tempter on this interpretive model.8 Because to tempt another person is by
definition to entice him or her toward something immoral, even sinful, that female bodies
signify tempter implies that female bodies have the power to corrupt. The virgin saints
are not excepted from the consequences of this analogical resemblance to Eve. Hence,
even Euphrosyne’s masculine disguise cannot relieve her of the burden of the corrupting
female body; the temptation her body inflicts on the men around her points to the
Christian spiritual “truth” that the female body tempts others to sins of lustfulness.
Although they believe her to be a man, the monks with whom she is cloistered as
Smaragdus are “sorely tempted by Smaragdus’ fairness” and grow “disturbed with the
abbot because he had brought such a beautiful man into the monastery” (Donovan 85).
That they were tempted to sins of lustfulness by what they know to be a female body
would have been troubling to the monks. However, given the even greater degree of
sinfulness of homoerotic desire, they would have experienced their desire for Smaragdus
as even more debased and sinful than desire for a woman’s body.
Virgins’ bodies are thus doubly inscribed; their physical beauty signifies spiritual
purity, and simultaneously, their bodies are loci of corruption and temptation. This is the
paradox of the doubly signifying female body. The contraries are coupled; medieval
audiences did not have to decide between them because they were both simultaneously
true. In an ontological and interpretive climate in which transparent signs correctly
interpreted point only to one truth, the beautiful virgin is anomalous, since her body
signifies contradictory spiritual truths. Early Christian writers seem to have solved the
interpretive problem by positing virgins’ bodies as special sorts of signs, signs capable of
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simultaneously gesturing toward antithetical signifieds. The doubly signifying body is
always the initial source of conflict in virgin saints’ biographies. Even the pagan men
who assault them acknowledge that their beauty is a function of inner purity, yet that
same beauty incites the antagonist to action. For the composers of saints’ biographies,
“the truth (res) of a subject” “was . . . to be exemplified primarily . . . through the
depiction of specific action in the life of the saint” (Heffernan 5). Thus, saints’
biographers stressed “dramatized action over complex argument” (5), and narrative
events ritualized as they occurred over and over again in different biographies.
Ubiquitous events include an attack on the protagonist’s virginity; the attacker’s
assistance by a wicked female; the female protagonist’s defiance of the male antagonist,
who carries earthly authority such that the woman should ordinarily obey him; an
offering of riches by the male in return for the female’s sexual acquiescence, which
riches are, of course, refused; punishment for refusal; the protagonist’s attempts to reason
with her tormentor by pointing out that his self-interest clashes with his desire;
surreptitious aid to the protagonist by a chaste male; the protagonist’s choice to remain in
places of torment even though the opportunity to escape arises; prayers for death; the
protagonist’s eventual reunification with the family from whom she has been estranged;
and reward for virtue.
Writing Identity
By the late seventeenth century, empirical science had asserted itself as a
replacement for theology as the foundation for understanding the world and humans’
places in it. John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding replaced revelation
with perception as the chief conduit of human knowledge of the material world, which

35

led to changes in the understanding of history and the practices of historiography and
biography. Joseph M. Levine notes that “[m]edieval historiography worked largely by
accretion, rarely ever by subtraction; a story once told gained authority by mere
reiteration and the passage of time” (17).9 But “seventeenth-century historiography
developed the techniques of source criticism and archaeology that prepared the path for
the modern discipline” (ix). Eighteenth-century historians such as “Gibbon, Burckhardt,
and Delehaye were,” Heffernan explains, “all chagrined at what they considered a lack of
a concern for truth in medieval saints’ lives” (57).
New approaches to historiography and biography in the eighteenth century had
helped to create, and had been in part created by, writers, readers, and audiences capable
of making distinctions between history and fiction in ways that medieval audiences had
not been (Levine; Gallagher). Richardson’s Pamela, a servant, is perfectly ordinary—
except for her beauty and her fortitude in the face of Mr. B.’s various attempts on her
virtue—and “the ordinariness” of Richardson’s realism would have indicated fictionality
to eighteenth-century audiences (Gallagher 34). So, while eighteenth-century audiences
would have expected verisimilitude from Pamela’s story, they would not have expected
empirical truth because they would have recognized it as fiction and would not have
confused it for biography. Nonetheless, as sacred biographers did, Richardson includes a
preface to guide the reader toward the “correct” reading of his text, the one that will
“inculcate religion and morality in so easy and agreeable a manner, as shall render them
equally delightful and profitable” (Richardson, Pamela 31). And, like medieval virgin
saints’ bodies did, Pamela’s body signifies both purity and corruption.
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Richardson replicates the medieval understanding of woman’s signification and
bases the novel’s pre-marital conflict on it, no matter how unconsciously or
unintentionally. Pamela’s pre-marital plot appropriates and adapts other conventions of
medieval virgin saints’ biographies as well: Mr. B. launches an assault on Pamela’s
virginity, aided by the wicked Mrs. Jewkes; Pamela defies Mr. B., whose status as
Pamela’s employer means that she has an obligation to obey him; Pamela refuses the
riches Mr. B. offers in return for her sexual acquiescence and is punished for refusing;
Pamela attempts to reason with Mr. B. by pointing out that his real self-interest clashes
with his desire; the chaste Mr. Williams helps Pamela; Pamela prays for the release of
death yet chooses to return to Mr. B. after she is safe; Pamela and her parents are
reunited; and finally, Pamela’s virtue is “rewarded” with marriage above her class.
Ethical Sentimentality
In the eighteenth century, Anthony Ashley-Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury’s
attempts to synthesize ethics and aesthetics were among the most influential ideas of his
age and introduced an ethics of sentiment to British thought. Critical to the emergence of
sentimentalism as a system of moral philosophy are Shaftesbury’s attacks on what he
sees as Hobbes’ undermining of the possibility of real morality based in objective
standards of goodness. Shaftesbury argues that the natural affection of parents for
offspring means that human beings are naturally social. For him, it follows that society is
not a war of all against all as Hobbes claims (Characteristics 287). Shaftesbury rejects
the Hobbesian notion of society as an artificial construct designed to protect people and
their property from one another and declares instead that society is humankind’s natural
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state. Thus, he locates the foundation of a human moral sense in individual affective
response rather than in individual self-interest as had Hobbes (168).
Shaftesbury believes his distinction between goodness and the moral sense allows
him to refute Hobbes. Proposing that what is good adds to the “existence or well-being”
of the system of which it is a part, Shaftesbury distinguishes between goodness, an
objective matter, and virtue, a specifically human aim. While goodness is available to all
sentient animals that feel affection for their young, virtue is available only to those who
reflect on their passions and desires and who also develop feelings about them.
Shaftesbury calls the uniquely human capacity to reflect on and develop feelings about
passions and desires “the Moral Sense” (179–80). This moral sense is not identical to the
affective response by which it speaks to human beings, and it is an innate part of human
nature. Moreover, since the moral sense is stimulated by feelings, only eliciting
“contrary” feelings can transform it. As Shaftesbury says, the
[s]ense of right and wrong therefore being as natural to us as natural
affection itself, and being a first Principle in our constitution and make,
there is no speculative opinion, persuasion or belief which is capable
immediately or directly to exclude or destroy it… [T]his affection being
an original one of earliest rise in the soul or affectionate part, nothing
beside contrary affection, by frequent check and control, can operate upon
it, so as either to diminish it in part, or destroy it in the whole. (Inquiry
I.3.1)

Shaftesbury sees an individual’s virtue in his or her attempts to create a life of moral
beauty. However, since virtue is lost by indulging base feelings, one must continually
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struggle to live in a morally beautiful way. Because he equates the moral sense, the
“affectionate part,” with the soul, the feelings that stimulate the moral sense function in
British sentimental literature much as the physical body did in sacred biography: as a sign
of the beauty of a heroine’s soul, as a sign of her virtue.
But, like so many words, virtue may mean different things to differently situated
readers and writers—and to differently situated characters. Corinne Harol cogently
argues that because there is no reliable physical sign of it, virginity cannot be, with
certainty, said to exist on a perception-based epistemology. Thus, empiricism’s inability
to establish the existence of a particular virginity led to virtue’s stepping in as a figure for
virginity.10 By the time Richardson writes Pamela, as Harol notes, virtue has acquired
“such symbolic importance that it can serve as both tenor and vehicle in a number of
symbolic systems” (141). The problem for characters is that often the “symbolic systems”
they inhabit use virtue in different ways.
Before Pamela and Mr. B. marry, characters often comment on Pamela’s singular
virtue in such a way that makes it clear that Richardson intends virtue to figure for
virginity. In fact, Richardson all but substitutes the word virtue and its variants for
virginity and its variants (Harol 137). For example, Mr. B. asks, “‘Why that word
virtuous?’ . . . ‘Was there any reason to suppose her otherwise? Or has any body taken it
into their heads to try her?’” (Richardson, Pamela 60, emphases original). The “to try
her” in Mr. B.’s final question indicates that what he says concerns Pamela’s virginity,
since it was a common euphemism for having sex with a virgin at the time. Pamela and
her parents also use virtue and virginity synonymously, but Pamela herself does not
always use the terms entirely interchangeably. Pleading with Mr. Williams, the chaste
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male who assists her, Pamela declares, “‘Were my life in question, instead of my virtue, I
would not wish to involve any body in the least difficulty for so worthless a poor
creature’” (197). Here, it is not so clear that “virtue” refers only to virginity, although it is
equally clear that “virtue” encompasses virginity without being exhausted by it.
Pamela holds herself responsible for her own virtue. Mr. B. attempts to convince
Pamela that if he rapes her, the guilt will be his: “‘Who ever blamed Lucretia? The shame
lay upon the ravisher only’” (Richardson, Pamela 63). Pamela does not accept his
sophistry: “‘May I . . . Lucretia like, justify myself by my death if I am used
barbarously?’” (63). Pamela indicates her belief that she will bear some measure of blame
if Mr. B. succeeds in raping her by her use of the word “justify.”11 But readers
understand that Pamela’s situation is unlike the Roman Lucretia’s or the virgin saints’
because they were repulsed by their would-be rapists. Pamela is attracted to Mr. B.: “I
looked after him out of the window, and he was charmingly dressed: to be sure, he is a
handsome, fine gentleman” (235). Perhaps more tellingly, of an incident when Mr. B.
declares his love for her and takes her in his arms, Pamela writes, “O how my heart
throbbed! and I began (for I did not know what I did) to say the Lord’s prayer . . . ‘Lead
me not into temptation; but deliver me from evil, O my good God!’” (117). In choosing
this part of the Lord’s Prayer to utter at this particular moment, Pamela admits she is
tempted.
Medieval virgin saints such as Lucy, certain that they could experience no
pleasure from the sexual and material enticements offered them by the pagans who desire
them, had no real fear of corruption by temptation. As Lucy says, “The body cannot be
dangerously defiled, if it does not please the mind” (Donovan 94).12 Lucy is certain her
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mind will not be pleased by rape, so she is confident she will not be corrupted by it.
Pamela’s concern, however, is with the quality of the feelings such an encounter would
arouse in her. Pamela’s “‘O my good God’” may give voice to the warring feelings
aroused by both her desire for Mr. B. and her desire to preserve her virginity. In
psychoanalytic terms, the prayer-interrupting interjection might express a moment of
cognitive dissonance arising from the recognition of bodily pleasure that the mind wants
to reject but cannot.13 Pamela’s certainty that kissing Mrs. Jewkes will not arouse desire
in her as kissing Mr. B. did endorses heteronormativity. Pamela knows that the
“unnaturalness” of such a proposal would arouse her disgust, and she is able find the
voice kissing Mr. B. momentarily took from her: “Every now and then she [Mrs. Jewkes]
would be staring in my face, in the chariot, and squeezing my hand, and saying, ‘Why
you are very pretty my silent dear!’ And once she offered to kiss me. But I said, ‘I don’t
like this sort of carriage, Mrs. Jewkes; it is not like two persons of one sex to each other”
(145).14 Just as medieval virgin saints did, Pamela’s beauty provokes sexual assaults by
members of both sexes who read it incorrectly.
This illuminates a noteworthy distinction between medieval and eighteenthcentury heroines: The virgin saint is motivated by disgust, which engenders a turning
away from that which disgusts her (Ngai 168), in this case, sex. This turning away in turn
becomes a turning toward that which she desires: unmediated access to Christ, whose
bride she is. Her ability to do this is an expression of her virtue. Pamela, however, need
not succeed in retaining her virginity to live a life of moral beauty. That she struggles as
she does is enough. Since only another feeling can diminish a feeling once aroused,
Pamela tries in vain to rouse one to mitigate her desire: “[W]hat pity his heart is not so
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good as his appearance! Why can’t I hate him?” (235). However, if Pamela cannot hate
Mr. B., she cannot leave him either. She both lives and works in Mr. B.’s home.
In keeping with the eighteenth century’s shift to a wage-labor economy,
Richardson first locates the basis for Mr. B.’s authority in his status as Pamela’s
employer, not in his sex. She is Mr. B.’s live-in servant. Mr. B. and Pamela have
radically opposed visions of the paradigm that informs their employer-employee
relationship. Like a sort of micro-level divine right employer-king, Mr. B. expects his
employees to obey his every command without question. Pamela believes there are some
commands she need not follow because he has not the right to issue them. For instance,
after one particular episode of sexual assault Pamela berates Mr. B. He asks if she
remembers to whom she is speaking, and Pamela responds, “‘Yes, I do, sir, too well!
Well may I forget that I am your servant, when you forget what belongs to a master’”
(55). Pamela’s response demonstrates her beliefs that Mr. B. has obligations to her as her
master and that there are limits to his power. She claims the right to disobey when Mr. B.
does not remember his duty to honor the relationship’s boundaries. Pamela implies Mr.
B.’s duty as an employer presupposes a correspondent right on her part.15 More than this,
Pamela claims that her right to her virtue outweighs Mr. B.’s right to expect obedience.
Unlike the virgin saints, who know, with a certainty Descartes would envy, that
God will not allow them to be raped, Pamela has no one upon whom she can so
confidently rely to protect her virtue as the saints can on God.16 Although God is the
agent of virgin saints’ earthly salvation from rape, they sometimes receive assistance
from chaste men,17 as does Pamela when the chaste Mr. Williams helps her to
correspond with her parents. But Pamela knows that in the end, because she has no
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wealth or trustworthy male protector, she alone is responsible for her virtue or for her
life. She is vulnerable because she must earn a living. Nevertheless, she defies her
employer because she values her virtue. In her defiance and resistance to Mr. B.’s
attempts to name her whore lies Pamela’s route to a coherent adult female identity.
The heroine’s defiance of legitimate male authority deserves special attention
since the obligation of particular females to obey particular males is so important in both
early Christian and eighteenth-century texts of all sorts. In sacred biography, female
defiance of earthly authority is always a function of fidelity to a higher authority.18 Virgin
saints defy earthly political, religious, and/or familial male authority in order to obey God
(who, it must be noted, is a male figure as well). But the divinely ordained injunction to
comply with God’s laws, even if one must defy earthly authority to do so, applies to all
the faithful, regardless of anatomical sex.19 A secular version of this sexless model of
subservience and authority carries over into Pamela’s pre-marital conflict as a vehicle
that allows Pamela to be read as a criticism of divine right theories of government.
Pamela endorses the liberal democratic model of government by “fiduciary trust”
(Ebenstein and Ebenstein 384). Pamela’s assertion of rights identifies her with the liberal
democratic trustor/beneficiary, who has all of the rights in the wage-labor fiduciary trust,
just as “the people” do in the public political trust (384). Pamela replaces the divine-right
employer/king, whose position Mr. B. claims, with the liberal democratic
employer/legislator, who, governing in trust, has only obligations and no rights (384).
Pamela replaces medieval biographies’ and divine right theories’ spiritual subjects who
had only obligations to an omnipotent deity or king with Pamela, a liberal democratic
trustor with the right to revoke the trust if Mr. B. does not live up to his obligations.
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Pamela thus implicitly criticizes the divine right king by the failure of his analogical
representative—Mr. B., the employer-king of the wage-labor marketplace. In the end, this
struggle over Pamela’s rights or lack thereof is a struggle to define both Pamela and Mr.
B. If Mr. B. wins, he defines Pamela as a subject and himself as an absolute monarch.
Pamela wins, however, and in doing so she defines herself as a rights-bearing trustor and
Mr. B. as an obligation-bearing trustee. Analogous to the victory of Christianity over
pagan political rule in sacred biography, Pamela’s “reward” is thus a metaphoric victory
for the liberal democratic fiduciary trust over divine right monarchy.
Sentimental Domesticity and “Ingenuous Subjection”
As theorists such as Carol Pateman, Lauren Berlant, Elizabeth Maddox Dillon,
and Helen Thompson have convincingly shown, liberal democratic citizenship emerges
out of a foundation of “naturally” compliant wives and daughters. The democratic
liberalism endorsed by Locke derives male conjugal authority from anatomical sex and
the “natural,” love-based relations between men and women in an apolitical domestic
sphere (qtd. in Thompson 4-5). Although a marriage is a contract on this view, the
signatories do not remain equals after signing it with a performative “I do”; another
performative, the celebrant’s “I now pronounce you . . .,” not only produces a marriage, it
erases the new wife before the law, along with her right to divorce an abusive or absent
husband. The material possibility of an abusive or absent husband does not vanish,
however, and an ethics of sentiment provides an explanation of human nature that locates
one antidote for such abuses in the sympathetic “moral sense.” Pamela enacts this ethics
of sentiment in her pre-marital interactions with Mr. B. and makes his acceptance of that
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ethic a precondition of marriage; his transformation from predator to loving husband is
effected through the power of the sympathetic love endorsed by an ethics of sentiment.
Entrance into the marriage contract transforms the basis of Mr. B.’s authority
from socio-economic class to anatomical sex. This transformation’s supporting narrative
is a thinly disguised version of antiquity’s narrative of woman’s divinely ordained, and
hence natural, subservience. The only real difference between the medieval and the
eighteenth-century versions of the myth is that the medieval casts God as the active cause
of women’s subservience, while the eighteenth-century rendering credits an essential,
sex-specific human nature. This difference is really no difference, of course, because the
essential sex-specific human nature comes from God. In other words, Pamela, like the
liberalism it endorses, resorts to a divine right theory to justify “natural” male conjugal
authority. Pamela poses a vexing problem for liberal notions of “naturally” authoritative
husbands and “naturally” subservient wives because Pamela is not naturally subservient,
and those of us who have been privy to her writing know it. That includes Mr. B.
Once their relationship moves from the public sphere to the domestic, the burden
of ratifying Mr. B.’s conjugal authority falls to Pamela as his wife (Thompson 3-4).
Marriage to Mr. B. marks Pamela’s exit from the fiduciary, rights-conferring relations of
the public realm into the “apolitical,” nominally contractual domestic realm. Marriage
both elevates Pamela’s status and strengthens the social expectation she will freely obey
Mr. B. It also transforms her from a liberal democratic trustor who has all of the rights in
the relationship into a wife who has none, not even the right to divorce. At the same time,
marriage makes Mr. B. over into a divine right husband-king; where he’d had only
obligations and no rights once Pamela had established their pre-marital relationship as a
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fiduciary trust, he now has nearly all of the rights and few obligations. Mary Astell
expresses this idea in Reflections on Marriage, in which she argues liberal democratic
marriage as it emerges in the seventeenth century legally entitles husband-citizens to act
as domestic tyrants—a possibility she, of course, deplores.20 According to Astell,
although a husband may not kill his wife, he “may however do what is more grievous to a
generous Mind, render Life miserable, for which [a wife] has no Redress” (qtd. in
Thompson 5).
Even love cannot allow Pamela to easily negotiate the shift from being an
employee with rights to being a wife with none, as her responses to the “rules” of
marriage indicate (Thompson 80-81). For example, Pamela writes,
I must bear with him, even when I find him in the wrong.—This may be
a little hard, as the case may be circumstanced. . . . If she would
overcome, he says, It must be by sweetness and compliance.—A hard
lesson, I doubt, where one’s judgment is not convinced. . . . I am afraid
this doctrine, if enforced, would tend to make an honest wife a
hypocrite. . . . The words COMMAND and OBEY, he says, shall be blotted
out of his vocabulary.—Very good! Most chearfully do I subscribe to
this! (Richardson, Pamela 468-469; emphasis in original)

Although Pamela attributes the rules she records to her husband, she herself transcribes
and abridges them from a lengthy monologue of Mr. B.’s. In other words, through the
process of transcription, Pamela asserts herself as an agent with the ability to usurp her
husband’s rule-making role.21 Her responses to the rules as she has rewritten them reveal
that she believes she still has rights. While the subjects of sacred biography
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unquestioningly accept God’s rules, they defy earthly authority. Just as the virgin saints
do in their debates with the authority figures they defy, Pamela employs reason to
convince her tormentor that he is acting contrary to his true interests (469). Despite these
parallels, however, there are some not insignificant differences. The most important, of
course, are that Pamela lives through the text and she marries. Pamela’s marriage to Mr.
B. is entirely consistent with the late medieval configuration of chastity as intercourse
within lawful marriage. Moreover, Pamela’s inability to obey male authority is as much a
part of her God-given nature as, say, Agnes’ Christianity is of hers.
Borrowing the phrase “ingenuous subjection” from Richard Allestree, Helen
Thompson uses it to denote the spontaneous and unforced compliance, based on love,
with which a wife ratifies a husband’s conjugal power. While Pamela considers
complying with her husband’s rules, she finds that she cannot unquestioningly obey male
authority. Before marriage, Pamela obeys Mr. B. insofar as she believes his requests are
“naturally” grounded in the employer-employee relationship; she rejects his other
commands and demands. After she is married, Pamela finds that “ingenuous subjection”
to her husband-monarch’s commands is not in her nature.
The virgin saints unquestioningly obey their mutual divine husband; some even
speak quite erotically about the marriage bed they share with Jesus as they reveal their
God-given essences to their tormentors. As they repudiate their bodies’ signification of
corruption in any of the many forms that have been inscribed on the female body over the
millennia, these heroines, including Pamela, reveal identity by erasing what they are not.
In logical terms, women signify A and ~A. If either interpretive possibility is erased, only
the other remains. If the identity possibilities are purity and corruption, and the
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possibility of corruption is refused, only purity remains. The virgin saints’ purity consists
in the obedience to their divine husband, Jesus, that underlies their insistence on
maintaining their materially virginal state. According to this reading, obedience retains its
status as the cardinal feminine virtue, which is consistent with medieval Christian
orthodoxy.
However, when reading Pamela, we must not lose sight of the role the
normalization of heteronormative sentiment in establishing both women’s moral and
legal obligations to obey men and cultural valuations of particular affective responses to
those obligations. Thus while it seems that obedience remains the cardinal virtue for
eighteenth-century married women, the liberal democratic wife’s purity consists not only
in obeying her husband, but also in a particular phenomenological experience of doing
so—Thompson’s “ingenuous subjection.” By ingenuously complying, wives render
invisible the arbitrariness of assigning such power to embodied males. A wife’s
“ingenuous subjection,” moreover, has the power to modernize her husband by
discouraging his capricious use of the force that marks the pre-modern exercise of
conjugal authority. Even proto-feminist Aphra Behn suggests that a wife’s efforts to
comply spontaneously and voluntarily with her husband’s wishes might have the positive
effect of encouraging him to defer from “the show of arbitrary force that otherwise turns
her into a grievous or servile object” (6).
Pamela must learn to construct the “ingenuous subject” she must become in order
to ratify her husband’s conjugal authority (Thompson 5). As she reconstitutes herself as
an ingenuous subject, Pamela writes: “I am glad that I have fallen on this method of
making a journal of all that passes in these first stages of my happiness; because it will
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sink the impression still deeper; and I shall have recourse to my papers for my better
regulation” (Richardson, Pamela 467). In relying on her “papers” for her “better
regulation,” Pamela acknowledges the powerful role language plays in her attempts to
reconstruct herself as an ingenuously compliant wife and reveals the contingency of
women’s “natural” subservience to men.
The medieval construction of the female body as an always already doubled and
paradoxical sign is one of the systems of material and discursive practices that enable
Locke’s construction of wives simultaneously as property and objects of love for citizensubjects. Eighteenth-century female bodies still simultaneously signify purity and
corruption. Their purity is the rational, loving sympathy that grounds the human moral
sense, and the corruption of that same sympathy into an excessive and false sensibility
that can overcome reason and so threaten social order. The latter is the same excessive
and false sensibility Mary Wollstonecraft excoriates in A Vindication of the Rights of
Woman. Excessive sensibility has the potential to corrupt marriage and the power to
transform marriage from the contractual and rational friendship Wollstonecraft envisions
into the desperate pursuit of passion enacted by Eliza Haywood’s eponymous protagonist,
Fantomina.
Pamela’s appropriation of hagiography’s ritualized plots legitimizes the medieval
construction of virgins’ bodies as doubly signifying signs and brings that construction
into the eighteenth century as the field of the text’s pre-marital conflict. The struggle
between Pamela and Mr. B. over Pamela’s virtue is a battle over who will define whom
as what. Both of the available definitions for Pamela—virgin and temptress—are preEnlightenment constructions. If Pamela succeeds in claiming rights, she defines herself
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both as virgin and trustor and Mr. B. as a trustee. If Mr. B. emerges victorious, he defines
Pamela as a temptress and himself as the absolute monarch to whom she is subject.
Pamela’s victory thus allows her to self-define as virgin and provides Richardson a
vehicle to criticize divine right theories. In facilitating Richardson’s critical objectives,
however, the pre-marital novel leaves intact the Christian construction of women as
naturally subservient by setting the conflict in the eighteenth century’s version of the
medieval field of power—the employer-employee relationship—where anatomical sex is
not the basis for authority.22
The logic of the post-marital Pamela unravels Richardson’s pre-marital
endorsement of democratic liberalism by laying bare some contradictions, including the
paradoxically signifying female body on which the plot’s main conflict depends. Since
the liberal democratic trust presupposes “naturally” compliant wives who inhabit an
apolitical domestic sphere, and since anatomical sex cannot ensure women’s compliance,
liberal democratic trust merely replicates monarchic rule in the domestic sphere while
calling it “love.” Richardson’s reliance on early Christian constructions of women’s
doubly signifying bodies and natural subjection in the post-marital Pamela unravels his
criticism of divine right and endorsement of the liberal democratic fiduciary trust offered
in the pre-marital Pamela.
Conclusion: The Overplot
Medieval hagiography and Pamela anticipate the “overplot” Baym identifies in
nineteenth-century women’s sentimental literature (Women’s 12). The young martyrs’
faith leads to their loss of familial and social support; Pamela, a young girl, loses the
parental financial support on which she had “rightly or wrongly” depended and is
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therefore “faced with the necessity of earning her own way in the world” (11). Their
“friendless” state leaves the heroines vulnerable to male licentiousness (35). According to
the ideology of femininity endorsed by the virgin saints and Pamela, to assent to wealth’s
promise of an easy life is prostitution (39). These characters embody Baym’s “unflawed
heroines” (36), who discover within themselves the “intelligence, will, resourcefulness,
and courage sufficient to overcome” the obstacles in their paths (38). The heroines
themselves define their “final ‘domesticity’” (38), and their primary emotional support
comes from the domestic circle they thus define (39). The martyrs’ self-defined domestic
circle includes their divine husband, while Pamela’s includes Mr. B., her parents, and the
estate’s tenants. Neither the martyrs’ marriages to the heavenly groom nor Pamela’s
marriage to Mr. B. is represented as a “rescue” (39). Finally, all of these heroines attain
their true goal of constructing a coherent adult female identity. Moreover, others accept it
as their “true” identity. By steadfastly insisting that their bodies be read in only one way
and resisting attempts to read them otherwise, the heroines successfully refuse the
nominative power of their bodies’ analogical resemblance to Eve. Although the meaning
of virtue shifts, as we have seen, in effect, each of these heroines names herself Virtue,
and, in the end, others must acknowledge that as their true identity (23).
Historicizing the power relations between Pamela and Mr. B. illuminates them as
simultaneously enacting both gender and class and provides one interpretive possibility
whereby Pamela may be legitimately read as critiquing divine right theories of
government. This reading also reveals the substitution of monarchy’s naturally subjected
subject with democratic liberalism’s ingenuously subjected wife as a necessary, but not
sufficient, enabling condition in the emergence of male liberal democratic citizenship.
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Although Richardson may have intended virtue’s “reward” to be marriage to Mr. B.,
when read through twenty-first-century eyes, the post-marital text reveals that marriage in
eighteenth-century England may have been rewarding mainly for husbands—at least for
husbands of a certain class.
For many of Richardson’s readers, though, Pamela’s marriage would have
represented a victory for the sentimental values of the domestic realm over the
dehumanizing values of the public. For the middle-class wife Pamela becomes, marriage
may require a lifetime of negotiation, a lifetime of turning away from her desires, a
lifetime of ingenuous subjection, but according to her lights, her virtue lies in this very
struggle. As she performs her pre-marital identity in her interactions with Mr. B. and
(dis)ingenuously subjects herself to her husband’s will after marriage, Pamela
demonstrates the power of sentimental ethics by proving that the arousal of sympathy can
soften the heart of even the hardest employer. Mr. B.’s transformation marks the victory
of eighteenth-century democratic liberalism over the medieval theocratic moment out of
which the virgin saints’ biographies emerged and a victory for the ethics of sentiment. 23
Like the hagiographers of the Middle Ages, Richardson relies on the paradoxical
signification of the female body to motivate the plot’s conflict. A difference in faith
separates the heroines of hagiography from their families; economic circumstances
separate Pamela from hers. In their places of torment, they are indeed “poor and
friendless” children.24 These unflawed heroines already know the right thing to do, and
they stand steadfast in the face of terrific challenges to their “true” names. In the end, the
saints and Pamela have the will to refuse their bodies’ double signification and others
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must recognize the names they claim. In all of these respects, medieval sacred biography
and Richardson’s Pamela anticipate the literature Baym examines in Women’s Fiction.
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NOTES
1

“‘Your desire will be for your husband, and he will rule over you’ ” (Gen. 3.16). Anderson and
Zinsser note that this biblical command to Eve “is repeated in every era and every European nation” (xvii).
2
“[A] man . . . is the image and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of man. For man does
not originate from woman, but woman from man; for indeed man was not created for the woman's sake, but
woman for the man's sake” (1Corinthians 11: 7-9).
3
[T]he woman together with her own husband is the image of God, so that that whole substance
may be one image; but when she is referred separately to her quality of help-meet, which regards the
woman herself alone, then she is not the image of God (On the Holy Trinity 12.7.10).
4
“These sacred tales survive in greater volume and variety than any other writing. If we consider
that only a fraction of the lives that were written managed to survive the iconoclastic ravages of reformers,
we can get some idea of the extraordinary currency of the genre in its own time” (Heffernan 13). The South
English Legendary, for example, “survives in sixty-two manuscripts (a small percentage of the original
number), outnumbered in extant Middle English texts only by the Pricke of the Conscience, the Canterbury
Tales, and Piers Plowman, three compositions written a century later” (259).
5
In the texts of antiquity, a disobedient woman constitutes one of the greatest threats to order. For
example, Eve and Pandora disobey their husbands, releasing sin, pestilence, and death upon the earth; when
Aphrodite and Hera disobey Zeus, the destruction of Troy results.
6
In Athens, Solon’s law allowed fathers to sell into slavery a daughter who had lost her virginity
while forbidding them to sell any other children (Anderson and Zinsser 34). Roman law prescribed death
by stoning for non-virgin daughters (34). Hebrew law called for the execution of an affianced daughter who
had intercourse with a man other than her betrothed before the marriage (34). Under Germanic law, the
man who attempted to seduce a warrior’s daughter was fined, but the compensatory fine went to her father
because the dishonor was his, not hers (35). In Roman and Hebrew literature, the “wanton” daughter
symbolized cultural decline (34).
7
The lives of male virgin saints focus on the men’s spiritual fidelity to the Judaeo-Christian god
despite threats of execution if they do not renounce their faith. Biographers of female virgin saints depict
their subjects intrepidly defending their virginity against physical and psychological assault by antagonists
of both sexes (Donovan 14).
8
Although Genesis does not say that Eve tempted Adam, (it only says that he was with her and he,
too, ate) this is the traditional Christian interpretation. According to this interpretation, Eve’s sin leads to
women’s subordination to men. Adam’s sin brings human death into the world.
9
Although it did not entirely change the ways in which biographers manipulated their subjects’
lives to suit their own purposes. One only need look at the publication chronology in Samuel Johnson’s
biography of Richard Savage to see this.
10
Thus, virtue is also doubly signifies when it comes women. Sometimes it means virginity, and
sometimes it means virginity . . . and more.
11
For eighteenth-century Protestants, “justification” served as a synonym for “rectification”
(Barnhart 560), and in his pamphlet, Justification by Christ Alone Richardson uses it thus.
12
As Aquinas says, “So long as voluntariness remains in the ignorant person, the intention of sin
remains in him: so in this respect, his sin is not accidental.” (Aquinas 2.1.75).
13
This interpretation would have been available to Richardson’s readers, even though the
vocabulary of psychoanalysis used to express it would not have been. Of course, the proliferation of antiPamela satire implies that at least some of Richardson’s audience read this passage and others like it as
expressions of pleasure over which the heroine draws a discreet veil. Juxtaposing Pamela’s desire for Mr.
B. with an ethics of sentimentalism shows that her desire for Mr. B and the base feelings it arouses in her
are not the problem, anti-Pamelas notwithstanding. In the economy of sentiment, Pamela retains her virtue
as long as she struggles to quash those base feelings rather than indulging them.
14
This episode calls to mind Eugenia’s biography, in which Melantia becomes so enamored of
Eugenia’s beauty, that she “embraced that untainted maiden [Eugenia] and wanted to subject her to
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shameful intercourse” (Donovan 71). And, there is Aphrodisia, who attempts to “pervert Agatha’s mind”
by acting “alluringly” (38).
15
Indeed, Richardson’s eponymous heroine demonstrates a rights-based sense of autonomy
throughout Pamela, which would have been unintelligible to medieval audiences.
16
Agnes, for example, tells Simpronius, “I reject your threats completely, because I know the
power of my Lord. . . . nor will I ever be degraded by the pollution of strangers as a debased prostitute”
(Donovan 49). When Simpronius has her stripped and dragged to a prostitute’s home, her hair miraculously
grows long enough to hide her nakedness (49).
17
Eugenia relies on two eunuchs’ help in disguising herself as a man so she can enter a monastery
(Donovan 69). St. Peter himself visits Agatha in prison to comfort her.
18
Even when a daughter defies her father, her faith-based wish not to marry a pagan grounds her
defiance.
19
Most often, medieval antagonists are pagan lawmakers or enforcers: for example, Agatha,
Agnes, and Lucy (Donovan), Domnina’s daughters (Eusebius), and Perpetua (Perpetua). The antagonists in
Protestant martyrologies are Catholic, usually clergy (Challoner; Foxe).
20
In his political philosophy, Shaftesbury says that totalitarianism decreases civility and increase
the likelihood of violence, while liberty creates more “polite” citizens and peaceful and fosters peace.
Notice the striking parallels between what Astell says and Shaftesbury’s ethics of sentiment.
21
Pamela unsurprisingly ignores the passage where Mr. B. declares that he cannot compromise,
and her italicized responses to the rules she has constructed indicate that he will have to.
22
This is not to claim equality for men and women in the eighteenth-century wage market. Nor do
I ignore the sex-specific ways in which employers and other employees were able to oppress women. These
points are simply not relevant to my argument.
23
By establishing that Pamela has rights, Richardson leaves open the possibility that at least some
women enter into the marriage contract already possessing rights, a particularly vexing proposition for
democratic liberalism.
24
Pamela is fifteen, and the virgin saints are in their teens or preteens.
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CHAPTER THREE
MOTHERS: DOMESTIC ANGELS AND HARRIED HOMEMAKERS
American Women’s Literary Domestic Humor
At least since Anne Bradstreet’s seventeenth-century imitation of Elizabethan and
Augustan poetic techniques, North American women have appropriated humor’s
conventions for their writing.1 Some of these women have been authoritatively
designated women’s humorists by marketers or editors of scholarly anthologies, for
example.2 Still, there are no widely agreed-upon criteria for identifying women’s humor,
although not for want of critical effort. In their influential article, “Women’s Humor in
America,” for instance, Nancy A. Walker and Zita Dresner say that American women
writers and humorists “have created a distinctive body of humor with common subjects
and themes that set it apart from the male tradition of American humor” (172). According
to Walker and Dresner, U.S. women’s humor reflects a concern with the interpersonal
relations of the domestic sphere because their lives have taken shape there. However,
some of the texts they identify as examples of women’s humor do not focus on either
women’s lives qua women’s lives or domestic concerns at all.3 Moreover, men, too,
create literary humor that explicitly takes domestic life as its subject.4 Clearly, then,
subject matter alone cannot serve as the characteristic that distinguishes a tradition of
women’s humor from humor unmarked.5 Since men and women employ the same
humorous techniques as they construct their texts, technical difference cannot distinguish
women’s humor from humor unmarked, either.6 Nor can the sex or gender of the
humorist’s persona, given that the personae cross sex/gender lines.7 Moreover, the same
problematics that undermined efforts to distinguish among marked (women’s literature,
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for example) from unmarked (literature) literatures undermine attempts to distinguish
among marked and unmarked humor.8 Attempts to differentiate humorous literary
traditions by treating women’s humor as an ontological entity with empirically verifiable
characteristics are doomed to the same failure as efforts define women’s literature.9
However, even though not all humor authoritatively designated women’s takes
culturally normalized domestic life as its primary subject, the subjects of this chapter do.
Shirley Jackson’s Life among the Savages and Raising Demons and Erma Bombeck’s At
Wit’s End all purport to offer a first-person peek into the lives of an “ordinary” white,
suburban, middle-class homemaker and mother. Each author tells her story through the
voice of a humorous persona, a technique with a long tradition in U.S. humor. As I define
it for the purposes of this study, then, American women’s literary domestic humor is
written by people who self-identify as women or whose names identify them as female to
encultured readers. An adult female first-person narrator or narrative persona who claims
to be sharing her own experience is the speaker, and the primary subjects are domestic
roles, functions, and concerns culturally identified as feminine or female. It exhibits
literary devices and techniques conventionally associated with humor. Finally, it has been
in some way authoritatively designated women’s.
Although this definition is couched in terms that seem to point to an ontologically
distinct entity, the cultural realist frame insists that all of these properties are emergent,
mutually intereffective and overdetermining systems with material and discursive
histories. Through this frame, critical attention can shift at any time to any or all of the
emergent systems of discursive practices that converge in interpretive experiences. Such
systems include, but are not exhausted by, reading and writing practices; embodied
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writers, readers, and publishers; and gender ideologies. These material and discursive
systems participate in constructing embodied readers who will seek a book
authoritatively designated women’s domestic humor. Only by attending to all of the
participants in reading transactions can we begin to understand how women’s domestic
humor works to deliver laughs, why such a diverse readership might interpret it so
similarly, and whether the interpretive practices it rewards have any feminist subversive
potential.
From Domestic Angel to Harried Homemaker
The role of women’s magazines and other mass media in shaping U.S.
conceptions of “virtuous” housewifery and motherhood cannot be exaggerated (Walker,
Shaping 111). Nineteenth-century female domestic humorists most often published in
periodicals whose titles hailed women as their intended readership, Godey’s Ladies Book
and its predecessor, Ladies’ Magazine, for example.10 When these magazines’ writers
used the phrase True Womanhood, they took for granted that their audiences knew to
what they referred (Welter 151, n.1). To successfully adopt this identity possibility was,
as Barbara Welter notes, to instantiate “four cardinal virtues—piety, purity,
submissiveness, and domesticity. Put them all together and they spelled mother, daughter,
sister, wife—woman” (152).11 However, in her most virtuous manifestations, the True
Woman is a natural nurturer. As Welter says, she “naturally loved her children; to suggest
otherwise was monstrous” (171). This discursive formation not only naturalizes female
nurturing, its normative force constructs mother and nurturing as effectively synonymous
with good woman. And, if a good woman nurtures “naturally,” one who does not is a
monster. Out of the conjuncture of True Womanhood, U.S. republicanism, industrial
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capitalism, and Christianity emerges a new paradoxically signifying female body: the
asexual Angel of the Hearth.12
The Angel is the instantiation of the maternal love that, according to the ethics of
sentiment, grounds all human morality. Of course, discursive representations such as the
Angel of the Hearth emerge out of material and discursive histories. In the period
between the Civil War and World War I, the economy was in flux, shifting more
decisively from agriculture to manufacturing, and the ideology of the housewife began to
gain greater currency. By the end of World War I, American production was almost
completely centralized and industrialized (DuBois and Dumenil 462). An image of
femininity that “glamorized” the experience of “young, urban, prosperous white women
dominated” in the “popular media” (522). The home had become a center of consumption
rather than production (Walker, Shaping 54; Zukin 1-34). Ideologically, the feminine
domestic space was “one of influence rather than power, of kindness and love rather than
one of work, of educating children” and “maintaining cultural continuity in the home”
(Camfield 15). Domestic and market values still opposed each other, although white
middle-class mothers were forging new roles for themselves in “what historians have
called ‘the affectionate family’” (DuBois and Dumenil 532). The maternal role in the
domestic space was first and foremost to construct it as a “‘a haven in a heartless world’”
(Camfield 15). Middle-class mothers remained at home and reared children, although this
ideal was never really a possibility for vast numbers of working-class women.
The Depression may have extended the life of the geographically close extended
family in the United States, but it could not be saved. With American domestic space
almost wholly urbanized, the urban middle-class affectionate family shrank (DuBois and
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Dumenil 523). Popular media images of “New Woman” as “Home Manager—Purchasing
Agent—Art Director—Wife” re-visioned women’s domestic labor as “technological
efficiency” (532). Magazines such as the Ladies’ Home Journal stressed “individual
aspiration and self-development” and “openly acknowledged America’s distinct class
system” in articles until December 1940 (Walker, Shaping 5), when it announced
“‘America is proud to have no aristocracy’” (qtd. in Walker, Shaping 5).
U.S. women moved into traditionally male/masculine manufacturing jobs during
the 1940s at the behest of “business executives . . . government bureaucrats . . . and . . .
mass media” (Dresner 94). After the war, the same forces that had promoted women’s
entry into traditionally “male” occupations reversed themselves. Now they declared that
for women to work in those occupations was “‘unfeminine’” and “‘un-American’” (94).
As part of a campaign to move them back into the home, women were blamed for
destroying society by undermining the American family by “leaving home to work in the
first place” (94).13 By 1953, women’s magazines “insisted on a community of shared
values that crossed economic lines: hard work, the centrality of family life, and
aspirations for a better future” (Walker, Shaping 111). The phrase Good Housekeeping
Seal had long since entered the American lexicon. Print media of all sorts were filled with
advertisements and lifestyle advice (Walker, Shaping105-112; Zukin 175-176). The
white, suburban, middle-class ideal they touted was available at the local department
store, and women functioned as “the household’s ‘general purchasing agents’” (Walker,
Shaping113).
After World War II, with the rise of the suburbs and the final shift from an
agrarian to a manufacturing economy, came the dissolution of the geographically
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contiguous extended family. By mid-century, the white, middle-class suburban nuclear
family emerged as the normalized American domestic unit. White, middle-class U.S.
women were largely isolated either in rural bedroom communities, as in Jackson’s
Harried Homemaker persona, or in discrete nuclear-family homes in the newly-created
and often-barren suburbs, as is Bombeck’s persona. The Harried Homemakers’ physical
segregation in the suburbs and the rural bedroom re-visions earlier heroines’ separation
from support networks on which they had “rightly or wrongly depended” (Baym,
Women’s 11). In effect, their physical segregation translates the heroine’s isolation for
mid-twentieth-century U.S. readers. It is the form of isolation assumed by white, middleclass mothers in the mid-twentieth-century United States.
Idealized motherhood in mid-twentieth-century United States culture simply revisions the nineteenth-century angelic mother to accommodate a contemporary audience.
Adrienne Rich paints the picture:
Motherhood calls to mind the home, and we like to believe that the home
is a private place. Perhaps we imagine row upon row of backyards, behind
suburban or tenement houses, in each of which children are being fed and
sent off to school. Or we think of the house of our childhood, the woman
who mothered us, or of ourselves. . . . When we think of motherhood, we
are supposed to think of Renoir’s blooming women with rosy children at
their knees, Raphael’s ecstatic madonnas [sic], some Jewish mother
lighting the candles in a scrubbed kitchen on Shabbos, her braided loaf
lying beneath a freshly ironed napkin. (Of Woman 274-275)
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Notice, though, how these images elide the domestic practices that produce the food
being fed to the children, the bread on the Shabbos table, the clean kitchen floor, the
candles, and the ironed napkin. As Rich says, hegemonic images of motherhood elide the
juridical power of
the laws which determine how we get to these places, the penalties
imposed on those of us who have tried to live our lives according to a
different plan, the art which depicts us in an unnatural serenity or
resignation, the medical establishment which has robbed so many women
of the act of giving birth, the experts—almost all male—who have told us
how, as mothers, we should behave and feel. . . .the Marxist intellectuals
arguing as to whether we produce “surplus value” in a day of washing
clothes, cooking food, and caring for children, or the psychoanalysts who
are certain that the work of motherhood suits us by nature. We do not think
of the power stolen from us and the power withheld from us, in the name
of the institution of motherhood. (275)
Hegemony collapses housewife-manager into mother-angel,14 and the normative and
affective claims of motherhood re-vision women’s domestic practices as expressions of
love. To fail at domestic practices is to fail to love one’s children and so to fail at
motherhood. It is to be monstrous. The collapse of housewife-manager into angel-mother
is a necessary yet insufficient contributory precondition of the emergence of the midtwentieth-century American maternal body. Although this maternal body simultaneously
signifies Manager and Angel, the Manager is invisible, her productive domestic practices
erased by love’s ascendance as the source of clean clothes, freshly made beds, and hot
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meals. June Cleaver emerges as the incarnation of Manager as Angel, fully grown, apron
and pearls in place, like Athena erupting fully armored from Zeus’ head.15 In the Cleaver
household, dinners appear on the table, clothes are cleaned and pressed, and floors
sparkle, all without the audience seeing any domestic work being done. June’s hair is
neat, and no residue of domestic labor sullies her freshly starched and spotless apron.
With the ascendance of the Angel and the construction of the Manager as femme
couverte, domestic labor, like the American working-class, disappears into the well of
white, suburban, middle-class, heteronormative domesticity.
In order to successfully perform a coherent adult female identity that actually
expresses who she is and that others acknowledge as hers, the Angel must make the
Manager’s work visible. The conflict that initiates action, then, emerges first as the
struggle to make the Manager and her domestic labor wholly visible but not casting the
Angel and her motivating love into darkness. Coherence of identity necessitates the
illumination of both at the same time. When the discursive spotlight simultaneously
illuminates Angel and Manager, the Harried Homemaker persona emerges. The Harried
Homemaker’s is the body out of which emerge the conflicts that hinder her self-naming.
The Harried Homemaker who wishes to construct an autonomous and coherent adult
female identity must make others see the value in her domestic practices even if hers fall
short of the cultural ideal. Therefore, self-naming for Harried Homemakers requires that
they re-vision maternal virtue. They must in effect redefine motherhood by casting away
the veil of maternal love that conceals domestic labor. The Harried Homemaker must do
all this without allowing her lack of fulfillment by domestic labor to conceal the love
domestic labor expresses. However, as Jackson and Bombeck reveal, Angel and Manager
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coexist in Harried Homemaker, but they do not exhaust her identity. If she wishes to be
understood as anything more than “just” a mom or “just” a housewife or even “just” a
homemaker, she also must open up the field of identity possibilities available to “good”
mothers. In order to construct an intelligible adult female identity that expresses “who she
really is” in ways that others can understand, she must also establish that maternity, as
Rich says, is not permanent identity (Of Woman 23).
Ordinariness, Persona, and Cooperative Reading
For writers of humor, encouraging cooperative reading is critical. Humor is
particularly vulnerable to uncooperative interpretation, for if it does not engender
laughter, it has in some sense failed.16 The voice of an engaging humorous persona can
encourage readers and auditors to cooperate with the humor. Indeed, as Mark Twain’s
creator Samuel Clemens realized, in humor, persona can be everything. The Harried
Homemaker personae through which Jackson and Bombeck speak are the white,
suburban, middle-class literary descendants of Samantha Allen, Marietta Holley’s
nineteenth-century female version of the American “crackerbox philosopher” type, the
ordinary American.17 Just as Samantha Allen’s rough rural vernacular signifies her
ordinariness as a nineteenth-century rural wife and mother, the Harried Homemakers’
vocabularies and voices signify their situatedness as “ordinary” middle-class women in
mid-twentieth-century America.
The Harried Homemakers are nameless except insofar as readers attribute
authors’ names to them.18 Insistence on the persona’s anonymity facilitates readers’
ability to universalize the persona’s experience and creates a space in which they can
creatively imagine the persona’s experience as their own, in flavor if not in specific
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detail. Thus, when Bombeck’s persona reveals the “woman who is hidden,” she is in
some sense, articulating a very ordinary experience. The Woman Within, as I shall call
her, coexists with Angel and Manager, and she has her own dreams, aspirations, fears,
and desires (Bombeck 215). She is the woman who
sings duets with Barbra Streisand and pretends Robert Goulet is singing to
her. Who hides out in the bathroom and experiments with her eyes. Who
would wear a pair of hostess pajamas if everyone wouldn’t fall down
laughing. Who reads burlesque ads when she thinks no one is watching.
Who would like to feed her kids early without feeling guilty. Who thinks
about making ceramics, writing a play and earning a paycheck. (215-216)

Here is the final component of the Harried Homemakers’ successful construction of a
coherent adult female identity. The Woman Within is part of the “real” woman whose
identity the Harried Homemaker must successfully perform. She must redefine maternal
virtue so that it accommodates both her domestic practices and the desires, fears,
aspirations, and dreams of the Woman Within. If the nineteenth-century heroine’s goal is
to construct an adult female identity while refusing society’s equation of “female with
permanent child” (Baym, Women’s 17), the Harried Homemaker’s is to refuse its
equation of female with permanent mother. Harried Homemakers are willing to accept
that only readers will see the woman inside. They certainly do not expect their families
to.
The Harried Homemaker must encourage readers to deploy the cooperative
reading practices out of which the Woman Within can emerge as a viable identity
possibilty. But, one might object, personae ask readers to accept them as ordinary women
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while their creators publicly perform their identities as acclaimed writing professionals.
This hazards the kind of cognitive dissonance that might incline readers to withhold the
cooperative reading practices the author wants to elicit. Readers might resist or even
reject a persona’s attempts to self-identify as a housewife if they are repeatedly reminded
that the persona must also find time to work in addition to her homemaking activities.
That authors do not depict their personae writing encourages readers to elide their public
status as extraordinary women. Still, some readers refused to cooperate. For instance,
Bombeck reports some of the mail she received: “Other readers were not so enamored.
‘Who do you fancy career girls think you are, sitting in a plush office telling us
housewives what it’s like?’” (221). 19 Nevertheless, a great many readers were aware that
both authors were something more than their narrative personae claimed to be and yet
accepted the narrative personae they adopted. And, from Benjamin Franklin to Roseanne
Barr, some of the most successful American humorists have constructed personae who
adopt the stance of the ordinary person.20 The continued success of personae who purport
to be “just folks” indicates that this is an important component in eliciting cooperative
interpretive practices from humor’s readers and auditors.21
Performing Identity
Life Among the Savages and Raising Demons typify U.S. women’s domestic
humor in the mid-1950s, focusing as they do on events in Shirley Jackson’s own
Connecticut household. These texts, published in 1953 and 1957 respectively, in many
ways enact a pre-second wave continuation of U.S. working- and middle-class women’s
humorous treatments of their domestic lives.22 To establish herself as ordinary, Jackson’s
Harried Homemaker uses a variety of literary and humorous techniques to hail readers as
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enough like her to identify with her concerns. The first words of Life among the Savages
establish the ordinariness of the domestic setting: “Our home is old, noisy, and full”
(385). The compound sentence that follows tells readers what the occupants brought to
the house and what the persona expects to take when they leave: “When we moved into
the house we had two children and about five thousand books; I expect that when we
finally overflow and move out again we will have perhaps twenty children and easily half
a million books; we also own assorted beds and tables and chairs and rocking horses and
lamps and doll dresses and ship models and paint brushes” (385). The ordinariness of her
concerns and possessions can help readers who may be aware of her celebrity to accept
her persona’s initial stance as “just a housewife.” Her “bewilderment” at having “fallen
into” a “way of life” “inadvertently, as though we had fallen into a well and decided that
since there was no way out we might as well stay there and set up a chair and a desk and
a light of some kind” intimates that there is nothing special about the way her family has
gotten where it is (385).
The Harried Homemaker immediately invites readers to identify with her by
framing her desires as desires they share:
I cannot think of a preferable way of life, except one without children and
without books, going on soundlessly in an apartment hotel where they do
the cleaning for you and send up your meals and all you have to do is lie
on the couch and—As I say, I cannot think of a preferable way of life, but
then, I have had to make a good many compromises all told. (Jackson, Life
385-386)
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Jackson’s use of the second person creates a conspiratorial tone and welcomes readers as
co-conspirators. The second-person functions on two levels here. First, in U.S.
vernacular, especially in conversation, the use of you in this way can signify that the
predicate is a universal experience that the interlocutors share. It hails readers as people
who share the persona’s concerns and desires. Readers who respond to invitation by
acknowledging her desire as their own evince the kind of readerly engagement on which
humor’s success depends. That the desire she invites readers to share is for a kind of
comfort that almost anyone would find attractive helps, of course. On the second level,
though, the you opens up a space out of which can emerge some equivocation about the
“they” to whom “you” are opposed. This negotiating reading echoes Judy Brady’s iconic
feminist satire, “Why I Want a Wife.” It opens up the possibility that “they” are the
family members for whom the pleasurable possibilities of idleness are realized by the
domestic labor of the speaker.
With such remarks as “Mothers have their own seasonal occupations” (415),
Jackson’s persona makes visible the necessary connection between motherhood and
housework. Multiple meanings of occupation operate here. On the most obvious level,
“occupations” simply means work. The implicit all preceding “Mothers” universalizes a
necessary connection between motherhood and the domestic activity she next describes,
which is altering a child’s overalls (415). In this way, Jackson’s persona invites readers to
recognize something universal in an ideologically invisible connection between
motherhood and housework. Some readers can accept that invitation quite easily, perhaps
in part because nearly every member of the American working- and middle-class adult
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female reading public has had some experience with motherhood’s dual requirements,
even if only as a child or as a worker.23
But there is another sense of occupation at play here. According to the OED,
occupation also signifies the “action of taking or maintaining possession or control of a
country, building, land, etc., esp. by (military) force; an instance of this; the period of
such action; (also) the state of being subject to such action” (“Occupation”). So, what is
going on in this scene? The Homemaker sits “quietly in the living room,” alone, altering
children’s clothes. Her son, Laurie, enters with two friends. Her daughter, Jannie,
follows; she in turn is followed by Toby, the dog (415). The vitality and chaos of the
children and dog’s entry disrupts the serenity of the maternal scene. The juxtaposition of
children’s energy and placidly sewing Homemaker interrogates the hegemonic ideal by
complicating it with the active children and domestic labor representations elide.
The boys cannot be cheered up. They even reject an offer of ice cream. The
Homemaker pretends she does not notice their gloom. Then, Jannie asks if her mother is
mending Laurie’s overalls for the first day of school. Her inquiry is followed by “a long
silence” (416). The boys do not want to go back to school. What could be more ordinary
in an American home at the close of summer? The Harried Homemaker veils her own
feelings for just long enough to allow readers to think her response will one of empathetic
nostalgia. However, after telling the boys that she “used to love school,” a “falsehood so
patent that none of them felt it necessary to answer [. . .] even in courtesy,” she begins to
recommend diverting amusements (416). The children reject her suggestions. Instead, her
son tells her, “‘[W]e’re going to make a show. You’re going to be the audience, and you
got to go out to the kitchen while we get ready’” (417). Laurie’s use of the imperative
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mood gestures toward the cultural normalization of good motherhood as ingenuous
subjection to a child.
The Harried Homemaker next spends nearly four pages detailing the children’s
incoherent and chaotic performance, which results in dirty children and living room. This
is followed by Laurie’s offer to do a better show the next day. His proposal reminds
everyone that the boys will not be there the next day to perform. Of this, Harried
Homemaker says, “I thought briefly and comfortably of the quiet mornings, the long
lovely afternoons, the early bedtimes. ‘Well,’ I said, with immense heartiness, ‘it will be
summer again before we all know it’” (420). Her relief is patent for cooperative readers,
but it is short-lived. The next paragraph indicates that she is pregnant with a third child
(420). Her body itself will be occupied for the next nine months, followed by unremitting
subjection to an occupying child until that child, too, begins school.
For at least the next nine months, the persona’s body is indelibly inscribed Angel.
Jackson’s Harried Homemaker understands very well that maternity can mean unrelieved
subjection to children and circumscribe a woman’s ability to make herself seen as
anything other than Angel. Even when the persona directly claims the Woman Within as
part of her identity, hegemony rejects her identity claim. Her exchange with a female
desk clerk at the hospital where she goes to give birth exemplifies the discursive power of
the maternal body to configure identity:
“Name?” the desk clerk said to me politely, her pencil poised.
“Name,” I said vaguely. I remembered, and told her.
“Age?” she asked. ‘Sex? Occupation?’
“Writer,” I said.
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“Housewife,” she said.
“Writer,” I said.
“I’ll just put down housewife,” she said. (426)

The bureaucratic exchange continues for a moment, and it seems that the Homemaker,
who is in labor, has accepted the name hegemony’s functionary has assigned her.
However, for some readers, her response when the clerk asks for her husband’s name and
occupation might indicate resistance to being thus named:
“Husband’s name?” she said. “Address? Occupation?”
“”Just put down housewife,” I said. (426)

On my reading, the subversive possibilities emerge out of the same incongruity as the
humor. Jackson’s husband is also a writer. This fact affords an interpretive nuance that
lends subversive energy to her response. The reasonable tone with which she resists her
interlocutor encourages readers to follow her implicit chain of reasoning to its
nonsensical conclusion. If to be a writer is to be a housewife, and her husband is a writer,
then her husband is also a housewife. But in the gender economy of the 1950s U.S. white
middle class, housewives are, by definition, female and husbands, male. The moment of
recognition of incongruity in the image “male housewife” affords the possibility both
laughter and subversion, for her embodied presence as mother, housewife, and writer
gestures toward an incongruity between her material practices and an ideology that denies
their existence.
U.S. women rely on a variety of somewhat sophisticated literary techniques to
convey their feelings about its repetitiveness and monotony—and its rewards.24 Jackson,
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unsurprisingly perhaps given her stature as an author, uses conventional literary
techniques such as listing to great effect for this purpose. Jackson’s lists convey a sense
of the unending repetitiveness of domestic labor. In order to avoid distorting Jackson’s
effect, I quote at length.
I went, one spring morning, to clean out one of those downstairs closets,
which begin as very practical affairs, meant to be the resting place for wet
boots and umbrellas, and end up as containers for ice skates and then
hockey sticks and then tennis rackets and then, by the most logical of
extensions, baseball gloves and football helmets and basketballs and riding
boots and jackets left behind by visiting children. I had picked up a big
cardboard carton at the grocery, and into it I put the baseball gloves and
the football helmets and the riding boots and the tennis rackets and the
basketball. I put the carton at the foot of the back stairs, so I would
remember to take it up the next time I went, and I put clean newspaper on
the floor of the closet and went and got all the wet boots from the corner
of the kitchen and the spot inside the front door and the back seat of the
car, and I lined the boots up in the closet and derived an enormous
satisfaction from closing the closet door tight for the first time in months.
(Raising Demons 534)

Jackson, a highly skilled writer, almost certainly chose her punctuation carefully. This
195-word paragraph comprises three sentences broken only by six commas and two
periods. Moreover, she abandons her very formal comma use early on in the first
sentence. The droning quality of the sparsely punctuated list of possessions, the repetition
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of the conjunction and, as well as the ordinariness of the objects and activity contribute to
the scene’s verisimilitude and convey housework’s monotony and never-finished quality.
In this scene, readers are afforded a rare glimpse of Homemaker “satisfaction.”
But she does not derive satisfaction from the work itself; her satisfaction comes, as she
says, “from closing the door tight for the first time in months.” And, when the
Homemaker gets the carton up the stairs, she realizes that there is no place else to put the
things it contains, so she carries it back downstairs, takes the boots out of the closet,
empties the carton back into the same closet, and “then the door would not close again”
(535). That she is back where she started reflects domestic labor’s unending
repetitiveness and unceasing incompleteness. One can never close the door on domestic
disorder, she seems to be saying.
By 1967, when Bombeck’s collection was first published in book form, The
Feminine Mystique had impacted white, middle-class U.S. women’s willingness and
ability to speak openly about the difficulty of trying meet social expectations and feeling
isolated and ashamed. In short, women began publicly to admit that they did not find the
dual roles of Angel and Manager fulfilling. Betty Friedan calls this the “problem that has
no name” (15). The two-fold problem, of course, was white, middle-class women’s
dissatisfaction with lives that they found unfulfilling and their guilt and shame about
wanting something more. That the Rolling Stones’ recording of “Mother’s Little Helper,”
a warning about the risks of the barbiturate Nembutal for housewives, went to number
eight on the U.S. Billboard chart in 1966 says a great deal about how thoroughly
permeated with discourse about the unnamed problem U.S. culture became in a very
short time. The song depicts the problem as a great many people at the time understood it.
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On this view, the problem is neither institutionalized motherhood nor normalized
domestic practices. The real problem is feminine vanity. The rest is rationalization:
What a drag it is getting old . . .

Kids are different today, I hear ev’ry mother say.
Mother needs something today to calm her down.
And though she’s not really ill, there’s a little yellow pill,
She goes running for the shelter of a mother’s little helper,
And it helps her on her way, gets her through her busy day. (Jagger and
Richards)

About his inspiration for the lyrics, Jagger says, “It’s about drug dependence, but in a sort
of like spoofy way. As a songwriter, I didn’t really think about addressing things like
that. It was just everyday stuff that . . . I’d observe and write about” (Songfacts). Of
course, according to Jagger and Richards, death is the “spoofy” end for a mother who is
“not really ill” and yet uses tranquilizers “to calm her” anxieties about aging:
And if you take more of those,
You will get an overdose.
No more running for the shelter of a mother’s little helper.
They just helped you on your way,
Through your busy dying day. (Jagger and Richards)

When Bombeck’s persona speaks, she is not just speaking to readers. She is also speaking
to Friedan and the Stones and to those who share their beliefs. She is speaking to all those
Americans who belittle housewifery and housewives, including by neglect. And,
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although she is careful to stress that she loves her family and her country, this Harried
Housewife is fed up.
That Bombeck returned to public writing after the public emergence of U.S.
feminism’s second wave has much to do with her voice and her reception. Women who
wrote American domestic humor after World Wars I and II showed readers the domestic
practices that underwrote images of home as haven and mother as angel. They depict
housework directly, and some even announce that they hate housework, for example Peg
Bracken, author of 1960’s The I Hate to Cook Book.25 Resentment and frustration remain
implicit, however, conveyed only by an occasional sarcastic remark or retort. After 1963,
however, the Harried Homemaker’s voice changes. Bombeck’s Harried Homemaker’s
voice is not the slightly sardonic tone of a woman who sees that things are ridiculous but
does not quite care to fix them that Bracken adopts. No longer does the Harried
Homemaker enact a drag performance of James Thurber’s “Little Man,” as Jackson’s
often does. She has changed her attitude toward the things that bewilder her.
The Harried Homemaker of the 1950s and early 1960s shows us the domestic
labor she performs, and, simultaneously, implicitly reveals the disingenuousness of her
subjection to her children. Bombeck’s Harried Homemaker does not so much show
readers domestic labor as reveal what she thinks of and how she feels about its
invisibility to those who benefit from it. In other words, while Jackson’s persona devotes
a good deal of narrative attention to depicting what she does, Bombeck’s persona reveals
her thoughts before, during, and after doing what she does. Gone is the veil of
understatement, equivocation, and lexical ambiguity that hid the disingenuousness of her
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subjection. The disingenuousness of this Harried Homemaker’s subjection is patent from
the outset. She says to herself,
A drudge. That’s all I am. They’ll all be sorry when I’m not around to
run and fetch. . . .Lunches. Better pack the lunches. Listen to them bicker.
What do they care what I pack?
Of course, none of these things would bother me if I had an
understanding husband. . . .He doesn’t have to throw himself across the
washer during ‘spin’ to keep it from walking out of the utility room. He
doesn’t have to flirt with a hernia making bunk beds. He doesn’t have to
shuffle through encyclopedias before the school bus leaves to find out
which United States president invented the folding chair. (Bombeck 14)

Her love-tempered frustration continues to resonate with readers. As one fan writes,
“‘Why Erma Bombeck? Because of this—because she wrote about things that nobody
else thought mattered, that everyone worried about in the back of their heads but no one
articulated because it didn’t seem important enough” (Astyck n.p.). In other words,
Bombeck gives a voice to the “problem that has no name.” Bombeck’s Harried
Homemaker clearly and directly expresses exasperation and frustration. The voice of
Bombeck’s Harried Homemaker is polyphonic and encompasses Angel, Manager, and
Woman Within. Her voice emerges out of the “troubled” intersection of contending
discourses about the roles of women in the public and domestic spheres; the value for
society of women’s creativity, experience, and labor; and the expression of identity
through lifestyle performance.
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The Contrastive Trope
The use of character contrast or foils to establish the heroine or persona’s
identity—for instance, the juxtaposition of Pamela with Mrs. Jewkes or Agatha with
Aphrodisia—is what I call the contrastive trope. This trope places the heroine or persona
in a “position of superiority” or inferiority relative to the foil (Camfield 158). The
nineteenth-century use of this contrastive trope replicates the writing practices of
medieval biographers and Richardson in that it establishes the heroine’s virtue in part by
contraposing her with women who either lack or possess the very qualities she
tenaciously strives to manifest (Baym, Women’s 35). As these conventional contrasts are,
as Rich would say, re-visioned for a nineteenth-century U.S. female readership, they
retain the didactic role of normalizing a cisgendered, heteronormative femininity.26
Some scholars of humor and laughter hold that humorists put themselves in “a
position of superiority” (Walker, Very Serious 12-19). Such “aggression” theories locate
the source of laughter in the humorist or persona’s confrontation by social forces with
which s/he is at odds (Camfield 158). Although Walker, for instance, claims that
women’s humor generally does not function this way, it often does. Some of the authors
she identifies as women’s humorists in fact use humor “as the language of social
aggression against outsiders” (158).27 Still, because aggression theories of humor
carefully consider the ways humor can emerge out of clashes of “opposites,” they provide
a frame for examining how the contrastive trope participates in normalizing or valorizing
particular character traits instead of others for situated, embodied readers. Successful use
of the contrastive trope can participate in the normalization of the heroine’s values,
beliefs, and practices for cooperative readers. The contrastive trope is most often used in
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one of two ways. First, the flawed heroine’s virtue is normalized when her values, beliefs,
and practices are finally congruent with the unflawed foil’s. This is a forward-looking use
of the trope and the narratives in which it predominates take the heroine’s process of selftransformation as their central concerns.
The normalizing use of the trope aims to establish a flawed or unflawed heroine’s
values, beliefs, and practices as normal, average, or ordinary. This use of the trope can
either juxtapose an unflawed heroine, say, Saint Agatha, with a clearly flawed female
antagonist like Aphrodisia. Or, and this is more often the case in contemporary women’s
popular literature, a first-person heroine or persona contrasts her own values, beliefs, and
practices against an exaggerated image of the ideal. For instance, Jackson’s persona
compares her family’s values and beliefs with those of an overly genteel twentiethcentury version of Betsey Bobbett, her daughter’s teacher, Mrs. Skinner. Jackson’s
portrait of Mrs. Skinner re-visions the nineteenth-century anachronistically passive
woman that Baym identifies as so often appearing as the sentimental heroine’s foil
(Baym, Women’s 36). The incongruity of Mrs. Skinner’s very old-fashioned notions of
“womanliness” being repeated by a kindergarten-aged girl dissolves in readers’ laughter
at Mrs. Skinner’s anachronistic womanhood and the values on which it is based.
The normalizing contrastive trope constructs the characters being compared as
metonyms for the values, beliefs, and/or practices they manifest. The normalizing
configuration of the contrastive trope can thus place the persona in a position of
superiority, and Bombeck draws on this possibility to tap its subversive possibilities. She
wants to normalize homemaking practices that Sarah Kemble Knight would have
identified as slatternly, and, at the same time, to ridicule the ideal that popular media tout.
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In other words, what Bombeck attempts to do with her unique voice and particularly
inventive self-reflexive use of the contrastive trope is to get readers to agree to her
hierarchy of domestic practices. Her mission here is nothing less than to overturn
hegemony’s equation of homemaking skill with good womanhood.
Bombeck’s Harried Homemaker welcomes readers by invoking familiar images
that call attention to the inadequacy of her homemaking practices: “The draperies are
dirty (and will disintegrate if laundered), the arms of the sofa are coming through. There
is Christmas tinsel growing out of the carpet. And some clown has written in the dust on
the coffee table, YANKEE GO HOME” (Bombeck 10). For contemporaneous readers,
the contrast between her domestic practices and normalized domestic practices would
have been immediately apparent. Readers’ recognition of incongruity between these two
incompatible sets of domestic practices is one space out of which laughter can erupt.
However, the Harried Homemaker needs to ensure that readers are laughing with her and
not at her if she is to successfully perform her full identity.
Her next move is to place her husband and herself in the frame of the contrastive
trope and compare their parenting practices: “[G]ood old Daddy would simply heave a
flannel-wrapped bundle at me and say, ‘Here’s Mommy’s little boy.’ (Any mother with
half a skull knows that when Daddy’s little boy becomes Mommy’s little boy, the kid is
so wet he’s treading water!)” (11). This passage exemplifies Bombeck’s use of the ironic
aside as part of her persona’s identity performance. Bombeck’s Harried Homemaker also
immediately uses a universal modifier (in this case, any) to set up what follows as the
universal experience of all mothers, and the universal experience of all mothers is the
husband/father refusing one of the more unpleasant parenting tasks, and presuming that it
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is natural, or at least normal, that he do so. This brief passage perfectly depicts the
multiple subjection of the suburban wife and mother. Her husband’s casual assumption of
male privilege depends on the cultural construction of women as naturally more suited to
the tasks of child-rearing, even when those chores require little more than hand-eye
coordination. It is a performance of male domestic authority that seems perfectly normal
and natural to him. What is more, this is something all husbands do, she says. When she
accepts the child and changes the diaper, she subjects herself to both him and the
ideological underpinnings that enable such casual assumption of male privilege. Her
subjection, no matter how disingenuous, though, ratifies sentiment’s discursive
construction of maternal love as the foundation for human morality.
The parentheses setting off the aside typographically conjure the conspiratorial
gesture of a hand cupped to the mouth to safely contain the words’ extension. Moreover,
the cupped hand keeps some people out even as it keeps words contained. Furthermore,
the closing exclamation point brings an incredulous note to the aside. Her incredulity
invites readers to laugh at men’s parental ineptitude, and to recognize it as a selfinterested move to avoid unpleasant tasks instead of as a response to women’s “naturally”
superior child-rearing skills. But there is even more going on here. In a 1998 interview
with Elizabeth Farnsworth, Toni Morrison said, “All paradises, all utopias are designed
by who is not there, by the people who are not allowed in.” Bombeck’s enclosure of
women’s knowledge about men admits women but excludes men except insofar as they
are the objects of women’s knowledge. If some media coerce cisgendered women to read
as cisgendered men, as Judith Fetterly and Laura Mulvey have convincingly shown they
do, Bombeck’s Homemaker occasionally turns the tables by making men read themselves
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through women’s eyes. Her utopia, then, is one in which men must see themselves as
women see them, and knowledge is constructed from women’s experience. Jackson
allows readers to see the disingenuousness of mothers’ subjection to their children.
Bombeck reveals the contingency of the “natural” foundation of male child-care
ineptitude, and by exposing the contingency of normalized male parenting practices, she
makes visible husbands’ casual assumption of male privilege. Additionally, with her
repetition of this motif, she brings to light the source of male privilege in the maternal
female body’s always already “ingenuous” subjection to her children.
That the Harried Homemaker’s subjection to her children is disingenuous is clear
in the brusque, “‘Everybody out!’” with which she sends them out to play in the snow.
Her terseness is a consequence of the children’s refusal to “let” her awaken in her “own
way,” itself a ritualized morning reminder of the privilege her husband enjoys at her
expense (Bombeck 10). Once the children are outside, the Harried Homemaker moves to
the window and watches them for a moment. She muses to herself, “Look at ‘em
stumbling around the driveway like newborn field mice” (15). This is no sentimentally
idyllic scene of fond maternal oversight. These are not the words of a domestic angel who
is certain that her gentle guidance and example ensure that her children are on the right
path. These are the words of a Harried Homemaker whose culture never tires of assuring
her that “children and mothers are the ‘causes’ of each others’ suffering” (Rich, Of
Woman 23).
Continuing to cast about for the cause of her malaise, the Harried Homemaker
continues, “It’s the weather all right. No leaves on the trees. No flowers. No green grass.
Just a big picture window with nothing to look at but . . . a new bride moving into the
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cul-de-sac! Well, there goes the neighborhood” (15). The Harried Homemaker speaks
directly to readers with the next sentence, addressing them with sarcasm and a vernacular
second-person interrogative that transforms her interior monologue into gossip: “Would
you look at her standing at her new husband’s elbow as he stencils their marvy new name
on their marvy new garbage cans?” (15). The next sentence gives readers who remember
her earlier description of her home an opportunity to compare the Harried Homemaker’s
domestic practices with the new bride’s: “I suppose tomorrow she’ll be out waxing her
driveway” (15). If readers do not take this utterance as serious speculation, and the
Homemaker’s hyperbolic image almost ensures that they will not, then the image of a
woman “waxing the driveway” may be read as ridiculing a domestic ideal that could give
rise to such behavior. And, with the next sentence, she repudiates that ideal in favor of
the real, thus establishing her common sense: “So, give her a few years and she’ll be like
the rest of us sifting through the coffee grounds looking for the baby’s pacifier” (15-16).
Since this comes shortly after she has told readers that she is unappreciated, though,
perhaps the impossibility of the ideal is not all she criticizes here.
Typographically, this three-sentence passage encloses both the new bride and the
speaking I with the “rest of us” whom she will “be like” in “a few years.” The speaker,
the Harried Homemaker, is thus simultaneously located in the present, watching the new
bride and her husband; in the past, when she was herself the new bride; and in the future,
when the new bride will be like “us.” In a few years, the new bride will be a mother, and
she will be looking for a pacifier. Although childless, in the suburbs she already inhabits
the maternal body. This passage hints that the suburbs themselves represent a threat to the
Harried Homemaker’s attempts to construct identity, and she repeats this motif
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throughout the text. In the suburbs, all married female bodies are always already
maternal, and maternity defines them for others. In the suburbs, the new bride’s present is
“our” past and her future is “our” present. But what of our future? Well, Bombeck says,
we could end up like Aunt Lydia.
The final twist in this self-reflexive configuration of the contrastive trope is to
imagine “our” future. Once again, the persona begins with the sad state of the domestic
space, but then moves immediately to link her future with the past: “This place will have
to be cleaned before they can condemn it. Wouldn’t be at all surprised if I ended up like
my Aunt Lydia” (17). That domestic disorder reminds her of Aunt Lydia links whatever
happened to Aunt Lydia to a chaotic home. With what immediately follows, the Harried
Homemaker begins by speaking about what she has been told, but quickly becomes more,
shall we say, confident about why Aunt Lydia left home:
Funny, I haven’t thought about her [Aunt Lydia] in years. Grandma
always said she ran away with a vanilla salesman. Lay you odds she made
her move right after the holidays. Her kids probably hid the Christmas
Candy in the bedroom closet and the ants were coming out of the
woodwork like a Hessian drill team. One child was going through the dirty
clothes hamper trying to retrieve her “favorite” underwear to wear to
school. (17).

Aunt Lydia functions as a contrastive projection that allows the Harried Homemaker to
compare her past self (the bride) with her present self and her future self (Aunt Lydia).
Her verb choices facilitate her identification with Aunt Lydia by conveying increasing
levels of certainty about Aunt Lydia’s motives. At first, she simply reports what she has
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been told. With “I’ll lay you odds,” she indicates a greater degree of certainty than
unsubstantiated family legend can provide. Her next verb choice shifts from the
speculative, laying odds, to probability. The clause “the ants were coming,” marks her
shift to declarative certainty, and with this shift, it becomes clear that she is no longer
speaking only of Aunt Lydia. The next paragraph drops the “Aunt” from Lydia’s name,
thus erasing her particularity and allowing her to stand in for any woman or all women
named Lydia. In this paragraph the persona also shifts to the use of the simple past tense
in the declarative mood to relate the story of the dog that “laughed out loud” before
soiling the rug (18). In the next one-sentence paragraph, Lydia loses her name altogether
and becomes “her”: “Uncle Wally probably pecked her on the cheek with all the
affection of a sex-starved cobra said he wanted to talk to her about Christmas bills when
he came home (18). With this shift to namelessness also comes a syntactic change that
removes the woman from subject to direct object.
In the final paragraphs before the departure, when the now-nameless subject of
the anecdote passes a mirror, the Harried Homemaker places her back into the syntactic
subject position, and the narrative point of view shifts. Although until this point in her
narrative the Homemaker reported on past events and possibility, she now reveals with
declarative certainty the feelings and emotions that led to the departure, assuming the
stance of a first-person narrator with at least limited omniscience:
She passed a mirror and noticed a permanent crease on her face where
the brush roller had slipped. Her skirt felt tight. She sucked in her breath.
Nothing moved. Her best friend called to tell her the sequin dress she
bought for New Year’s Eve had been reduced to half price.
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Speculating on her future she could see only a long winter in a house
with four blaring transistor radios, a spastic washer, and the ultimate
desperation of trying to converse with the tropical fish. (18)

That there were no transistor radios, electric washing machines when Aunt Lydia was
part of the family, the sense that she speaks of herself and other women like her is
strengthened. And, in “Aunt Lydia’s” home, domestic disorder is not the result of lax
domestic practices, but instead, consequent upon the activities of others and the inevitable
passage of time marked by a thickening waist and a loss of the sex appeal that can signify
the Woman Within. What Bombeck has done with her complicated use of the contrastive
trope is to present to readers a timeline of the stages of the life of the white, suburban,
middle-class woman. But she does more than this in these few short pages. She names the
“problem that has no name” (Friedan 15). The problem, as she names it, is not so much
the child care as the isolation from other adults, not so much caretaking and doing
housework as the lack of appreciation for their being done, and not so much womanly
vanity as maternity’s colonization of the whole woman.
More than naming the problem, though, Bombeck claims it as part of her identity
as both Angel and Manager and thus reunites them into a coherent whole. She performs
the problem in the light of day, so to speak. Her performance is the contact zone in which
Mother and Housewife can merge and out of which the Harried Homemaker persona
emerges as a hybrid identity. Finally, love goes hand-in-hand with labor instead of
masking it.
The important difference between the medieval saints and Pamela and these
twentieth-century women is the material fact of motherhood. The Harried Homemakers
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face the same problem Pamela and the saints do: They must control how others read their
bodies in order to successfully perform an intelligible adult female identity. The paradox
of the mid-twentieth-century maternal body differs from the problem of the virginal or
chaste female body only insofar as it adds another layer of complexity to the persona’s
task. The virgins and Pamela seek only to reveal the real woman, the true person that they
already are. They strive to resist misprision, and their success is dependent only on
illuminating the correct reading of their bodies. There are only two interpretive
possibilities: virtue and corruption. The Harried Homemaker, however, experiences
multiplicity as an integral part of the identity she seeks to reveal. She must also, then,
reconcile multiple, and often conflicting, dreams, desires, fears, and aspirations. She
must, that is, construct a coherent self before she can perform it. Only then can others
read or misread it. As Jackson and Bombeck write it, American women’s literary
domestic humor becomes a discursive performance of the process of the identity
construction of an ordinary white, middle-class American woman. If the nineteenthcentury heroine’s goal is to construct an adult female identity while refusing society’s
equation of “female with permanent child” (Baym, Women’s 17), the Harried
Homemaker’s is to refuse its equation of female with permanent mother and to
accommodate the Woman Within. So, have they?
Conclusion: Cooperating, Negotiating, and Resisting
Incongruity theories of humor dominate in contemporary humor studies and posit
that humor and laughter emerge out of the space between two seemingly opposite things
that have enough in common to be meaningful when they are juxtaposed. This is why the
contrastive trope can be so productive in humor. Characters are held in tension, and, if
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they are sufficiently similar and at the same time sufficiently different, readers’
recognition of a meaningful incongruity can elicit laughter. Unfortunately, focus on this
frame to the exclusion of others thus far has led to little other than attempts to identify the
particular juxtapositions out of which laughter elicited by U. S. women’s domestic humor
emerges. For instance, Walker says domestic humor’s subversive potential emerges out
of the incongruity between appearance and reality. She suggests that by writing
“amusingly” about housework and child rearing, mocking their own lives, and inviting
others to laugh at and share their frustration, Harried Homemakers “appear” to remain
“subservient” (Walker, “Toward Solidarity” 60). From this subservient position, they can
“openly advance . . . a feminist cause” (60). And of course, they can. But they do not
often do so, at least until the 1980s. However, she continues, “The humor of American
women has in fact functioned as a means of establishing and representing a community of
shared concerns about oppression” (60). The problem here is that this view presupposes
that the women who write and read—and laugh at—domestic humor experience their
domestic roles as oppressive. But how then do we account for the tones of pleasure and
pride that infuse the Housewives’ descriptions of their fictionalized families’ chaotic dayto-day lives? And how do we decide between and among competing claims to
incongruity? For instance, does the success of domestic humor depend on its play with
the incongruity between U.S. ideologies of homemaking and women’s actual
homemaking practices? Or does its success depend on or emerge out of an awareness of
conflict among ideologies of femininity? To assume that answers to these questions or
others like them will definitively identify “the” source of readers’ laughter is to
presuppose that all readers laugh at the same things for the same reasons and that the
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tensions in the text are distinct and readily identifiable. These presuppositions are simply
untenable given what we know about the variety and fluidity of interpretive practices.
Other feminist criticism of literary domestic humor is grounded in Freudian and
post-Freudian psychology. These “relief” theories explain humor and laughter as the “the
saving of emotional energy marshaled to confront suffering” that allows embodied
human beings to “sublimate pain in laughter” (Camfield 154). The pleasure we feel in
laughter on this view is the body’s relief at saving emotional energy it otherwise would
have expended on confronting an unbeatable source of pain or rage.28 And indeed,
Bombeck gestures toward this personal affective experience when she says that she began
writing domestic humor because, “I knew if I didn’t follow Faith’s advice and laugh a
little at myself, then I would surely cry” (Bombeck 223). For Betty Friedan and Patricia
Meyer Spacks, though, this “laugh or cry” attitude is omnipresent in domestic humor and
encourages women to dispel in laughter their hopelessness, desperation, and unmet
aspirations.29 Spacks also holds that domestic humor perpetuates oppressive stereotypes
of women by “preserving the image of feminine incompetence, siphoning off anger,
suggesting that if it’s funny to be a bad housewife, there may be some dignity to being a
good one” (qtd. in Dresner 95). For these critics, domestic humor is “profoundly
conservative” (Walker “Toward” 62).
Domestic humor does not necessarily encourage women to “siphon off”
unpleasant emotions rather than expressing them, however. Indeed, the Harried
Homemakers express anger, that most un-Angelic of emotions. For instance, Jackson’s
Homemaker becomes angry with another mother whose son, she has been told, attacked
her son without provocation, and they verbally confront each other. When she and the
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other mother learn the true circumstances surrounding the fight, they bond even more
strongly than they had before their verbal altercation (Life 408-414). Instead of
sublimating her anger, this Homemaker acts upon it, thus presenting readers with a model
of a woman who acts on her anger without terrible consequences. And, it presents to
isolated homemakers the existence of other women like them and the possibility of
bonding with those women.
Nor do these texts necessarily perpetuate negative stereotypes about women.
Alice Sheppard notes that the “woman driver” is among the most common stereotypical
humorous images of women’s incompetence in U.S. culture (35). Yet when the children
decide that the family needs a car in Life among the Savages, no one suggests that the
nameless husband learn. Everyone takes it for granted that the Harried Homemaker will
be the family driver. The husband merely settles the children’s argument over who will
ride in the front seat next to his wife by saying, “‘I am going to ride in front’” (447). And,
when she is involved in an accident, her tenacious insistence that the other driver was at
fault leads to the exposure of his scheme to defraud her insurance company (448). Not
only is the Harried Homemaker a competent driver, she is sufficiently assertive to bring
the truth to light even though her opponent is a practiced con man.
One stereotype that the texts do seem to reinforce, at least on a surface level, is
that of woman as natural nurturer. The Harried Homemakers is able to manage the
complexities of feeding and caring for the children, for instance, and her husband is not.
So, when Jackson’s Harried Homemaker plans for a weekend trip to visit some college
friends, it takes her three days to accomplish the multitudinous preparatory tasks. She has
so much to do and organize, in fact, that it takes her three pages to list them all. She
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leaves behind a detailed schedule of where the children need to be and when they need to
be there, and instructions about how to heat the prepared meals she has left waiting in the
refrigerator. Still, her husband cannot follow the directions and is unable to manage
successfully without her. She returns home to a note telling her that they are at the
hamburger stand having dinner—and that they had eaten there the night before as well
(Raising 584-588).
For some readers, the Harried Housewives’ careful attention to relationships
among family members and their husbands’ domestic ineptness confirms hegemony’s
assignment of sex/gender-specific characteristics. For these readers, the “fact” that
women focus on relationships is an aesthetic expression of a “natural” female biological
caretaking imperative. The text thus meets readers’ expectations by reiterating prior
reading experiences and confirming cultural ideologies that construct sex and gender as
causal influences when it comes to human behavior, tastes, interests, and inclinations. On
this level, the text is, as Spacks says, “profoundly conservative” (qtd. in Dresner 95). But
these reiterations are not merely functions of a text. They also depend on particular
convergences of situated, embodied readers; historied discursive systems and material
practices; and fluid movement between and among idiosyncratically authorized
interpretive practices. Readers who must negotiate clashes among or between ideologies
might notice that this episode hints that women can leave some of the responsibility for
child care and housework to their husbands. Disaster will not necessarily ensue. No one
will starve, although it may be that no one will cook, either. This is an important
transformation of a long-historied system of twentieth-century U.S. women’s humor most
important contributions of to women’s efforts reveal the domestic labor behind maternal
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love. Indeed, they show as Bombeck famously, or perhaps apocryphally, said, “No one
ever died from sleeping in an unmade bed.”
Jackson’s and Bombeck’s personae discursively reunite domestic labor and
maternal love, re-visioning both according to their own values in the process. As they do,
they rename themselves Harried Homemakers. As Harried Homemakers, though, their
self-naming is incomplete, for even redefining motherhood and domesticity and
reconfiguring the relationship between them does not name the whole woman. They must
still reveal the Woman Within, and, if her identity performance is successful others will
recognize it as her true name, just as Quintian and Mr. B. accepted Agatha’s and
Pamela’s, respectively. But whose acknowledgment do the Harried Homemakers seek?
To whom do they want to reveal the Woman Within? Both personae acknowledge the
futility of making their families see her, so their efforts cannot be aimed at making their
families acknowledge her. The Woman Within does not even appear as an active
character in the texts. However, that the performances take place through personae
indicates that the authors do not seek to reveal their own identities. To be sure, persona,
as Jackson and Bombeck use it, masks personal identity.
That they take such pains to construct the persona as an “ordinary” woman and
paint their concerns as the concerns of “ordinary” women suggest that the endorsement
they seek might be that of other “ordinary” women. And in fact, Bombeck’s final
recursive turn leaves no doubt. Bombeck directly refers to herself as a writer only once in
At Wit’s End, in its final section. First she tells us why she writes:
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It goes back to the first time I saw authoress Faith Baldwin in a fullpage magazine ad admonishing, “It’s a shame more women don’t take up
writing.” I said aloud, “Ain’t it the truth, Faith.”
She looked directly at me and said, “If you’re a woman who wants to
get more out of life, don’t bury your talents under a mountain of dishes. . .
Even though you are tied down to your home, you can still experience
fulfillment.” (218)

The Harried Homemaker writes because she wants to find fulfillment. And she has. She
responds, “Faith, you had me pegged, all right” (218). Next, she outlines the stereotypes
she wants to displace by revealing the ordinary America housewife. Some of the
stereotypes are popular culture images of women who look remarkably like the
villainesses in nineteenth-century sentimental literature: the coquette, the social climber,
the sex fiend. She wants to counter Madison Avenue’s construction of modern
homemaking as little more than push-button work and authoritative discourses that hold
mothers, but not fathers, accountable for children’s mental health.
Addressing readers again with the second person, Bombeck tells us who she
writes for,
At first, I began writing for one woman. I visualized her as a
moderately young woman, overkidsed and underpatienced with four years
of college and chapped hands all year round. None of the popular images
seemed to fit her. She never had a moment alone, yet she was lonely most
of the time. She worried more about toilet training her fourteen-month-old
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than Premier Chou Enlai. And the BOW (Big Outside World) was almost
a fable to her.
After a while I began to visualize other women as I wrote. The woman
with no children who made a career out of going to baby showers, the
teenagers with wires coming out of their ears . . . the older woman who
gagged every time someone called her a senior citizen, and the career girl
who panicked when she saw the return of the dress with waistlines and
belts. . . .
These women and many more make up this book. They represent a
myriad of moods, situations, frustrations, and humor that make up a
housewife. (220)

Bombeck writes for ordinary women. In the first paragraph, though, her shift to
omniscience again suggests the situations and emotions are common enough experiences
that women will understand them even if they have not had them themselves. This
technique is, in fact, firmly grounded in the ethics of sentiment that gave rise to the Angel
of the Hearth domestic humor rejects. It relies on what Michael Bell calls “the paradox of
fictional compassion,” which is “that we are moved by painful events we know to be
fictional, and have positive enjoyment in being so moved” (6). That Jackson’s and
Bombeck’s texts resonate with “ordinary” women is evident in their continued
popularity.
Moreover, the material fact of Jackson’s and Bombeck’s names on the covers of
books, on bestseller lists, and in newspapers announces their identities as authors and
public figures to American readers. Many of Jackson’s readers would have been aware
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that she was already an acclaimed literary figure before the publication of Life among the
Savages.30 By the time Bombeck’s At Wit’s End was published in 1967, her twice-weekly
column appeared in thirty-eight newspapers.31 Even those who were unaware of
Jackson’s prestige as a literary figure or Bombeck’s acclaim as a syndicated columnist
may have realized that even though the personae are never depicted actually writing, the
authors produced texts. The texts themselves thus evince the fact that persona and author
are not identical. That is, if the persona does not write and the author produces texts, their
material practices are not identical, and so they cannot be the same people. Here is one bit
of feminist power to be derived from domestic humor, then. Jackson and Bombeck and
other women like them are in fact embodied women who publicly and simultaneously
enact Harried Homemaker and the Woman Within. That women accepted their
performances perhaps is reflected in the 1980s boom of small- and imprint-press
domestic humor written by U. S. women. That readers continued to take the personae as
reliable narrators is a tribute to both writing skill and the power of an “ordinary” persona.
Finally, Bombeck’s last turn is crucial. In the book’s final paragraph, she returns
to “the original model—the one who was overkidsed and underpatienced, with four years
of college and chapped hands all year around. I knew that if I didn’t follow Faith’s advice
and laugh a little at myself, then I would surely cry” (223). Bombeck turns back and
reveals that she wrote the book for herself, to find some fulfillment in what was otherwise
a loving but unsatisfying life. In other words, her writing was not an other-regarding
action. She began writing for no reason other than it was important to her. For a white,
middle-class, suburban homemaker to publicly and without shame “admit” being
motivated by self-interest, take time from home and family to do something for herself,
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and refuse to be exhausted as an individual was to risk censure for selfishness (223). The
truly subversive power of domestic literature may just lie in its presentation of models of
women who have successfully navigated the shoals of suburban domesticity and set sail
on the sea of self-fulfillment. Their texts are the evidence that it can be successfully done
by “ordinary” women. In various ways, both authors discursively demonstrate that it is
possible to love your children and to love yourself at the same time. No less than the
virgin saints, they each enact the identity they choose. In the end, readers acknowledge
both, and they achieve their objective of making visible the Woman Within to the people
to whom they set out to make see her.
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NOTES
1

As in, for example, her satire of men’s attitudes toward women writers in “The Author to Her

Book.”
2

Other discursive practices also participate in authoritative “naming.” For instance, Barbara
Johnson’s Living Somewhere between Estrogen and Death is labeled, “For Women Only.” Others designate
gender-appropriateness in the title, for example, Tom Hobbes’ Jokes Men Won’t Laugh At: For Her Eyes
Only, and Jokes Women Won’t Laugh At: For His Eyes Only. Moreover, The Library of Congress’ subject
headings also authoritatively designate some humor as properly belonging to women, for instance. Erma
Bombeck’s At Wit’s End is listed under only one subject heading in the Library of Congress’ online
catalog: Housewives--Humor. Most of Bombeck’s other texts may be found under the subject heading
Women--Humor, although a few may be found by searching the LOC subject terms Conduct of Life-Humor, Life Skills--Humor, and Mother and Child--Humor. Bookstores reproduce the Library of
Congress’ classification of the subjects of Bombeck’s books, most often classifying them as women’s
humor. In contrast, the LOC subject classification of James Thurber’s My Life and Hard Times, which also
focuses on the home and family life, is Humorists, American--20th century--Biography. The subject of
Fatherhood, one of Bill Cosby’s three entries into the domestic humor market, is categorized as Fathers-Anecdotes, facetiae, satire, etc. Finally, the LOC elides categorizing Jack Douglas’ 1971 What Do You
Hear from Walden Pond? according to subject altogether. These classifications, no less than the
designations chick flicks and dick flicks encourage readerly self-regulation by conveying to readers and
consumers the normalizing force of authoritative discourse and material practice.
3
Mercy Otis Warren’s eighteenth-century satiric poetry and drama, for instance, conveys antiTory propaganda and encourages both men and women to republicanism. Susanna Haswell Rowson’s “lost
play,” The Volunteers, was a farcical treatment of the Pennsylvanian rebels of the 1795 Whiskey
Insurrection (Vickers 213). Neither of these authors takes the domestic sphere or domestic relations as her
primary subject matter. Additionally, Judith Sargent Murray’s The Traveller Returned suggests that
properly educated women have a legitimate role to play in the public political life of the emerging United
States. In the late nineteenth century, Marietta Holley adopted the persona of Samantha Allen, “Josiah
Allen’s wife,” in part to address the “Woman Question.” Alice Duer Miller’s 1915 collection of her New
York Tribune columns, Are Women People?, ridicules some of the arguments against woman suffrage most
commonly made in the first two decades of the twentieth century. None of these women confine their
topics to the domestic realm, and nor do a host of others.
4
James Thurber, E. B. White, S. J. Perelman, Dave Barry, Bill Cosby, and Paul Reiser have all
written humor that takes domestic life as its sole subject.
5
By humor unmarked, I mean humor. By marked humor or marked literature, I refer to such
systems of discursive conventions as women’s humor, women’s literature, African American humor, Native
American humor, and the like.
6
Both male and female humorists use a variety of humorous techniques, including pratfalls,
slapstick, mistaken identity, drag performance, wordplay, puns, and hyperbole. Both men and women use
stereotypes, incongruity, contrast, periodic sentences, peripeteia, digression, dialect, vernacular dialogue,
parody, satire, irony, and well-timed pauses as they construct their humorous text.
7
Benjamin Franklin’s Silence Dogood, for instance.
8
See the section “Literature and Women’s Literature” in chapter one.
9
Perhaps unsurprisingly, having been written by a woman seems to be a necessary condition of
designation of a text as women’s humor. Molly Ivins’ sex seems to have been enough for Ann Safran Dalin
to include one of her essays about Texas politics in Life’s a Stitch: The Best of Contemporary Women’s
Humor, for instance. Nonetheless, sex is insufficient as a distinguishing characteristic since American
readers do not consider all humor written by women women’s humor. Dorothy Parker’s humorous texts are
not widely considered women’s humor, nor are Flannery O’Connor’s, Alison Lurie’s, Eudora Welty’s or
Grace Paley’s. None of these humorists are considered writers of women’s humor even though all of them
at least occasionally address issues of particular concern to women. They may be women, but if you want
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to find texts by these authors, do not look in the “Women’s Literature” section of the local big-box
bookstore.
10
Jackson continued in this tradition; the stories that developed into Life Among the Savages and
Raising Demons were originally published in Women’s Home Companion, Charm, Woman’s Day, Good
Housekeeping, and Mademoiselle. Bombeck’s texts first appeared in her syndicated newspaper column.
11
With the exception of domesticity, the cardinal virtues of the True Woman are the same
feminine virtues outlined by Tertullian, Augustine, and St. Paul for early Christian women. To be sure, the
True Woman bears a remarkable resemblance to both the virgin saints and to Mary, Jesus’ virgin mother.
12
Of course, this brief listing of discursive systems is not intended to be exhaustive. In the
nineteenth-century United States, the presence of the angelic mother was understood to guarantee the moral
health of the family, and, by extension, that of the republic as well (DuBois and Dumenil 233). Without
her, as Welter says, “all is ashes” (152).
13
Given the differences in the material conditions of men’s and women’s lives, it is unsurprising
that even when men and women write in the same genre and use the same comic devices, the effect and
focus of their writing can be different. For example, there are no small children in Thurber’s domestic
humor essays, whereas children figure prominently in Jackson’s and Bombeck’s texts. This difference is, of
course, not unpredictable, given the different relationships in which men and women stood, both materially
and ideologically, with regard to children in the early and middle parts of the twentieth century. Male
writers of domestic humor, including Thurber, did not focus on children as characters, since they so rarely
bore much responsibility for the day-to-day care of their own children.
14
For the purposes of this discussion, Mother and love refer to culturally and historically
normalized systems of maternal affects and practices. Housewife and labor or domestic labor refers to
culturally and historically normalized systems of homemaking practices.
15
Played by actress Barbara Billingsley, June Cleaver is the eponymous character’s mother on
Leave It to Beaver, a domestic situation comedy that ran on ABC from 1958 until 1963.
16
This claim does not commit the Intentional Fallacy, for I make no claim that readers’ laughter
coincides with authorial intention. Readers may, of course, miss humor authors hope they will find, and
they may find humor where the author sees none.
17
The name of this type comes from Jennette Tandy’s 1925 Crackerbox Philosphers in American
Humor and Satire. The crackerbox philosopher represents “the man of the people” whose common sense
“suggests a national ideal” (ix).
18
As we shall see, even when Jackson’s persona is asked her name directly, she elides her
response.
19
Some of the participants in the blogosphere’s “Mommy Wars” reiterate sentiments like this.
20
Ben Franklin wrote as Silence Dogood and Poor Richard. Roseanne Barr’s Domestic Goddess
and she share the same name.
21
Contemporary examples include Daniel Lawrence Whitney, whose persona “Larry the Cable
Guy” joined Jeff Foxworthy, Bill Engvald, and Ron White on Blue Collar Comedy Tour from 2000 until
2006. Garrison Keillor’s persona, “The Man from Lake Woebegone” and Phyllis Diller’s self-deprecating
housewife is another.
22
For a representative sample of American women’s domestic humor in the nineteenth century,
see Marietta Holley’s My Opinions and Betsey Bobbett’s and Fanny Fern’s Fern Leaves from Fanny’s
Portfolio. In the early twentieth century, Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings’ 1926-1928 newspaper column, Songs
of a Housewife, has been collected and edited in book form under the same title by Rodger L. Tarr.
Cornelia Otis Skinner made three contributions to domestic humor in the 1940s, Dithers and Jitters, Soap
Behind the Ears, and Nuts in May. Betty MacDonald’s The Egg and I was published in 1945.
23
After all, most pink-collar jobs involve workplace versions of what Susan Maushart calls
“wifework,” that is, the emotional and/or physical caretaking of men that ideologically belongs to all
women naturally (10). This work can be normalized as women’s work in part because of the myth of the
maternal instinct.
24
Many of Jackson’s lists are lists of activities or are constructed so that they point to activities.
Jackson often uses listing to convey a sense of the repetitiveness of domestic labor. For instance, we are
told that, because the closets are so full that the doors will not close,
I went, one spring morning, to clean out one of those downstairs closets, which begin as very
practical affairs, meant to be the resting place for wet boots and umbrellas, and end up as
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containers for ice skates and then hockey sticks and then tennis rackets and then, by the most
logical of extensions, baseball gloves and football helmets and basketballs and riding boots
and jackets left behind by visiting children. I had picked up a big cardboard carton at the
grocery, and into it I put the baseball gloves and the football helmets and the riding boots and
the tennis rackets and the basketball. (Raising Demons 534)
The narrator puts the carton on the back stairs so that she will remember to take it up and put the
things in it away. But, when she gets the carton up the stairs, she realizes that there is no place else to put
the things it contains, so she carries it back downstairs, empties it back into the same closet, which she
conveys by using the same list, and “then the door would not close again” (535).
25
However, no matter how much Bracken hated to cook, the book is still a cookbook full of easily
prepared meals and thus discursively participated in making domestic labor visible.
26
Nineteenth-century texts announce their didactic intentions in a preface, just as medieval sacred
biographies and Pamela do. For instance, Louisa May Alcott asserts her didactic goals in the preface to An
Old-Fashioned Girl: “The ‘Old-Fashioned Girl’ is not intended as a perfect model, but as a possible
improvement upon the Girl of the Period, and, . . . through her, render home what it should be,—a happy
place, where parents and children, brothers and sisters, learn to love and know and help one another” (n.p.).
The contrastive trope operates on several levels in Alcott’s text, and one juxtaposes Polly as the product of
her upbringing by an angelic mother against Fanny, the product of mothering that “encouraged her feelings
at the expense of her reason, gave her mind no objects worthy of its own powers, and accustomed her to the
sense of her own trivial and superficial nature” (Baym, Women’s 28-29).
27
Tabitha Tenney’s satirical novel, Female Quixotism, written in the same scathing satirical style
as Voltaire’s Candide, indicts women who give in to the pleasures of sensibility at the expense of reason. In
A New Home—Who’ll Follow? Caroline Kirkland pokes fun at urban overly-sentimental gentility while
simultaneously undermining mass-cultural romanticizing of women’s lives on the frontier. Anna Cora
Mowatt’s stage comedy Fashion and Ann Stephens’s High Life in New York both chide female social
climbers. Fanny Fern, Marietta Holley, Dorothy Parker, Anita Loos, Flannery O’Connor—all of these
women use humor to separate some women from others as part of the process of constructing performative
identities for their female narrators, protagonists, and heroines
28
Gregg Camfield admirably reveals other shortcoming with relief theories of humor in chapter
six of Necessary Madness: The Humor of Domesticity in Nineteenth-Century American Literature.
29
See especially chapter two of The Feminine Mystique for Friedan’s criticism.
30
Time magazine had published a cover-story profile of her shortly after the publication of The
Lottery: Or, The Adventures of James Harris four years earlier, in 1949.
31
Not long after Erma Bombeck revived an old column under a new title, At Wit’s End, she was
offered the opportunity to publish two columns per week in the Dayton Journal-Herald. Three weeks later,
she signed a contract with a news syndicate, and by the end of 1966, her column appeared in thirty-eight
newspapers twice each week. Within five years, her column appeared in approximately five hundred
newspapers twice per week. The book At Wit’s End, first published in 1967, comprises a collection of her
syndicated newspaper columns.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CHICKS IN CHOOS: THE SIGNIFYING BREAST
In the nineteenth century, much of the U.S. reading public thought of romances as
dangerous texts that encourage passive female readers to indulge their baser feelings.
This thinking has antecedents at least as far back as early modern England, when and
where women were forbidden to read anything other than religious texts for these very
reasons.1 Academic champions of high culture like Matthew Arnold, the New Critics, and
Harold Bloom hold the value of fiction lies in its originality, so formulaic literature can
have no value for them. They believe that readers’ intellects are eroded by genre
literature such as Janet Evanovich’s Stephanie Plum novels and Gemma Halliday’s
Making It series. Even scholars who study contemporary women’s romance seem anxious
to establish that they do not read it for enjoyment, but rather, only as an object of
scholarly inquiry.2 Writers and publishers print generic designations like novel on book
covers and elide the pejorative connotations of labels like popular romance and chick lit.3
Cultural representations of fans as female homemakers who live vicariously through the
fantastic experiences of incredible characters persist, contrary to empirical data that refute
the stereotype.
Matthew Arnold may not have been the first literary critic to oppose “the best that
has been thought and known in the world” to popular culture (815), but his claim that
reading formulaic popular fiction produced for a mass market caused social crisis stood
basically unchallenged for nearly one hundred years. In the 1930s, the New Critics F. R.
Leavis and Denys Thomson wrote Culture and Environment, in which they warned of the
pernicious, civilization-eroding effects of mass and popular cultural artifacts from
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newspapers to fiction. Q. D. Leavis called upon teachers to “educate taste” in her 1939
Fiction and the Reading Public (D. Johnson 7). However, the idea that the value of a
particular text depends on the text’s instantiation of some universally agreed-upon
standards of taste is subject to the same vulnerability that Eagleton identified in some
definitions of literature: Tastes, like definitions, change. The Arnoldian and New Critical
positions also raise the issue of who gets to set the standards. Indeed, feminists have
argued convincingly that canonical texts have historically served to preserve the status
quo: “[I]f art has a race, it is white; if it has a sex, it is male; if it has a class, it is the
ruling one” (Robinson and Vogel 279).
Dwight Macdonald’s spirited attempts in the 1950s to refine ideas about the high
culture/low culture binary reveals its contingency. First, Macdonald’s conception of mass
culture’s consumers as “passive . . . their participation limited to the choice between
buying and not buying” (2) is not tenable in an age of interactive literature, fan fiction,
and fanons,4 (“Fanon”). His argument collapses without it. Macdonald’s conclusions also
rely on his claim that the distinguishing characteristic of what we call popular culture “is
that it is solely and directly an article for mass consumption, like chewing gum” (1, my
emphasis). This claim, too, elides the roles of writers and readers in both production and
consumption. More problematically, it confers upon popular culture an illusory
ontological status. But of course, we have already seen the productive power of readers
engaging authoritative reading practices. We understand reading as an embodied practice
that produces meaning far in excess of the denotation of the words on the page or screen.
Macdonald’s definition of mass culture as “imposed from above. . . . fabricated by
technicians hired by businessmen” fares no better (2). Middle English romance, for
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instance, one of the most widely consumed genres of the time, trickled down to the
“common people” from the courts where it originated. Moreover, sacred biography
actually fits Macdonald’s definition if one just substitutes the word clerics for technicians
and Church for businessmen. That these texts enjoy canonicity now gestures toward the
importance of situating the texts we analyze, for texts that were once what we would now
identify as mass or popular literature in time can “achieve” canonicity, just as virgin
saints’ biographies, once the most popular literature of their day, have.
Although medieval sacred biography is studied as part of the Western canon, it
shares many of the textual features most often cited as evidence of popular literature’s
power to undermine social order. Formulaic to the point of repeating passages verbatim,
the sacred accounts of the lives of the medieval virgin saints present heroines and villains
who are barely distinguishable from other heroines and villains. The stories are gory,
filled with sexual violence and graphic bodily mutilation. Their prefatory passages
indicate that most of the virgin saints’ biographers were in fact clerics composing at the
behest of a superior with an eye toward providing models of ideal Christian femininity.
The content, and often the tone, of fourteenth-century vernacular virgin martyrs’
biographies have more in common with Judith Krantz than Nathaniel Hawthorne. Hence,
the genealogy of medieval virgin saints’ biographies as a canonical literary genre casts
light on the contingency of the binary by which canonical and popular are opposed and
on the importance of situating texts before formulating claims about their meaning.
Moreover, despite widespread disdain for popular romance, its overplot can claim
roots deep in canonical Western literary tradition. Consider, for instance, Mikhail
Bakhtin’s description of the plot of classical Greek romance: A male and female of
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marriageable age experience a mutual, passionate attraction; encounter obstacles that
threaten their union; overcome the obstacles to their union; and consummate their love.
Bahktin’s synopsis could as easily describe one of the latest romances to roll off
Harlequin’s, Dell’s, or Silhouette’s presses. In fact, if we identify Jesus or God as the
romantic hero of the virgin saints’ biographies, Bahktin might just as well have been
summarizing the plot of the vernacular biographies of Saints Katherine and Cecelia! Thus
the discursive practices out of which the overplot shared by sacred biography and
nineteenth-century women’s fiction emerges have shaped and been shaped by the
conventions of romance and ancient rhetorical practices.
Contemporary comic mystery romance series such as Evanovich’s Stephanie
Plum series and Halliday’s Making It series “re-vision” (Rich 33) shared formulaic plot
motifs in a vocabulary that makes their heroines’ struggles, failures, and successes
intelligible to post-Enlightenment readers.5 Readers who have developed authoritative
reading practices in women’s popular romance, mystery, and humor can cooperate with
this emergent genre because the conventions they are familiar with are reproduced in
these texts. Readers of popular romance may perhaps feel most at home in this generic
world, though, since its conventions overdetermine plot and characterization.
Still, comic romantic mystery series depart from other modes of popular genre
literature in that each novel is part of a series, not just a discrete story, although each is
that as well. Each book’s conclusion must leave some distance between the hero and
heroine so that the romantic overplot can repeat in the next book, yet the conventions of
romance require the heroine and hero to reconcile and the domestic unit to be restored by
the end of each book. Furthermore, each book must provide a narrative in which the
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heroine successfully finds the “intelligence, will, resourcefulness, and courage” to
surmount her “trials” and develop a fully adult female identity (Baym 22), but the series
form requires there be something left for her to learn at the end of each book so that the
heroine’s process of identity construction can begin again in the next book.
While the series form accommodates transformations occurring over the course of
an entire story arc, neither popular romance nor mystery has developed in this way.
However, the conventions of the mystery genre do provide a way to reconcile the
seemingly antithetical aims of genre (romance, mystery) and form (book, series). The
mystery narrative provides the closure required by the sentimental and romance formulae
but foreclosed by the series form. The resolution of the mystery can either substitute for
or supplement the domestic “reward” the romance heroine should receive at the end of
her story. The mystery narrative also provides a generic vehicle through which obstacles
may be put in the heroine’s path.
Many of the heroine’s tribulations emerge out of the mystery narrative. The
physical torture of the virgin saint finds its contemporary analogues in violent attacks on
the heroine or members of her domestic community by criminals.6 Moreover, as do the
martyrs and Pamela, contemporary heroines face psychological as well as physical
obstacles. Heroines are beset from all sides. Stephanie and Maddie grapple with
economic exploitation, sexual infidelity, body image, sexually competitive women,
selfish lovers, landlords, deadlines, and unreasonable bosses, all of which constitute
threats to their physical and psychological well-being. They must overcome these
obstacles and others if they are to achieve their dual goals of solving the puzzle and
constructing a coherent adult female identity. Because these stories are narrated in the
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first person, cooperative readers can follow along and experience the heroine’s “trials and
triumphs” as she herself does because the heroine shares her feelings and thoughts about
her journey to adulthood as she narrates.
Twentieth- and twenty-first-century U.S. ideas about adulthood emerge out of
innumerable emergent ideologies, material conditions, and social practices. Stephanie’s
and Maddie’s ideas about adulthood combine post-Feminine Mystique liberal feminism
and a twentieth-century version of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s robustly virile self-reliance.
According to this view, lacking children, fully adult females financially support
themselves. The inability to support herself financially publicly identifies a young,
childless woman as a “permanent child” (Baym, Women’s 17). If her goal is to form a
coherent adult female identity that can be understood by others, the heroine cannot return
to the child-state of being financially supported by or living with others. In other words,
if a single woman wants to be a fully independent adult, she needs a job, Stephanie and
Maddie not excepted.
Despite their desire for stable and fulfilling domestic lives, however they define
that, like nineteenth-century sentimental heroines, the heroines of contemporary romantic
mystery series must work, and they identify themselves for readers in part by naming
their work. Stephanie is a “Fugitive Apprehension Agent,” and Maddie designs children’s
shoes. Tracking and apprehending criminals is Stephanie’s job and Maddie’s hobby, but
each considers it an essential part of her identity. However, they face opposition from
families and partners who wonder why they cannot “just go shopping or get [their] hair
done like a normal girl” (Halliday, Killer 202). They cannot because they must not and
will not be named by others.
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Stephanie and Maddie understand constructing adult female identity, as last
chapter’s personae do, as naming themselves. The conventions of the genre make
available several devices for self-naming in ways that will be intelligible to cooperative
readers and other characters. Significantly, especially given the domestic goals of the
genre, the two heroines address their lovers by family names. Morelli usually addresses
Stephanie as “cupcake.” Ranger calls her “babe.” Richard calls Maddie “Pumpkin.”
Ramirez describes Maddie as “girly.” His pet name for her is “Miss Girly Girl.”
Cooperative readers are unlikely to think anything more about the gender difference in
forms of address because the heroine accepts them as terms of endearment without
question.7 Cooperative readers, however, take another step. The relationship between
masculinity and femininity in these novels is conventionally both complementary and
dialectical for cooperative readers. She alone cannot name herself feminine; only
masculine desire expressed as a response to her body can do that. If, as Virginia Woolf
says, women characters in fiction written by men serve as vehicles to reveal male
characters’ “views” and “passions” to readers (1026), in contemporary romance written
by women, male desire reflects femininity back to the heroine and to cooperative readers.
So, then, if the heroine is to construct independent, self-named identity, she must herself
limit what her body can signify for others. Narrators rely on other generically
conventional devices for intelligibly and coherently identifying themselves for readers
and other characters.
Heroines can name themselves for readers by naming culturally significant
commodities. Stephanie does not just wear shoes, carry a gun, and love food. Stephanie
wears Doc Martens, carries a Glock, and loves greasy fried chicken from Cluck-in-a-
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Bucket and pizza from Pino’s. Maddie wears five-hundred-dollar Manolos, would rather
be wearing Jimmy Choos, and covets a Prada bag. She craves Quarter Pounders from
McDonald’s and other fat- and carbohydrate-rich foods, and she indulges in them
whenever her friend Dana is not around to act as her conscience. Both heroines enjoy and
desire sexual intimacy with men. Moreover, they are flattered by the attentions of men
other than their “lawful” mates and find pleasure in viewing other men as sexual objects.8
This is an apparent reversal of the virgin saints’ attitude toward physical comfort and
pleasure. However, this discursive shift emerges in part out of the “dramatically
heightened address to women as consumers” that has characterized U.S. popular culture
since the nineteenth century (Tasker and Negra 8). The so-called sexual revolution of the
1960s and 1970s plays a part as well. Furthermore, in late industrial capitalist society,
identity itself has in a sense become a commodity, as Jack Amariglio and Antonio Callari
so forcefully demonstrate.
Buying Identity
Choosing and rejecting commodities have become essential mechanisms by
which others can be invited to identify the particularity of individuals. Like any sign’s
gesture, a commodity’s nod toward meaning is both dynamic and conventional. Naming
commodities by brand in the context of identifying oneself as a specific individual
presumes that there is some sort of conventional meaning attached to those commodities.
The particular brands or styles named change concurrently with changes in patterns of
cultural consumption; thus Range Rover now can confer the status upon owners that
BMW and Cadillac once did, for instance. Of course, as emergent signs, brands and
names have histories, and those histories must be interrogated as part of determining why
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the heroine might some brands and items rather others as part of her invitation to readers
and other characters to identify her as a certain sort of “person.” Cooperative readers
answer her invitation affirmatively because the commodities themselves also
simultaneously convey multiple culturally conventional meanings. The examples that
follow should not be understood as the only, best, or most legitimate readings. Rather,
they are offered as speculations about possible systems of cultural associations by which
the attachment of specific meanings to particular commodities can by normalized for
cooperative readers and whose normalization is simultaneously presupposed by the
heroine’s invitation to recognize in them something meaningful about her identity.
Doc Martens were developed to be a comfortable version of British army boots,
and since the early 1960s have been associated with working-class solidarity and youth
(“History”). Repeated association with a commodity linked to the working class
reinforces Stephanie’s claim to a working-class identity. The brand’s simultaneous
association with youth culture lets readers know that she is relatively young and fashionconscious, but that she is practical as well.9 The Glock has been one of favorite pistols of
both law enforcement and criminals since 1989 (Timeline). It is deadly, accurate, and
light. Like all guns, it signifies power. That it is a Glock indicates that she has some
knowledge about guns and hints at competence, and indeed, Stephanie is an excellent
shot. However, Stephanie also hates to carry a gun. She prefers her Taser or even
hairspray. For cooperative readers, Stephanie’s suspicion of firearms affords a possibility
of audience connection in a moment of doubled recognition. Stephanie invites the readers
to recognize her as both a certain kind of person and to recognize themselves as either
like or unlike that sort of person. That Stephanie always captures the felon she sets out to
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get grants to those who see themselves in Stephanie a vision of success that conforms to
their values. For those negotiating readers who do not share her attitude toward firearms,
the slapstick moments that so often emerge out of her reluctance to carry a weapon can
confirm their values. By leaving open the possibility that she might be even more
effective were she to arm herself, the narrative can accommodate differently situated
readers’ efforts to identify something familiar in the heroine with which to connect.10
Cooperative readers might simply laugh at the slapstick and move on. Negotiating
readers might notice the contradiction inherent in her simultaneous facility with firearms,
her acknowledgment of their efficacy, and her reluctance to use them. For these readers,
the humor of slapstick can mitigate their suspicion that bounty hunters who pursue felons
actually take their guns along with them. That Stephanie ends up smelling like a
dumpster because she did not is funny, and that deviation from the norm occasions
embarrassment instead of death for the heroine distinguishes this genre from, say, police
procedurals. Moreover, it can allow negotiating readers a momentary feeling of
superiority tempered with sympathy that allows them to elide the contradiction. Resisting
readers, however, might focus on the ways that Stephanie’s reluctance to arm herself
reiterates hegemony’s construction of the feminine as inherently nurturing. They might,
for instance, see Stephanie’s refusal to carry her gun even when she knows she should as
another example of a female character that softens her job-related performance of
masculinity by performing traditional femininity even at risk to her own life. For
instance, resisting readers of Ridley Scott’s film, Alien, might find jarring Ripley’s
decision to leave the safety of the pod and risk facing the alien again in order to save a
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cat. Stephanie’s distaste for firearms might be interpreted as reworking this motif by
resisting readers.
For cooperative readers, the heroines’ passion for fast food can express a shared
disinterest in domestic practices such as cleaning, shopping for groceries, and cooking, as
well as the demands of juggling both work and personal lives. Heroines’ indifferent
cooking skills suggest that their identities do not encompass this particular feminine
virtue. The absence of any detailed accounting of their own domestic efforts may also
reflect their rejection of the traditionally feminine chores of domesticity. Nevertheless,
these characteristics do not necessarily indicate a repudiation of domestic values. To be
sure, their enjoyment of the products of others’ domestic labor reveals the heroines as
women who can recognize virtue in more than one possible feminine identity without
having to manifest that identity’s particular virtue themselves.
Once again, the heroines’ expressed and implicit values enable them to invite
diversely situated readers to adopt those values as their own, at least for the duration of
the reading transaction. And, once again, they use contrast and humor to connect with
audiences and encourage them to accept the invitation. For instance, Mrs. Plum often
uses homemade dessert to lure her thirty-year-old daughter “home” for dinner. The care
packages she sends home with Stephanie extend her maternal arm, and with it the
blessings of domesticity, into Stephanie’s otherwise barren apartment. That Stephanie
sometimes uses the food to persuade men to help her indicates that she appreciates the
efficacy of domestic skills in work life. But more importantly here, maternal use of food
to entice recalcitrant children home is part of a national discourse about motherhood.
Mrs. Plum’s concerned support and sometimes tight-lipped, alcohol-assisted respect for
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the boundaries her daughter sets stands, for example, in stark contrast to Marie Barone’s
intrusive meddling, but it is nonetheless part of the same humorous tradition.11 The trope
makes sense to readers because it is familiar culturally, and perhaps, personally.
Narrators also use stance and voice to construct identity and foster cooperative
reading simultaneously. For instance, although Stephanie and Maddie rely in part on
culturally meaningful commodities to construct identity, they position themselves
differently toward branding in general and locate their identities in different sorts of
brands, both of which are intimately tied to their identities as working adults. The brands
Stephanie names designate work-related commodities. When she details her interactions
with fashion, her portraits indicate indifference to brand but not to effect. However, she
acknowledges that commodities say something about her and that she tries to control how
others see her by controlling what commodities they associate with her: “[W]hat did it
matter if people saw me driving a 1953 Buick? It was transportation, right? Sure. That’s
why I’d parked a quarter mile away in an underground garage” (Evanovich, Two 114).
Maddie, a shoe designer, describes shoes in detail and attaches a great deal of
significance to them. Covetous commodity discourse like Maddie’s is in fact as much one
of the generic markers of chick lit as is a closing wedding or domestic pairing. That
Maddie covets the brands she names lets some readers know that fashion is important to
her and that she, like them, cannot afford all of the things she desires. Other readers can
recognize in her the good taste to aspire to what they already own. They can also perhaps
recognize themselves or someone they know in Maddie’s willingness to overindulge a
taste for fashion to the detriment of her budget.12 In these and other ways the genre
invites readers to see themselves in the heroine or to identify with her. Consistently and
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repetitively linking self-indulgence uninfluenced by reason with negative
consequences—weight gain and pregnancy, for instance—suggests a place for reason in
authentically adult identity. The relationship between the successful use of literary humor
and readerly connection is dialectical in that each on occasion facilitates the other, often
in conjunction with other generically conventional meaning-making practices.
As we saw in the previous chapter, a self-deprecating voice can do much to
engender the kind of audience good will on which humor relies to generate laughter. It is
a commonplace of humor studies that U.S. women comics and humorists have relied on
self-deprecation as part of their performances.13 The “Harried Housewives” use selfdeprecation extensively, albeit equivocally. The voices of the two heroine-narrators also
emerge out this tradition and have an affinity to the voices of Jackson’s and Bombeck’s
personae.14 However, first-person narration complicates the task of establishing a
heroine’s beauty. Contemporary readers might interpret as arrogance, conceit, or selfsatisfaction straightforward first-person declarations of one’s own beauty. By softening
their minimal self-description with self-deprecation, heroines manage to demonstrate that
they are attractive without antagonizing readers. For example, Stephanie Plum notes that
she is the “blue-eyed, fair-skinned product of a Hungarian-Italian union” (Two 1). At
“125 pounds, five feet, seven inches,” she cannot reasonably be considered overweight
(Three 2), yet she expresses concern about her tendency toward plumpness repeatedly
throughout the series. Stephanie’s assessment of her overall appearance is that she is
“[n]ot bad looking” when she has on makeup and has attended to her hair, but she doesn’t
“think Sharon Stone would drive off a bridge in a jealous rage” at the sight of her looking
her best (Two 51). Maddie Springer stands “5’ 1½” ” and attracts a not insignificant
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amount of lustful interest from men, but she describes her friend Dana in much more
flattering terms than she uses to describe herself. These self-deprecatory assessments
imply that these heroines are heteronormatively desirable but not threatening to other
women. The repetitive presentation of female bodies as meaningful identity markers
simultaneously presupposes, enacts, and normalizes a discursive conception of female
bodies as signs of identity, as signs of who women “really are.”
Cooperative readers understand the contemporary heroine in part because they
learn in a number of ways who and what she is not and in part because they are familiar
with the contrastive tropes by which the heroine is identified as an individual. Discourse
about breasts is a contemporary, generically conventional manifestation of the contrastive
trope. Its repetition establishes its significance. Heroines most often shed light on their
own standards by explicitly or implicitly contrasting themselves with women who violate
those standards. In other words, they show us who they are by comparing themselves to
another female, usually a character, who is unlike them. The heroines’ comparisons of
their own and other women’s breasts are one of the genre’s manifestations of the
contrastive trope by which heroines’ identities and the values those identities presuppose
and endorse can be made acceptable for diverse readers.
The Signifying Breast
In “A Few Words about Breasts,” first published in Esquire magazine in 1972,
Norah Ephron chronicles her nearly lifelong obsession with breasts and breast size. She
genealogizes her struggle with the feelings of “inadequacy” engendered by living as a
small-breasted woman in late twentieth-century America (38). She articulates the fears at
the bottom of many U.S. women’s obsession with breasts: “I knew that no one would
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ever want to marry me. I had no breasts. I would never have breasts” (35). She fears that
others consider her “less woman” and that no one will ever love her (38). She fears that
small breasts make her unlovable. Ephron concludes by saying that large-breasted women
who assure small-breasted women that it is “much worse” to be large-breasted than
small-breasted “are full of shit” (38). Many U.S. women share Ephron’s feelings, and
those feelings in common help to normalize the associations that make breast discourse
meaningful for cooperative readers.15
In what follows, I propose twelve “Signifying Breasts” as metonyms for the
generically conventional character types whose presence in the text facilitates for
cooperative readers the normalization of the heroine’s sexuality and the value systems her
identity performance presupposes, constructs, and ratifies.16 Not all of these types appear
in every text, but they appear in enough—and in enough other media—that cooperative
readers and fans will immediately recognize them. Indeed, like breast discourse in
general, these female types are part of U.S. culture. The U.S. viewing populace sees them
in soap operas, sitcoms, and films. It reads about them in magazines and on blogs. The
“Signifying Breast” is particularly apt as a metaphor because breasts can stand in as an
objective correlative for female bodies in contemporary U.S. representational culture, and
because it reaches back to sacred biography, in which breast torture, mutilation, and
amputation figure prominently.
The Miraculous Breast
Saint Agatha of Sicily personifies the Miraculous Breast. As her biographer tells
her story, the duke Quintian desires the virginal Agatha. When she refuses him, he sends
her to a madam, Aphrodisia, and her nine prostitute daughters. Since they cannot corrupt
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her with promises of earthly pleasure and riches, Aphrodisia returns Agatha to Quintian’s
court. Enraged by Agatha’s insistence that she has “given [her] heart to the sweetest
prince of all” whom she will “always cherish as [her] mate” (Winstead 29), Quintian has
her breasts “twisted” off by first having “hooks” and “willow twists bound” to them (30).
Agatha responds by calling him “Asshole” (30). After she is thrown back into prison,
Saint Peter, disguised as an old man, comes to her cell and offers to heal her. She refuses
until she learns that God has sent him. “As soon as he rubbed her wounds, they were
healed,” and her breasts grew back. When they learn of the miraculous restoration of
Agatha’s breasts, even Quintian’s minions acknowledge that there is something special
about her. Although Quintian eventually succeeds in killing her, she does not die until she
is ready (31). When she dies, she is reunited with her divine mate.
Agatha’s are the breasts of the defiant, fully adult female. The Miraculous Breast
names herself. She is Virtue. After others recognize this as her real identity, she receives
her heavenly reward and is reunited with her True Husband, the hero of the romance,
Jesus Christ. The contrast between Agatha and Aphrodisia and her daughters helps to
establish Agatha’s purity.
Boobs
Boobs functions as comic relief, and emerges out of the same humorous traditions
that gave America the humorous type Constance Rourke calls the “Yankee Jonathan”
(88), and the common sense of Marietta Holley’s Samantha Allen.17 While the Yankee
was from the country and Boobs most often is a decidedly urban type, she is “sharp,
uncouth, and witty” just as he is (Rourke 88). Her street smarts replace the Yankee’s
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common sense, and her sophistication is as counterfeit as her Via Spigas.18 Boobs’ role as
a wise fool allows her to speak moral truth to the heroine.
Boobs’ breasts are not just large. They are enormous. They are unrestrained. They
are usually visible. Stephanie’s Boobs sidekick,19 Lula, is a chocolate brown, 250-pound
former street prostitute with a penchant for wearing neon spandex two sizes too small
with wigs to match. Stephanie’s descriptions of Lula almost always include her breasts’
size and degree of display: “Lula was wearing a halter top with a lot of boob hanging out.
She rolled the cold can of beer across her chest. I figured it was a wasted effort. She’d
need a keg to cool off a chest that size” (Evanovich, One 177).
This fat, black manifestation of the Boobs type has “an infinite ability to adapt to
changing circumstances” (Walker, Introduction 83). However, Boobs is just as unruly as
her breasts. She instantiates flamboyant appetite. Always ready for food and sex, for
example, Lula drives a red Mustang and owns a variety of very large guns, at least one of
which she has with her at all times. Boobs invites chaos because she allows her appetitive
body to motivate her actions.
“I don’t feel so good,” Lula said. “It was that last doughnut. There was
something wrong with it. It was one of them cream-filled, and I think they
used old cream.”
“You ate ten!”
“Yeah, and none of the others bothered me. I’m telling you, it was that
last doughnut. I’d feel better if I could burp.” (Evanovich, Explosive190)

A few minutes after this exchange, Stephanie returns to the car to find Lula has eaten two
slices of pizza to “settle my stomach” (192). When the pizza doesn’t work, Lula reaches
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into Stephanie’s purse, and, mistaking a “love potion” for Pepto-Bismol, swills the entire
bottle. When Stephanie tells her that it was a love potion, Lula falls in love with the first
man she sees: the equally appetitive felon they have just apprehended who is so stupid he
is almost incapable of coherent speech. He immediately steals Lula’s car and Stephanie’s
gun and leaves them stranded, miles from home (209).
The heroine accepts Boobs as the voice of her conscience. For instance, Lula
does not know that Stephanie fears she may be pregnant after her interlude with Ranger.
Speaking about another matter, Lula says,
“Just think where we’d be if we didn’t pay attention to consequences.
Like, there’s consequences if you don’t got bullets in your gun. And
there’s consequences if you eat bad potato salad. And there’s
consequences if you don’t take precautions with your sweetie pie.”
I had a flash of panic recalling a small inadvertent lapse in my birthcontrol program in Hawaii.
“Are you okay?” Lula asked me. “You got real pale now, and you’re
sort of sweating.”
“I was thinking about consequences.”
“Yeah, they freak me out, too,” Lula said. (Evanovich, Explosive 207208)

Earlier, when Stephanie is considering her Hawaiian “lapse,” she says, “[T]here was a
voice, sounding a lot like Lula’s, in the back of my head, telling me I’d been looseygoosey with my morals in Hawaii, and that’s what had messed up my juju” (Evanovich,
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Explosive 136-137). That the heroine’s conscience speaks to her in Lula’s voice suggests
that Stephanie recognizes and accepts Boobs as a moral adviser.
That Lula’s is a fat black female body should be addressed, for her success as
comic relief reveals the grounding of some of the book’s humor in hegemonic ideologies
of gender, race, class, and body size. Presenting a black character who dresses loudly and
flamboyantly presupposes and reiterates racist U.S. stereotypes and hegemonic
discourses about beauty and body size. Sambo characters who cause chaos for themselves
and their white companions by emotionally, unthinkingly, or impulsively acting have
long been a part of U.S. humor’s engagement with race. While Lula lacks the
subservience to her white companion characteristic of the Sambo type, Evanovich’s
characterization of Lula does gesture toward it, and most of the comic relief Lula
provides as Boobs relies on her appetitive impulsiveness.
Another variant of the Boobs type is a male-centered female character with large
breasts. She is the heroine’s friend. This Boobs has an active and enviable sex life, and
she never lacks for partners. She is not just conventionally pretty. She is gorgeous. For
instance, Maddie describes her friend Dana as “a 5’7”, 36 double D, strawberry blond
aerobics instructor slash wanna-be actress with the kind of body that inspired rock songs”
(Halliday, Killer 2). This Boobs is completely unselfconscious about her body, takes care
of it, and enjoys the pleasures it affords her. She is quirky, sweet, funny, and a good
friend to the heroine. However, she has one major flaw. She puts relationships with men
before relationships with women. For instance, she can be unreliable, even when she and
the heroine have plans. If an attractive opportunity for sex comes along, these characters
will abandon their female friends and seize the day. The heroine is ambivalent about this
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Boobs’ sexual practices. She wants her friend to be happy, but she could never be so
promiscuous herself. Sometimes her lack of inhibitions causes chaos. She, too, can
function as the heroine’s conscience, but her admonitions are generally about the
heroine’s terrible eating habits. This Boobs is more akin to Marilyn Monroe’s onscreen
persona than to the wicked women of hagiography and sentimental fiction.
Hooters
Hooters, however, is indeed descended from the wicked women of the literary
past. Her U.S. literary foremothers include Katharine Brush’s Red-Headed Woman,
Lillian Andrews, and Dorothy Parker’s Mrs. Martin.20 Also male-centered, she usually
provocatively displays her large breasts. Hooters is cynical in general, but can be
especially cruel to other women. She is selfish and self-interested. Not terribly bright, she
is nonetheless calculating and competitive with other women, especially the heroine.
Joyce Barnhardt, Stephanie’s nemesis since elementary school, enacts this type. She lies,
cheats, and steals. She marries and divorces for money. This character does not limit her
sexual consumption to single men, and she has no sense that there might be anything
wrong with that. As she says to Stephanie, “‘Okay, once in a while I steal a husband. I
don’t see what the big deal is. They all turn out to be losers anyway’” (Evanovich,
Eighteen 179). One of the husbands she stole was Stephanie’s.
Falsies
Her breasts may be silicone or saline, but whatever else they may be, they are not
natural. As a type, Falsies reaches back to hagiographical and nineteenth-century
depictions of lustful, materialistic women as a means of establishing the chastity and
spirituality of the heroines, and she performs the same function here.
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The crucial differences between Falsies and Hooters are that Falsies additionally
transgresses by medically altering her body and she is dumb—at least on the outside. Her
lack of intelligence may be as phony as the rest of her. She is very competitive with other
women, and she uses her sexual appeal as a means to power and money. Falsies, like
Hooters, uses her body to get men and is not terribly fussy if the men are already married
or otherwise attached, as long as it helps her get ahead. This crosses the heroine’s frontier
of acceptable gender performance. While Maddie wears a push-up bra to supplement her
cleavage on occasion, for instance, to function as Bait, she would never consider breast
augmentation, and she considers acrylic nails, hair extensions, and tanning-booth color
just as dishonest as she does surgical alteration (Spying 4).
For Maddie, accessorizing the body to draw attention to one or the other of the
dual interpretive possibilities and to mask the other is acceptable. To eliminate the
possibility of either reading through surgery, by having too many children, by growing
old, or by wearing unacceptable clothing for one’s body type is not. To do so for purely
pecuniary reasons is no better than prostitution. Jasmine, Maddie’s nemesis in the first
three books of the four-book Making It series, enacts Falsies, and she finds her high
culture sisters in Clare Boothe’s Sylvia and Alcott’s Belle.
Mommaries
There are at least three conventional Mommaries characters: Moms, Office Moms,
and “The Breeder.” These women provide three different possibilities for mothering, and
three different stances relative to mothering.
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Moms
In her textual incarnation as the heroine’s mother, Moms functions as the
contrastive woman “from an earlier time” (28 Baym).21 Moms’ is the contemporary
representation of an “anachronistic” maternal femininity (28). The heroine rejects this
femininity for herself but respects it and depends on it as part of her support system
nonetheless. Stephanie’s and Maddie’s mothers are both Moms, although their mothering
styles differ. Maddie’s mother is eccentric and flighty, and her enthusiastic appreciation
for the pleasures of sex and the male body as a sexual object embarrass Maddie. That she
represents a woman from an earlier time is reflected in her costume; all of her garments
hearken back to the styles of the 1980s. Nonetheless, she loves her daughter, has raised
her well, and when Maddie needs her, she is there with emotional and material support,
most often in the form of free pedicures at her second husband’s Beverly Hills Salon.
Stephanie’s Moms is a 1950s housewife. She serves dinner promptly at six, and it
always includes homemade dessert. Her home is a model of home economy and as a
domestic space stands in stark contrast to her daughter’s barren apartment. As Stephanie
describes Morelli’s mother, though, she is the quintessential Moms:
Joseph Morelli’s mother made my mother look like a second-rate
housewife. My mother was no slouch, but by burg standards, Mrs. Morelli
was a housewife of heroic proportions. God himself couldn’t get windows
cleaner, wash whiter, or make better ziti than Mrs. Morelli. She never
missed mass, she sold Amway in her spare time, and she scared the
bejeebers out of me with her piercing black eyes. . . .Joe’s father could
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have been bought for five bucks, but his father was dead. (Evanovich, One
38).

The domestic space belongs to Moms, and if her husband is present in the home, he is
usually silent. More often, he is absent, as is Maddie’s until he turns up as Lola (Killer).
Office Mom
Office Mom handles the office equivalent of housework, organizes and arranges
the space, makes the day-to-day decisions, dispenses advice and bandages, and handles
the finances. In short, she does in the office what Moms does in the home. Vinnie, the
owner of the company stays hidden behind the closed door of his office, leaving the front
space to the women who comprise the office staff. Connie, who manages the bail bond
company where Stephanie works, functions as an ethnic Office Mom. Short, curvy, and
slightly mustached, Connie comes across as a tough broad. She does not trust men, but
she has a heart of gold where other women are concerned.22 Sarcastic, lusty, and cynical,
Office Mom stands up for her “daughters.” If she were not so supportive of other women,
she would be Hooters. As she is, she reiterates what Baym identifies as “the kind, stronghearted widow who . . . finds time to mother the heroine” (Women’s 39).
“The Breeder”
“The Breeder” is a baby-making machine. Her breasts are always engorged or
being suckled by the latest addition to the family. Maddie’s cousin takes this role in the
Halliday novels, and Stephanie’s sister fills the role in her narrative. Mommaries is
always either pregnant or nursing, and she serves as a reminder of the loss of autonomy
that comes with motherhood. She rarely plays any real part in the action, but her ghostly
presence hovers over the heroine at family gatherings whether or not she is present.
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Mothers tend to ask their heroine daughters when they are going to follow in
Mommaries’ footsteps and deliver a grandchild. Although they resent both the
comparisons and the questions, B-Cups want children. Someday. Just not right now.
Teardrops
Teardrops emerges out of the same humorous traditions as the Wife of Bath and
the droopy-breasted “Granny” character created by Robert “Buck” Brown for Playboy
magazine. Hegemonic ideologies of age and sex interact and make ridiculous the image
of an elderly female body announcing its sexual availability, seeking adventure, or
breaking the law, all of which Stephanie’s Grandma Mazur does.23 For cooperative
readers, Teardrops functions as comic relief. However, Teardrops is not comically
ridiculous because her openness to excitement and willingness to grab what she wants
impress the heroine, who would not at all mind being like her when she is old. B-Cup can
be closer to Teardrops than to her own mother.
Breasts Scorned
That the moral economy of the text views breast implants with suspicion is
evident in the conclusion of Spying in High Heels, the first book of the series. Althea, a
“meek frump,” turns out to be the murderer Maddie seeks (298). In order to subdue the
crazed woman, Maddie stabs a stiletto heel into Althea’s implant and deflates it. Since
Maddie is in fact a shoe designer, the stiletto’s deflation of the implant represents not just
Maddie’s “triumph.” It also figures for the triumph of her evaluation of artificial
femininity.
Although Althea has implants, she differs from Falsies, for she is completely
unattractive, has only “loved” one man, and does not use her body for financial gain or
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social advancement. She is the woman who changes herself to please a particular man.
Breasts Scorned warns that the affective responses that animate the moral sense may
deceive us. She is a warning. To love, Breasts Scorned tells readers, is dangerous for an
unattractive woman, but to change oneself to please a man is even worse. Althea may be
mad, but as she tells her story to Maddie, the concerns she expresses are similar to those
Ephron expresses: “‘You don’t think he would be interested in someone like me? You
think he’s too good for me? Who would ever love dowdy little Althea?’” (300). It seems
that the answer to Breasts Scorned’s question is the answer Ephron feared: No one.
Bosom Buddies
The incongruity of a male body in women’s clothing has a long history of
provoking laughter in the U.S. public. Underlying this laughter is a profound anxiety
about gender and power relations: Why would a male, a member of the dominant gender
in a patriarchal society, willingly take on the signifiers of the subordinate, less powerful
gender? Some of the humor in these novels emerges out of that tradition. For cooperative
readers, these Queer Bosoms provide comic relief. Queer images in these novels are
generally of male bodies, and there are at least two.24
Marco, the receptionist at Maddie’s stepfather’s salon, is the Making It series
Girlfriend, a flamboyantly effeminate gay man. Girlfriend is a contemporary
manifestation of the “belle” contrastive type Baym identifies, a type that “lives for
excitement and the admiration of the ballroom” (28). Girlfriend thinks he is all five of
Queer Eye for the Straight Guy’s “savants.” Heroines emphasize his hyperfemininity as
part of the process of normalizing their own. For instance:
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Two hours later, Marco put the finishing touches on his club outfit of
black leather pants and a form-fitting purple tank top, with three strands of
silver chains around his neck. Capped off by a black beret. And I was
pretty sure he was wearing more makeup than either Dana or me.
(Halliday, Killer 88, emphasis original).

Girlfriend’s exaggerated effeminacy contrasts with both the heteronormative masculinity
of the hero(es) and the heroine’s normalized femininity.
The second Bosom Buddy, Lola, lives as a woman. For her, her body is not an
announcement of sexual preference, but rather, an identity performative. Lola’s male
body thus gets inscribed with the same paradoxical quill as the female body. For instance,
Maddie’s father, Lola, also works as a drag performer, and as an aging woman working
in entertainment, she knows her days are numbered. Indeed, this Lola finds herself in
danger as a consequence of an ill-conceived get-rich quick scheme, and so the mystery
storyline in Killer in High Heels emerges out of a Queer Bosom rather than a biologically
female body. Likewise, the murders in Evanovich’s Four to Score are occasioned by a
misreading of a Lure as genuinely queer.
Bait
Bait is a false identity, a disguise. Any character may momentarily fill this role
because it is only a role. Bait practices indicate that female characters, including the
heroines, recognize the paradoxical possibilities of their bodies. In her attention to the
meaning of costume, Bait acknowledges that her body may be read as either virtuous or
wicked. Sometimes she attempts to erase one possibility by using accessories, clothing,
and makeup to emphasize the other. This most often shapes up as dressing like “a whore”
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in order to elicit information or assistance from a man while on a case. In this situation,
the heroine always notes that she must augment her breasts to create cleavage.
Cross-dressing Bait such as Salvatore “Sally” Sweet find that the boundary
between performance and performative are not very clear. Sally began cross-dressing as
part of an onstage persona and wears a blend of men’s and women’s clothing offstage.
Sally is not gay. When he and Stephanie meet, Sally says that cross dressing
“is a fucking statement. This is fucking politically correct. See, this is the
ultimate sensitive man. This is taking my female shit out of the closet.
And like I’m saying, here it is, you know?”
“Unh huh.”
“And besides, I’m making a shitload of money. I caught the wave on
this one. This is the year of the fucking drag queen. We’re like a freaking
fucking invasion.[ . . .]Not only am I booked solid for every weekend for
two years . . . I get money stuffed in my goddamn pants. I got money I
don’t know what to do with.”
“So I guess you feel lucky to be gay.”
“Well, just between you and me, I’m not actually gay.”
“You’re a cross dresser.”
“Yeah. Something like that. I mean, I wouldn’t mind being sort of gay.
Like, I guess I could dance with a guy, but I’m not doing any of that butt
stuff.”
I nodded. I felt that way about men, too. (Evanovich, Eighteen 33)

125

Although Sally is not gay, his roommate is. When his roommate takes Sally’s workrelated gender-bending performance as a sexuality-constructing performative, like
Breasts Scorned, he is driven to murderous madness by unrequited love.
As Bait, Sally’s presence in the text accomplishes several things for cooperative
readers. Sally’s declaration that his drag performance is “taking my female shit out of the
closet” gestures toward an incongruity between what men think it means to be a woman
and women’s lived experiences. The incongruity between Sally’s false femininity and the
heroine’s deadpan expression of real femininity provides a space out of which laughter
can emerge.
The Heroine: B-Cup
One of the first and most important ways heroines establish their ordinariness for
cooperative readers is to mention the average size of their own “B-cup” breasts fairly
early on in the text, usually using the humor of self-deprecation to do so. B-Cup’s
repetitive expressions of breast-directed self-deprecation express concerns about breasts
shared by many readers, and so facilitate both reader identification with the heroine and
readers’ formation of discursive communities such as fan clubs, reading groups, and
online discussion boards. Establishing their own breasts as average is a necessary step in
normalizing their own sexual practices and values, which can encourage the kind of
connection with the heroine and other readers for which fans say they look (Radway). BCup’s average-sized breasts metonymically gesture toward the heteronormative female
sexuality and cisgendered self-presentation simultaneously constructed and authorized by
the heroine’s narrative identity performance.
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When readers cooperate with the text’s value systems, B-Cup’s receptive
heterosexuality is normalized in the social economy of the book. Thus, in the moral
economy of the text, embodied sexual identity becomes a marker for virtue. Repeated
representation of heterosexual desire as the animating sentiment as well as the sentiment
that can be called upon to quash other feelings shifts the logical grounds for the operation
of the sentimental moral from Shaftsbury’s universal maternal instinct to heteronormative
love. First-person narration permits heroines to describe the operation of their twentyfirst-century version of the sentimental moral sense. B-Cup most directly confronts the
bodily autonomy that frustrates her attempts to construct a coherent identity on the sexual
field. For example, she may experience a powerful sexual response to a man who is not
her primary partner. Or, her body may respond to her lover when her mind is angry with
him. B-Cup expresses this experience as a mind-body disconnect. Stephanie, for instance,
claims, “[T]he closest I’ve hand to an out of body experience was when Joe Morelli took
his mouth to me” (Evanovich, One 70). When she is sexually aroused, the heroine cannot
summon the correct “sentiment” or enough command of her reason to quench completely
her physical desire; nor can she immediately access her reason. This illustrates one
persistent threat to this heroine’s chance to construct a coherent adult female subjectivity.
Her body and her mind do not consistently cohere. The heroine must be able to reconcile
her body and her mind in order to construct a coherent adult identity that others
understand to be an expression of her authentic self.25
Sexual practices are, in post-millennial U.S. ideology, an indication of sexual
identity (Foucault, History Vol.1). B-Cup’s sexual practices are heteronormatively
receptive and monogamous. She rarely has sexual intercourse with anyone other than her
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significant other (although his identity may change by the end of a book). When she does,
she is riddled with guilt. For instance, Stephanie reflects about having had sex with
Ranger while on business in Mexico:
If I asked Ranger for help, I’d end up naked. It had some appeal, but truth
is, I was beginning to not like myself so much. The honest confusion of
loving two men was giving way to something that felt a little like
unhealthy self-indulgence. . . .Anyway, like it or not, I was presently
caught in the throes of self-examination, and I was coming up short.
(Evanovich, Explosive 136-137)

Readers find out shortly after this introspective moment that Stephanie she had a birthcontrol lapse during this encounter and fears she might be pregnant by Ranger.
Repeatedly linking guilt and undesirable consequences to a specific sexual practice
portrays that practice as in some way inappropriate or illicit. This motif is repeated in
different forms through books and across series. That the practice crosses the heroine’s
normal boundaries sets up her boundaries as those virtuous women do not cross.
B-Cups, like their nineteenth-century counterparts, refuse to accept “the equation
of female with permanent child” (17). Maddie has an epiphany when she realizes that she
has feared that her mother’s second wedding would mean a final end to her childhood:
“And I realized, as I stared at my mother’s ‘80’s blue eyeshadow and lipstained stained
[sic] teeth,. . . I was afraid things were going to change. That I’d lose my Keds-withfloral-Muumuus Mom to Fernando’s ultra-chic world” (Halliday, Spying 210).
Contemporary heroines, too, then, must make their own ways in the world. Their stories
are also of women who, through their own “intelligence, will, resourcefulness, and
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courage,” surmount the obstacles they encounter (22). Their reward is the “network of
surrogate kin” that “gradually defines itself around the heroine, [and] makes hers the
story, not only that of a self-made woman, but that of a self-made or surrogate family,”
just as it is for both the virgin martyrs and the heroines of nineteenth-century sentimental
literature (38). With the exception of the hero, B-Cup’s “self-made” family is composed
almost entirely of other “Signifying Breasts.”
The Chest
Romance normalizes the heroine’s cisgendered, heteronormative sexual
receptivity in part by the hero’s response to her. Heroes, or Chests, are not developed in
any more detail than heroines, and they, too, are interchangeable. Joe Morelli, Stephanie
Plum’s primary romantic partner, is a cop; so is Jack Ramirez, Maddie Springer’s love
interest and eventual husband. Both Morelli and Ramirez have tattoos. Each has a thin
knife scar bisecting an eyebrow. They both own homes. Both have strong ties to their
ethnic and family communities. They are both family men who are not yet fathers. In a
word, by the standards of sentimental domesticity, these Chests are highly desirable
domestic partners. They are “solid, ethical, generous, frank, hard-working, energetic”
men, who are also “admirer[s] and respecter[s] of women” (Baym 41). They like the
heroines “as much or more” than they lust for them (41). However, the characterological
conventions of popular romance require not just that The Chest be attractive; he must be
perfect. He must be smart, he must be handsome, and he must above all be sexually
irresistible to any sane woman—or perhaps, sexually irresistible enough to make a sane
woman crazy.
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As she tells the story of her early relationship with Morelli, two weeks after her
mother’s warning that the Morelli boys do “‘[t]errible things” to girls “when they get
them alone,” Stephanie agrees to play “a new game” with him in “his father’s
garage”(Evanovich, One 3). A “combination of terror and prurient curiosity that bordered
on awe” led the six-year-old, skirt-wearing Stephanie to play the “tunnel” to Morelli’s
“choo choo” (4). The next time the virginal Stephanie encounters Morelli, they are ten
years older. Morelli visits the bakery where she works after school and, she says, “bought
a chocolate-chip cannoli, told me he’d joined the navy, and charmed the pants off me
four minutes after closing, on the floor of Tasty Pastry, behind the case filled with
chocolate éclairs” (5). When she next sees Morelli three years later, Stephanie
deliberately runs him down with a Buick. As she stands over him to “assess the damage,”
Morelli looks up her skirt. Stephanie leaves him “sprawled on the pavement” and drives
away. Morelli is Stephanie’s Chest. That is not to say that there are no other men in Stephanie’s life.
There are. Nevertheless, the opening pages of the first book materially make Morelli’s
importance to Stephanie clear.
Home Is Where the Heart Is
The organization of the first three paragraphs of One for the Money physically
surrounds the domestic mileu, “the burg,” with Morelli. Stephanie begins, “There are
some men who enter a woman’s life and screw it up forever. Joseph Morelli did this to
me—not forever, but periodically” (Evanovich, One 3). These two sentences constitute
the entire first paragraph, and they immediately set a wryly humorous vernacular tone,
identify the hero, and hint at the heroine’s ambivalence about him.
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In the second paragraph, Stephanie describes “‘the burg,’” the “blue collar”
Trenton, New Jersey neighborhood where she and Morelli were born and still live. The
last sentence of this paragraph informs readers that the burg is “an okay place to raise a
family,” which leads immediately leads to, “When I was a kid I didn’t ordinarily play
with Joseph Morelli” (3). The next three pages chronicle Stephanie and Morelli’s
romantic and sexual history to the point when the story begins. By emphasizing the burg
as a domestic space and physically surrounding it with an account of Morelli’s entry into
and continuing presence in her life, she surrounds the domestic with a representative of
the law, which visually suggests that the burg is a safe place to raise children because
men like Morelli protect it, which further implies that he would be a good father.
However, Stephanie ends this section by telling us that the last time she saw Morelli, she
ran him over with a Buick. This indicates that, like Pamela’s, Stephanie’s “subjection”
could never be anything but disingenuous.
For Stephanie, the burg “is not a space but a system of human relations,” as the
syntax of the book’s first section demonstrates, and that system of human relations is
home (49). In Stephanie’s and Maddie’s lives, work and home are not separate spaces.
Maddie works from home and sends the shoes she designs to her employer. Stephanie
spends more time with her coworkers than with anyone else. The presence of Office
Mother in the office where she picks up her assignments, taken together with the silent
“father” in his own space, transforms manager and owner of the work space into mother
and father respectively.26 Out of this transformation, the bond office emerges as a hybrid
domestic-work space. This is not a space where “home values” have penetrated the world
or where heroines can retreat until the world intrudes (Baym 48). In this domestic office,
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only the relationships between and among the women are based in affection of any sort.
On the rare occasions the owner-father issues an order, the women obey only because
they need a paycheck, and the basis for the “ingenuous subjection” that ratifies male
authority shifts from conjugal love to wages. The complaint females whose “ingenuous
subjection” ratifies male domestic and political authority cannot be found in this space.
They would not survive. All that are left are hungry Boobs, defiant B-Cups, and cynical
Office Mothers, all of whose compliance is based on a need for wages rather than on love.
Their “subjection” is also, then, just as disingenuous as Pamela’s.
Stephanie and Maddie are post-millennial versions of Baym’s “flawed” heroine
who has become impoverished through no fault of her own (Baym 35). Like their
nineteenth-century predecessors, contemporary heroines and their creators may not agree
about “what is, and what is not, a flaw, but all agree that some sort of self-control is a
moral and practical necessity while total self-abnegation is suicide” (36). Like nineteenthcentury heroines, Stephanie and Maddie rescue themselves with support, advice, and
assistance from friends, coworkers, luck, coincidence, and, yes, their male partners.
Contemporary heroines continue to determine for themselves from whom they will
accept support and under what conditions they will accept it. Thus, they can receive
assistance when they need it and still maintain the self-reliant independence that is such a
crucial part of U.S. ideologies of adulthood—and the heroines’ ideas about it as well.
That their careers “marry” their domestic and work lives indicates that the heroines do
not experience the concerns supposedly specific to each sphere as separate and that both
are equally important to their identities. They have this in common with the virgin
martyrs, Pamela, and the heroines of nineteenth-century U.S. literature.
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If cooperative eighteenth-century readers could find in Pamela’s “ordinariness” an
indication of fictionality (Gallagher 34), cooperative readers in the twenty-first-century
can find in B-Cup’s averageness a space for identification and connection. Cooperative
readers can accept the heroine’s values and beliefs as their own, at least for the duration
of the reading transaction. Other readers, negotiating readers, will notice that their beliefs
or value systems conflict in places with those endorsed by the text, for instance, the
grounding of some of the humor in racist, sexist, or ageist ideologies. For resisting
readers, however, aware of the mutually intereffective relationship between cultural
representations of gender and the normalization of some gender-identity performative
possibilities at the expense of foreclosing others plays an important role in normalizing
the practices and values associated with that conception for all women. Thus, for resisting
readers, the genre’s normalization of a female subjectivity that remains disturbingly close
to the hegemonic ideal can undermine efforts to connect with heroines and accept her
value systems as their own. The revolutionary power of genre literature, then, may lie in
the moments of cognitive dissonance out of which negotiating and globally contrary
readings emerge.
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NOTES
1

My thanks to Dr. Evelyn Gajowski at UNLV for reminding me of this.
For instance, in Reading the Romance, Janice Radway suggests that women’s reasons for reading
romance are complex, but in her introduction to the 1991 edition of her study, Radway makes clear that she
sees romance readers as distinctly “other” women from whom she separates herself.
3
The hardcover dust jacket of Evanovich’s first Stephanie Plum book, One for the Money,
identifies it as “A Novel Introducing Stephanie Plum” in bold all-caps immediately above the title.
Subsequent paperbacks use all-caps placed below the title to announce that the book is “A Stephanie Plum
Novel.”
4
Fanon denotes the fictional universe created by fans to supplement the details provided by
writers and authors (“Fanon”).
5
The heroines I consider are single, white, heterosexual, and thirty or younger. Although there are
several series with lesbian protagonists and others whose heroines are women of color, the scope of this
project proscribes their inclusion here.
6
Although the virgin saint’s antagonist is usually a legally sanctioned male authority figure and
the romantic mystery’s attackers are criminals, these villains are not so different when viewed from the
heroines’ perspectives. Pagans and criminals both operate outside the laws that the heroines of their
respective genres recognize as legitimate.
7
Negotiating readers may notice the power disparity implicit in these naming practices, but they
can accept them as culturally common forms of endearment and move on. Resisting readers are most likely
to notice that the names the men use to address the women designate infants, femininity, and food and so to
reject the text.
8
Significantly, both heroines’ love interests are law enforcement officers.
9
Stephanie is thirty.
10
I want to emphasize that it is not my intention to claim that this is the only legitimate reading
available to cooperative readers or to any other sort of readers, for that matter. I do, however, want to detail
one possible system of cultural associations by which specific meanings’ attachment to particular
commodities is normalized for cooperative readers and whose normalization is simultaneously presupposed
by the author’s choice to use it so.
11
The mother of the eponymous character on the CBS sitcom, Everyone Loves Raymond. Marie is
played by Doris Roberts.
12
In fact, in chick lit, this tendency may be the contemporary manifestation of Poe’s “Imp of
Perversity”!
13
Phyllis Diller and Joan Rivers may best exemplify the self-deprecating female persona among
U.S. women comics.
14
Significantly, the subject of much of Phyllis Diller’s self-deprecatory humor was her own flat
chest. My thanks to Joseph B. McCullough for reminding me of this.
15
I do not mean to say that writers or readers consciously think about breasts in this way. But I do
think that the repetition of these tropes has normalized them so that have become part of the conventional
language of the genre and are among the discourses out of which gender itself emerges.
16
I had not looked at Stillman and Beatts’ Titters for some time when I wrote this section. When I
revisited it, I realized that they had used vernacular synonyms for breasts—Knockers, Melons, Jugs,
Hooters, Bongos, Headlights, and Boobs—as the titles of the book’s sections. I now regard my taxonomy
as an homage to their creativity.
17
The narrator of Marietta Holley’s My Opinions and Betsey Bobbet’s and a multitude of other
books from 1872 until 1914. Holley was frequently compared to Twain.
18
Designer shoes.
19
Eventually, Lula also becomes a bounty hunter (Evanovich, Eleven).
20
The woman who encourages Hazel Morse to allow men to support her in “Big Blond.”
2
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21

In more hardboiled incarnations, such as Sue Grafton’s “alphabet” series, the heroine is an
orphan, which was also the most “frequent” way nineteenth-century authors isolated the child-heroine
(Baym 35).
22
Indeed, men’s inherent untrustworthiness is a general theme in the novels.
23
These discourses include the images of motherhood discussed in chapter three but are not
exhausted by them.
24
Maddie’s sister Valerie’s brief foray into lesbianism is not queer. She has some terrible
experiences with men and decides to try to be a lesbian for a while (Evanovich, Seven 128). She enacts the
Bait “Signifying Breast” type during this interlude, but she realizes she is not a lesbian as soon as she kisses
another woman.
25
This, as Michael Bell shows in Sentimentalism, Ethics, and the Culture of Feeling, is the
contemporary expression of the sentimental moral sense. See especially chapters six and seven.
26
Further complicating matters, Stephanie and Vinnie are cousins.
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CONCLUSIONS:
READING THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
Do the texts treated in this study reiterate the overplot Baym identified? If the
following questions can be answered affirmatively, then, yes, they do. Are the heroines
all isolated and lacking social supports through no fault of their own? (Baym, Women’s
11; 37). Do obstacles in their paths function as opportunities for them to reveal or
develop the qualities of character of fully adult, fully female human beings that others
cannot see or that they lack? (22-50). If so, do they surmount the barriers? What kind of
assistance do they receive and from whom? (38). How do they define their domestic
networks? (38) From whom do they derive their emotional support? (39). Are their
identity performances successful? When they claim the names that identify who they
really are, do others acknowledge those names as rightfully theirs? That is, do they “wrest
. . . respect and recognition from a hostile or indifferent world”? (21). Are these texts all
stories of a heroine’s or persona’s “‘trials and triumph”? (22). Do their identity
performances and triumphs problematize female submission? (xxxix)?
The heroines and personae are all isolated and lacking social support in some
way. The saints’ isolation stems from their unshared faith, Pamela’s from her parents’
straitened economic circumstances. The Harried Homemakers’ isolation is psychic as
well as physical and emerges out of discursive and material systems that are beyond their
control. These systems include, but are not limited to, gender, race, and class. Stephanie
had (wrongly) counted on her ex-husband for material support; Maddie lives surrounded
by people not of her economic circumstances. Moreover, Stephanie and Maddie both live
alone, and their sleuthing occasionally requires that they deceive those to whom they are
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closest. All of the characters, then, experience emotional isolation and loneliness in
addition to their physical separation from others.
The virgin saints and Pamela are “flawless heroines” and have no lessons to learn
(Baym Women’s 17). The other characters all encounter “difficulties not of their own
making” that provide them with opportunities to develop the qualities of character they
lack (17). All encounter assistance from similar sources, and the people who help them
become part of their self-defined domestic network. The virgins and Pamela receive aid
from chaste men, kindly women, and God. The Homemakers’ assistance comes from the
other women in their suburban communities and from readers who correspond with their
creators. The circles from which Stephanie and Maddie’s draw aid not only encompass
their families and friends, but their coworkers and the heroes as well. In the end, the
heroines’ and personae’s “final ‘domesticity’ is defined as the relations with all these
adults, rather than as child-bearing or child-rearing” (38). Like the sentimental heroines
Baym considers, they understand that “although children may be necessary for a
woman’s happiness, they are not necessary for her identity—and neither is a husband”
(38). Their female friends are more important than men to the heroine’s and personae’s
emotional lives (39).
The heroines of American women’s contemporary romantic mystery series are
ambivalent about marriage; the Harried Homemakers, like the virgin saints, are already
married. Nevertheless, all of these characters understand that “marriage cannot and
should not be the goal toward which women direct themselves” (39). While Pamela
positively desires marriage, her inability to ingenuously comply with her husband’s rules
of conduct indicates her ambivalence about marriage as hegemony constructs it. Even
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Maddie, who marries at the end of the Making It series, makes it clear that her identity as
a sleuth is more important to her than marriage; when she must choose between planning
her wedding and uncovering a murderer, she turns the wedding planner over to her
friends Dana and Marco (Halliday, Mayhem 93).
By the time their tales are told each heroine or persona has achieved her goal and
successfully performed an adult female identity of her own design in such a way that
others accept it as the person she really is. Stephanie has been able to make other
characters recognize her as an autonomous adult female as she has gained job skills and
greater control over her emotions over the course of the series. The virgins, Pamela, the
Harried Homemakers, and Maddie receive direct acknowledgement of the names they
claim for themselves from other characters and/or readers. Acknowledgment of the
identity as correctly expressing who the character is ratifies the identity she claims. (21).
In the end, the “individual authors are distinguishable largely by the plot elements they
select from the common repertory” of generic and formulaic convention and “by the
varieties of setting and incident with which they embellish the basic tale” (12). The
heroines’ and personae’s final triumphs problematize female submission by revealing the
disingenuousness of the characters’ subjection.
However, there is another pattern here, one that Baym does not address, and it
centers on the most intransigent obstacle to identity construction the characters face.
These literatures also share a particular configuration of the female body, one that shapes
it as a paradoxical sign that always already signifies both A and ~A.1 The virgins and
Pamela’s bodies simultaneously signify virtue and corruption, but they insist as being
recognized as what they already are—virtuous women. They succeed in naming
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themselves when those who have been misreading them acknowledge their true identities.
On a cooperative interpretation, the virgins and Pamela succeed in successfully
performing identities that express who they “really are,” and they are rewarded with
marriage to the groom of their choice. My reading of Pamela in chapter two negotiates
between and among eighteenth- and twenty-first-century material and discursive systems
of gender and class. This negotiating reading enables me to interrogate the normalization
of marriage as a reward for a virtuous heroine. Hence, despite formal differences among
them, sacred biography, Pamela, and American women’s domestic humor and popular
comic mystery romance all participate in the same overplot that Baym attributes to
nineteenth-century American women’s sentimental fiction.
However, there is another interpretive possibility available, one that interrogates
the source of the names the virgin martyrs and Pamela claim. According to this
interpretation, neither the saints nor Pamela succeed in constructing identity at all, for
while others acknowledge the identities they claim, they themselves are not the authors of
those identities. In other words, neither the saints nor Pamela names herself, for while
they claim Virtue as their identities, men have constructed and imposed on women the
female virtue they claim. The men who define the virtuous womanhoods these heroines
perform have constructed their female bodies as the fields on which men fight political
battles.2 For example, if the interpretation of Pamela in chapter two is tenable,
Richardson has inscribed the struggle between monarchy and liberal democracy on
Pamela’s body, and Pamela has “chosen” his side and claimed its name as her own.
Here, my interpretation rejects hegemony’s construction of the terms of the
conflict and reads the text against itself. Thus, my reading of sacred biography and
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Pamela exemplifies what Judith Fetterley calls “resistant reading” (13) and Stuart Hall
calls “oppositional” reading (34).
The struggle to construct identity is more complicated for Harried Homemakers
and B-Cups. Hegemony has split the Harried Homemaker into Angel and Manager. For
the persona, Angel and Manager are one, but others have defined the identities toward
which these names point. Nor does the hybrid Harried Homemaker fully express her
identity. To name herself, therefore, the Harried Homemaker must reconfigure her
maternal body so that others can see that while hot meals, clean clothes, and the like may
express maternal love, they also contain domestic labor. The identity she constructs must
also incorporate the dreams, aspirations, desires, and fears of the Woman Within. To
make her “authentic self” visible, she must join the three identity possibilities together
into a coherent whole and make it intelligible to others. Furthermore, someone must
acknowledge both identities—Harried Homemaker and Woman Within—as rightfully
belonging to her and correctly expressing who she is. The Harried Homemaker’s
problem is that the hegemonic female body always already paradoxically signifies some
form of virtue and its opposite. Since hegemony has in effect sanctified the maternal
female body, the Woman Within must gesture toward some female vice. The final barrier
to the Harried Homemaker’s self-naming, therefore, is hegemony’s construction of the
Woman Within as ~A, that is, as not-virtuous, as selfishness incarnated (Bombeck 22).
Thus, successful identity performance for domestic humorists’ narrative personae
necessitates a re-visioning of the Woman Within as Virtue. In a surprisingly Brechtian
move, the Harried Homemaker turns to the audience for ratification of her selfconstructed identity. The personae’s turn from hegemony to their female readership for
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identity endorsement enacts a truly feminist act of self-naming that refuses hegemony’s
“languages and images” as inadequate to express female identity (Rich, “When We
Dead” 35). When cooperative readers accept the persona as a reliable narrator and the
source of the narrative, they have endorsed her identity performance, and she has
achieved her goal. More than that, though, she has gotten readers to agree to her
reconfiguration of the maternal female body, at least for the duration of the reading
transaction. Herein lays a truly subversive possibility.
I said in the introduction that people bring their non-literary meaning-making
experiences to literary interpretation. But the converse is also true. People bring their
literary meaning-making experiences with them to interpretive events in other contexts.
Repeated encounters with challenges to hegemonic gender discourses can normalize
resistance to hegemony’s efforts to construct women according to its own emergent
needs, just as repeated encounters with hegemonic discourses normalize and render them
invisible. Hence, repeated images of women’s refusal to accept the identities hegemony
assigns them can normalize that resistance. And, repeated images of women’s refusal to
accept the identities that social critics and activists assign them can normalize that
resistance, too.
Unfortunately, normalizing resistance can also facilitate hegemony’s cooptation
of the particular forms resistance takes. If a particular expression or form of resistance is
repeatedly associated with female characters, it can seem to be seen as a “natural”
feminine characteristic. For example, the heroines of comic mystery romance series
repeatedly resist others’ attempts to convince them to be like “normal girls” (Halliday,
Killer 202). One way they resist being like “normal” girls is to sleuth. One way they do
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not resist being like “normal” girls is to deviate from the minimal sexual standard of
female serial monogamy without consequences. These characteristics—unconventional
employment and serial monogamy—are hegemonic constructions of femininity within
the textual world of the comic romance mystery series. Heroines and personae who do
not conform to these generic standards risk rejection by readers.
Narrative personae and first-person heroines try to ensure that readers of
American women’s literature read cooperatively enough either to agree to the heroine or
persona’s beliefs and values or to elide those they do not share at least for the duration of
the literary transaction. All of the literatures treated in this text can be read for their
didactic claims. However, the degree of cooperation readers bring to a text influences,
and perhaps in some cases, overdetermines, whether readers elide, negotiate, or resist the
different normative claims texts make. Some readers, those who share the unstated values
and beliefs that ground a character’s justifications for and explanations of her choices and
actions, for instance, are unlikely to challenge those values and beliefs. The subjects of
Janice Radway’s study, Reading the Romance, are such readers. Indeed, these women
cite characters whose behavior transgresses the (serially) monogamous, heteronormative,
cisgendered femininity generally endorsed in formulaic romance as the major reason they
put a book down without finishing it (105). Their refusal of such texts expresses their
reluctance to cooperate with representations of feminine resistance other than those
conventionally authorized by the genre or mode. For them, other forms of resistance to
hegemonic feminity—guilt-free non-monogamy, for example—are unnatural (88). For
these readers, particular expressions of opposition constitute part of what it means to be a
normal woman. Romance readers’ disdain for “deviant” rebellion brings to light
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American women’s popular literature’s potential for complicity in limiting challenges to
the sex/gender status quo. However, that potential for complicity is not always realized
for all readers.
Some readers will experience cognitive dissonance consequent upon a clash
between the values and beliefs that underlie their personal normative frame and those
underlying the protagonist’s. Such readers can accept, negotiate, or resist the values or
beliefs that clash with their own.3 Globally contrary readings like Spacks’ and Friedan’s
are based in an absence of shared values and beliefs and instantiate successful resistant
reading. Nancy Walker’s readings of American women’s domestic humor and its critics
discussed in chapter three resist globally contrary readings like Spacks’ and Friedan’s.
Moreover, they simultaneously resist and reveal feminism’s potential for constructing its
own hegemonic representations of the virtuous Liberated Woman.4 For example, Walker
resists hegemony’s construction of normalized femininity by cooperating with the textual
manifestations of the conventions of literary domestic humor. Walker’s reading
demonstrates the complexity and value of reading through practices that are fluid,
contingent, overdetermined, and mutually intereffective. Her critique of the devaluation
of domestic labor implicit in Spacks’ and Friedan’s criticism negotiates feminism’s
insights about the social and economic functions of women’s unpaid domestic labor and
humor’s ability to draw attention to incongruities. Calling attention to incongruities
between reality and representation is one of the most important tools upon which
challenges to the status quo rely. Indeed, because literary humor and devices such as the
contrastive trope seek to elicit readerly recognition of incongruity, they can be especially
productive avenues for revolutionary interpretive practice.
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Finally, some of my readings may invite a criticism commonly leveled at feminist
interpretation—that it commits the presentist fallacy and anachronistically reads texts
written before modern feminism. However, as we have seen, readers are situated and
incapable of true objectivity, reading practices are situated and overdetermined, and
denotation is historically contingent. Thus, contemporary American readers can no more
inhabit a medieval mind than the Romantic Noble Savage can return to the pre-social
state of nature after society emerges. Once texts are sufficiently removed from one’s own
epistemological, discursive, and material frames, one can at best speculate about what
they may have meant to their original audiences. Hence, there is always at least a trace of
presentism in criticism that takes as its subject literatures produced before readers’
lifetimes. This suggests that most literary criticism in fact commits the “presentist
fallacy,” which is then no fallacy at all. However, the impossibility of interpretive
certainty does not mean that all speculations are equal. Like that of any other inductive
claim, the strength of a speculative claim depends on the amount and quality of the
supporting evidence. In part, chapter two represents an attempt to provide enough
supporting evidence of sufficient quality to legitimate the frame I argue was available to
Christian medieval writers, readers, and auditors.
There is value in listening to what the texts of the past say to us in the here and
now, perhaps especially for social activists who are interested in literature’s revolutionary
possibilities. As Adrienne Rich says, “Re-vision—the act of looking back, of seeing with
fresh eyes, of entering an old text from a new critical direction—is for women more than
a chapter in our cultural history: it is an act of survival” (“When We Dead” 35).
Attending to what a literary text of another time or place says to us as contemporary
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readers in our own vocabularies can reveal “how we live, how we have been living, how
we have been led to imagine ourselves, how our language has trapped as well as liberated
us, how the very act of naming has been till now a male prerogative, and how we can
begin to see and name—and therefore live—afresh” (35). Presentist readings can
illuminate these things in ways that more traditionally cooperative readings might
precisely, for cooperative readings offer fewer moments of cognitive dissonance out of
subversive possibilities arise. My analyses of sacred biography and Pamela represent, I
think, feminist readings with presentist nuances. The “anachronistic” feminism of my
analytic frame permits me to place into tension texts produced across a span of almost
two millennia and to discern in them some commonalities of plot, characterological
convention, and hegemonic constructions of female virtue and vice. My “anachronistic”
use of some of American feminism’s insights has illuminated contemporary American
women’s popular literature’s resistance to and implication in constructing sex/gender and
class as hegemonic systems of normalized discursive and material practices. If reading
the texts of the past with the tools of the present can illuminate some of the discursive
threads that bind together hegemonic ideologies of sex/gender and class, perhaps they can
help us to creatively imagine ways to untie those Gordian knots oppression and create a
socially just future.
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NOTES
1

A and not-A.
My interpretation of Pamela operates on this level as well as others. One might interpret the
virgin saints as representing nascent Christianity, a reasonable interpretation idea given the ubiquity of
representations of the Church as the Bride of Christ. On this reading, the pagans who torment them might
stand in for political forces that oppressed Christians qua Christians.
3
I do not mean to imply that decisions about how to approach a text are always the result of a
conscious process, but neither do I mean to imply they never are.
4
Ti-Grace Atkinson’s declaration that “[f]eminism is the theory; lesbianism is the practice,” for
instance (XX).
2
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